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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Cultivation of the Intellect in Education: 
The Role of Cultural Lenses 
 
 
by 
 
Arif Amlani 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Education 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2016 
 
Professor Michael H. Seltzer,  Co-Chair 
Professor Theodore M. Porter,  Co-Chair 
 
 The intellect is beset with numerous problems and shortcomings some of which 
have been historically noted by Plato, Bacon, Locke and others. A particularly 
challenging problem in reasoning, is the problem of (colored) ‘lenses’ whose source is 
culture, broadly construed. While the vital role of culture in reasoning may have been 
alluded to by philosophers, it has not been closely analyzed or theorized. Through two 
empirical case studies drawn from the field of educational anthropology, I demonstrate 
how cultural lenses block reasoning altogether or severely constrain it. This poses a 
particular challenge for the cultivation of the intellect in education—a goal universally 
advocated by historical and contemporary philosophers of education. 
  iii 
 Current educational programs aiming towards the cultivation of the intellect, 
namely, through critical thinking and through an initiation into the disciplines, while 
they have their merits in helping students think more effectively, are insufficient in 
helping students to overcome the barrier of lenses (as theorized herein). And they fail 
because current educational programs focus on argument identification and evaluation. 
But problems of reason are not limited to problems of argument and reason is not 
limited to argument evaluation. Hence, what is required is a philosophy of education 
for the full cultivation of the intellect based on a broader conception of reason; a 
conception of reason which I demonstrate through empirical case studies. 
 To achieve the goal of the fuller cultivation of the intellect in education, I indicate 
a pedagogical direction for a possible educational program. I also recommend a focused 
research program in (i) the philosophical study of reason in a broader sense than just 
evaluation of arguments, (ii) a multidisciplinary study of various problems facing 
reason and (iii) an empirical study of educational methods for overcoming problems of 
reason. The implications of the present work are not just limited to students’ reasonings 
but have relevance to teachers’ and policy makers’ reasonings and indeed to the 
reasonings of philosophers of education as well. 
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It’s no easy task—indeed it’s very difficult—to realize that in every soul there is an 
instrument that is purified and rekindled by such subjects [e.g. arithmetic, geometry] 
when it has been blinded and destroyed by other ways of life, an instrument that it is 
more important to preserve than ten thousand eyes, since only with it can the truth be 
seen.  
Plato, The Republic 
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Introduction 
 
 One of the most important, perennial questions facing education is the 
cultivation of the intellect. In this dissertation, I identify one major barrier in reasoning, 
show the limitations of current educational programs in overcoming it and chart a 
research direction forward for the fuller cultivation of the intellect in education. In 
Chapter 1, I present numerous problems of reason through the eyes of philosophers of 
education and philosophers more generally. Here, I show that though we might be 
rational creatures there are numerous problems with the intellect many of which have 
been noted by philosophers. I start with problems noted by twentieth century 
philosophers of education beginning with John Dewey then present problems noted by 
Plato, Bacon and Locke. These problems are barriers and impediments in reasoning and 
for achieving rationality. At the same time, philosophers over the ages and 
contemporary philosophers of education, for the most part, are united in suggesting 
that the cultivation of reason and rationality should be an aim of education. I present 
this consensus from Plato till the present. 
 In Chapter 2, I present and critically analyze three contemporary and influential 
programs for the cultivation of the intellect in education, namely: i. through critical 
thinking as proposed by Paul Ennis, ii) through ‘fair-minded’ critical thinking as 
proposed by Richard Paul and iii) through an initiation into the disciplines as proposed 
by Israel Scheffler and others. In this chapter, I present their goals for the cultivation of 
the intellect and their suggested educational programs for achieving them. I then 
critically review these programs for their sufficiency in achieving the overall goal of the 
cultivation of the intellect in education. Each program has its merits. However, on the 
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basis of a broader view of reason argued by Morteza, I show how they all share a much 
too narrow conception of reason—one tied to evaluation of argument, reasons and 
principles. Also on the basis of this broader view, I show how problems of reason are 
not limited to problems of argument evaluation. Some (major) problems are to be found 
in the reasoner (which are distinct from problems of argument) many of which are 
intractable and not overcome by exercises in argument identification and evaluation. 
One such is the problem of colored “lenses” that one wears. 
 In Chapter 3, through a comparative study of education in different cultures, I 
demonstrate this problem of colored lenses in the reasoner while exemplifying the 
broader view of reason. Though the vital role of culture in reasoning may have been 
alluded to by philosophers, it has not been closely analyzed or theorized. I show how 
cultural lenses in the form of values and beliefs, acquired through upbringing and 
acculturation, though opening vistas, may, at-times, block reasoning altogether or 
severely limit it. I demonstrate this through a discussion and analysis of two empirical 
case studies drawn from the field of educational anthropology. I begin with an 
exploration of the lenses of “effort” vs. lenses of “ability” and reasoning or its lack of 
based on these lenses in the context of discussions of achievement in mathematics in the 
US, China and Japan as presented in the work of Stevenson and Stigler.  
 For my second case study, I explore various culturally based lenses and their 
effect on reasonings on preschool ideals and practices in Japan, US and China as 
documented in Tobin et al.’s Preschool in Three Cultures. Here, I explore, for example, 
reasonings and lenses surrounding causes of misbehavior in a classroom, fighting in 
young children, notions of ideal class size and notions regarding aims of preschools. 
These lenses, I argue, while they highlight certain elements, also influence, constrain 
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and limit reasoning. Current educational programs aiming towards the cultivation of 
reason and rationality (through critical thinking skills and through the disciplines), 
while they have their merits in helping students think more effectively, are insufficient in 
helping students to overcome the barrier of lenses as described above. And they fail 
because current educational programs focus on argument evaluation. Hence, what is 
required, I argue, is a more adequate program for the cultivation of reason in 
education— one that also enables students to transcend the sometimes negative 
interferences of colored lenses on their reasoning so that their own reasonings can 
flourish and where this program is undergirded by a philosophy of education that 
embraces a broader view of reason and its uses. 
 To achieve this goal of a more adequate program for the cultivation of the 
intellect in education, in the last chapter of the dissertation, I recommend a multi-front 
research agenda in i) the philosophical study of reason in a broader sense than just 
evaluation of arguments, ii) a multidisciplinary study of various problems facing 
reason, and iii) an empirical study of educational methods for overcoming problems of 
reason. The implications of the present work with respect to its analysis and 
recommendations are not limited to students’ reasonings. The problem of lenses also 
affects teachers and educational policy makers as their reasonings surrounding their 
teaching and policy making can often be under the grips of colored lenses. At their most 
influential level, lenses affect entire philosophies of education, which are often 
promoted not from a place of careful consideration and rationalization but from 
tradition and cultural affinities but which determine the course of the education of 
entire nations. The remedy lies in the cultivation of the intellect in education based on a 
broader view of reason. 
  4 
Chapter 1 
Problems of the Intellect,  
Goals for the Intellect in Education 
 
 In this chapter, I enquire into and present possible problems of the intellect such 
that an education of the intellect becomes necessary. I begin this inquiry through the 
eyes of philosophers of education, starting with John Dewey, the first philosopher of 
education of the modern era in the Western world, and continue with contemporary 
philosophers of education. Then, noting that historical philosophers have also 
documented numerous problems of the intellect, I present these as they are found in 
Plato, Francis Bacon and John Locke. 
 In tandem with perceived problems of the intellect, there has been and continues 
to be consensus in philosophy and philosophy of education that the cultivation of the 
intellect should form a major goal of education. I present this consensus in the next 
section of the chapter. In the last section, I highlight an observation made in the course 
of my inquiry into problems of the intellect and goals for education namely, that 
philosophers over the centuries have presented multiple, divergent and sometimes 
contradictory conceptions of reason, rationality and the intellect. This poses a potential 
problem in philosophy of education in that very different things are said to be cultivated in 
calls for the cultivation of reason and rationality in education—a situation which calls 
for a fresh philosophical study of reason in its own right. 
Problems of the intellect 
 Though the intellect is prized, its landscape is uneven filled with rifts, cracks and 
dark valleys. Philosophers of education, over the years, have commented on this 
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uneven and rocky landscape. John Dewey, in his How We Think, acutely noted several 
endemic problems in human thinking and reasoning.1  On the one hand, Dewey 
remarks that the power of thought “frees us from servile subjection to instinct, appetite, 
and routine.” On the other hand, this same power brings with it possibilities of “error 
and mistake.” In raising us above the brute, Dewey continues, “it opens the possibilities 
of failures to which the animal, limited to instinct, cannot sink.” Up to a certain limit, 
natural and social conditions enforce a certain discipline of thought: “The burnt child 
dreads the fire; a painful consequence emphasizes the need of correct inference much 
more than would learned discourses on the properties of heat. Social conditions also 
put a premium on correct inference in matters where action based on valid thought is 
socially important.” However, “[w]hen there is no direct appreciable reaction of the 
inference upon the security and prosperity of life, there are no natural checks to the 
acceptance of wrong beliefs.” Hence “[c]onclusions may be accepted merely because the 
suggestions are vivid and interesting, while a large accumulation of dependable data 
may fail to suggest a proper conclusion because of opposition from existing customs.”  
 Additionally, as human beings, we are beset with a “’primitive credulity,’ a 
natural tendency to believe anything that is suggested unless there is overpowering 
evidence to the contrary.” 2 The history of science shows that when a wrong theory gets 
                                                
1  John Dewey, How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1933). 
2  We seem to have this ‘primitive credulity’ it seems, because in Dewey’s model, superstition is as 
natural as science:  
 
As to the mere function of suggestion, there is no difference between the power of a column of 
mercury to portent rain and that of the entrails of an animal or the flight of birds to foretell the 
fortunes of war. For all anybody can tell in advance, the spilling of salt is as likely to import bad luck 
as the bite of the mosquito to import malaria. Only systematic regulation of the conditions under 
which observations are made and severe discipline of the habits of entertaining suggestions can 
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established, such as the Ptolemaic theory of the solar system, for example, “men will 
expend ingenuity of thought in buttressing it with additional errors rather than 
surrender it and start in a new direction.”3  
 Dewey also looks to the history of philosophy in documenting problems in 
thinking. He briefly mentions, for example, Francis Bacon’s ‘idols’ which allure the 
mind into false paths: idols of the tribe which have their source in human nature, idols of 
the market place which come from social intercourse and language, idols of the cave which 
have their origins in the specific constitutions of individuals and idols of the theatre 
which have their sources in fashion and the general current of a period. Dewey 
mentions these ‘idols of the mind’ very briefly and, in my view, does not quite see their 
enormous implications. In Bacon’s own extensive description of them, their significance 
for reasoning is clear. Hence, in the historical survey in the next section of this chapter, I 
present Bacon’s own descriptions as they are found in the original, in his Novum 
Organum. 
 In presenting further problems of the intellect,4 Dewey quotes extensively from 
John Locke and presents Locke’s three classes of men and their attendant errors: “[T]he 
first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think according to the example of 
others . . . (the second) is those who put passion in the place of reason . . . the third sort 
is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but . . . have not a full view of all 
                                                
secure a decision that one type of belief is vicious and the other sound. ‘Suggestion’ is a key word in 
Dewey and forms an integral feature of his ‘phases of thinking.’ Ibid., 24. 
3 Ibid., 23-24. 
4 Dewey’s preferred terminology for problems of the intellect is ‘causes of bad thinking’ and ‘ways in 
thought goes wrong.’ See Dewey, How We Think, 25-26. 
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that relates to the question . . . They converse but with one sort of men, they read but 
one sort of books, they will not come in the hearing but of one sort of notions.” I present 
these problems in more detail as they are found in Locke’s Of the Conduct of the 
Understanding in the next section of this chapter. Dewey concludes his discussion of 
problems of thought by remarking: 
Any observant person can note any day, both in himself and in others, the tendency to 
believe that which is in harmony with desire. We take that to be true which we should like 
to have so, and ideas that go contrary to our hopes and wishes have difficulty in getting 
lodgment. We all jump to conclusions; we fail to examine and test out ideas because of our 
personal attitudes. When we generalize, we tend to make sweeping assertions; that is, from 
one or only a few facts we make a generalization covering a wide field.5 
 Dewey’s educational philosophical work in the US, which continued well into 
the forties, may have inspired the rise of philosophy of education in Britain beginning 
in the late forties, when the first Chair of Philosophy of Education was established at the 
University of London.6 By the mid-sixties, philosophy of education in Britain had 
reached maturity in the works of R. S. Peters and Paul Hirst, for instance. Though 
emphasizing the development of reason, this was a philosophy of education having 
roots in very different soil.7 Hence, very different kinds of problems of reason and 
                                                
5 Ibid., 28. 
6 Louis Arnaud Reid, “Reviewed Work: Education as Initiation by R. S. Peters,” British Journal of 
Educational Studies 13, no. 2 (1965): 192. The first chair was Louis Arnaud Reid from 1947-1962 and the 
second chair was Richard S. Peters. According to Reid, the Chair of Philosophy of Education, when 
established just after the war, was a ‘pioneer in the Commonwealth.’ 
7 Dearden’s, Hirst’s and Peters’ major edited volume, in three parts, is titled Education and the Development 
of Reason. In the introduction to the volume, Hirst makes the emphasis on reason clear:  
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rationality were noted. R. S. Peters, as the second holder of the Chair of Philosophy of 
Education at the University of London, argued that very young children lack minds and 
hence reason: “No man is born with a mind; for the development of mind marks a 
series of individual and racial achievements.” Though a child has awareness, Peters 
continues, it is not differentiated and all modes of consciousness develop in tandem 
with the pointing out of paradigm objects as children grow. Mind is an achievement in 
human development and is a “product of initiation into public traditions enshrined in a 
public language, which it took remote ancestors centuries to develop.” Hence, 
“[children] start off in the position of the barbarian outside of the gates. The problem is 
to get them inside the citadel of civilization so that they will understand and love what 
they see when they get there.”8 Of particular note here is the view that no one is born 
with a mind and hence no one is born with reason and rationality. 
 In the United States, a more contemporary philosopher of education, Richard 
Paul, acutely notes different kinds of problems more in line with Dewey and with a hint 
of Bacon and Locke: “Everyone thinks; it is our nature to do so. But much of our 
thinking, left to itself, is biased, distorted, partial, uninformed, or down-right 
prejudiced.”9 Paul categorizes these problems into problems of ‘egocentric thinking’ 
                                                
The possibility of a positive formulation of educational aims grounded in the development of reason 
is in fact implicit, if not explicit, throughout the papers of this section . . . Part two of this volume . . . 
is devoted to papers concerned with examining the concept of reason . . . In the final section of the 
book is collected a small number of papers in which certain aspects of ‘the development of reason’ 
become central to the characterization of educational aims. 
Paul Hirst, “Introduction,” in Education and the Development of Reason, eds. Robert F. Dearden, Paul H. 
Hirst and Richard S. Peters (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1972), xii. 
8 Richard S. Peters, “Education as Initiation,” in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. Reginald D. 
Archambault (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 102-3, 107. 
9 Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools, 7th ed. 
(Tomales: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2014), 2. 
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and ‘sociocentric thinking.’ Egocentric problems stem from “the unfortunate fact that 
humans do not naturally consider the rights and needs of others. We do not naturally 
appreciate the point of view of others nor the limitations in our own point of view.” 
And the problem of sociocentric thinking results from the fact that “[m]ost people do 
not understand the degree to which they have uncritically internalized the dominant 
prejudices of their society or culture. Sociologists and anthropologists identify this as 
the state of being ‘culture bound.’” This includes “the uncritical tendency to place one’s 
culture, nation, religion above all others.”10 
 In reviewing recent literature in philosophy of education, I did not find further 
documentation of problems of reason and this, despite calls for the cultivation of reason 
and rationality in education. For example, Paul Ennis makes a strong case for the 
teaching of critical thinking in schools based on the value of critical thinking: “Critical 
thinking is reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do . . . I 
think that reasonable and reflective thinking focused on what to believe or do should be 
a very important part of our personal, civic, and vocational lives, and should receive 
attention in our educational system.”11 Most puzzling is his statement in his critical 
thinking textbook that “everybody is already at least somewhat proficient at critical 
thinking.”12 Then why a textbook in critical thinking? Israel Scheffler makes an earnest 
case for the cultivation of rationality in students (building on R. S. Peters’ notion of 
                                                
10 Ibid., 21-22. 
11 Robert Ennis, “Critical Thinking: Reflection and Perspective Part 1,” Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the 
Disciplines 26, no. 1 (2011): 10. 
12  Robert H. Ennis, Critical Thinking (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996), xviii. 
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education mentioned earlier) arguing for its desirability but does not himself mention 
any issues with students’ rationality.13 Mathew Lipman makes an elaborate case for 
teaching philosophy in schools as a way of improving thinking and reasoning: “[T]he 
most important thing we can do for children is teach them to think well . . .This means 
giving students practice in reasoning, through classroom discussion involving concepts 
that reach across all the disciplines rather than only those that are specialized within 
each subject. Only through philosophy can this be done effectively.”14 But he does not 
cite any studies which demonstrate issues with thinking and only casually mentions 
that “most elementary and secondary school children get only about three out of four 
logical problems right.”15  
 This state of affairs is perplexing. Shouldn’t the rationale for a philosophy of 
education surrounding reason be based not just on the desirability of reason, rationality, 
and critical thinking but also on significant problems students face in thinking and 
reasoning? It is desirable to have independent thinkers. Will children not become 
independent thinkers, say from upbringing, enculturation or normal maturation? Piaget 
argued, for instance, that children’s logical and abstract thinking emerges somewhat as 
a process of growth at about the age of eleven. Is this not the case? I could not find 
much evidence or discussion of problems individuals encounter in reasoning in the 
                                                
13  Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973). 
14  Ron Brant, “On Philosophy in the Curriculum: A Conversation with Mathew Lipman,” Educational 
Leadership 46, no. 11 (1988): 34. See also Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
15 Ron Brant, “On Philosophy in the Curriculum: A Conversation with Mathew Lipman,” 36. 
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contemporary philosophy of education literature. This is a serious lacuna, I believe, in 
any program that aims for the cultivation of the intellect in education.16 
 This lack of documentation of problems led me to a search of problems of reason 
in the history of philosophy. From my background knowledge in philosophy, I knew, 
for example, that Plato in his various works had quite an extensive treatment of reason, 
its blinders and their relevance to education. Dewey’s brief mention of Bacon’s ‘idols’ 
led me to read Bacon’s own extensive treatment of the intellect and its problems. After 
having read Bacon, I could appreciate the enormous relevance of his work to reasoning. 
In coming to read Locke’s ‘miscarriages of reason,’ first hand, I came to appreciate 
Locke’s extensive treatment of problems in reasoning and thier continued relevance to 
education. These readings impressed upon me the gravity of problems surrounding 
reason and the enormity of the task in cultivating reason in education. In what follows, I 
present the results of this search in the history of philosophy. 
In The Laws, Plato presents a captivating image of human beings as puppets pulled by 
strings:  
[L]et’s imagine that each of us living beings is a puppet of the gods . . . we have these 
emotions in us, which act like cords or strings and tug us about; they work in opposition, 
and tug against each other . . . back and forth we go across the boundary line where vice and 
virtue meet. One of these dragging forces . . . is the one we have to hang on to, come what 
may; the pull of the other cords we must resist . . . This cord [the former], which is golden 
and holy, transmits the power of ‘calculation’ [reason] . . . being golden, it is pliant, while 
the others, whose composition resembles a variety of other substances, are tough and 
                                                
16 I am indebted to Mansour Morteza for this important point and for the general point of the necessity to 
identify problems of reason. 
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inflexible . . . although ‘calculation’ is a noble thing, it is gentle, not violent, and its efforts 
need assistants, so that the gold in us may prevail over the other substances.  
“If we do give our help,” Plato continues, “the moral point of this fable, in which we 
appear as puppets, will have been well and truly made; the meaning of the terms ‘self-
superior’ and ‘self-inferior’ will somehow become clearer . . . [The individual] must 
digest the truth about these forces that pull him, and act on it in his life.” [Laws, 644b-
645c] 17 
In the Republic, we get a glimpse of some of these strings and their pull, where Plato 
describes the money lover in whose soul the appetitive part rules instead of his reason: 
His reasoning and spirited parts . . . are made to sit on the ground on either side of the 
king’s feet [i.e. his appetitive part]. The only calculations and researches he allows his 
reasoning part to make are concerned with how to start with a little money and increase it, 
the only admiration and respect he allows his spirited part to feel are for wealth and 
wealthy people, and he restricts his ambition to the acquisition of money and to any means 
towards that end. [Republic 553d 1-7]18 
                                                
17 ‘Calculation’ is said to be the work of the rational soul: “And calculating, measuring, and weighing are 
the work of the rational part of the soul.” [Republic 602e]. Plato, Complete Works, eds. John M. Cooper and 
D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997). Hence forth, all references to Plato are from 
this edition unless otherwise noted. 
18 Quoted in Peter Losin, "Education and Plato's Parable of the Cave," The Journal of Education 178, no. 3 
(1996): 53. 
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In the background to this metaphor of rulers and ruled is Plato’s tripartite division of 
the soul (with reason, spirit and appetite as the three parts), each having its proper role 
and function and where reason ought to rule but often doesn’t.19  
The ideal rule of reason is nicely captured by Plato in another metaphor in the Phaedrus: 
Remember how we divided each soul in three at the beginning of our story—two parts in 
the form of horses and the third in that of the charioteer? 
Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their 
charioteer. The gods have horses and charioteers that are themselves all good and come 
from good stock besides, while everyone else has a mixture. To begin with, our driver is in 
charge of a pair of horses; second of his horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the 
same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline. This means 
that chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painful difficult business. [Plato’s Phaedrus 
553d, 246b] 
This view of reason and its struggles against forces within oneself surfaces throughout 
the history of philosophy. However, problems such as these are rarely mentioned in 
contemporary philosophy of education in the context reason and rationality in 
education. 
 Though philosophers since Plato have identified problems of the intellect, it is in 
Bacon that we find a detailed meditation on them. In his Novum Organum: Or True 
                                                
19 Three parts of the soul are most clearly stated in the Republic:  
The first, we say, is the part with which a person learns, and the second the part with which he gets 
angry. As for the third, we had no one special name for it, since it’s multiform, so we named it after 
the biggest and strongest thing in it. Hence we called it the appetitive part, because of the intensity of 
its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things associated with them, but we also called it the 
money-loving part, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money. [Republic 
580d-581] 
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Directions for the Interpretation of Nature (1620), named after Aristotle’s extensive 
collections of works on logic, The Organon, Bacon begins with a critique of logic which, 
he says, “comes too late to do any good, when the mind is already, through the daily 
intercourse and conversation of life, occupied with unsound doctrines and beset on all 
sides by vain imaginations.”20 Hence, the “logic now in use serves rather to give 
stability to the errors which have their foundation in commonly received notions than 
to help the search after truth. So it does more harm than good” (Aphorism XII). 
 The unsound doctrines and vain imaginations which infect the human intellect 
are many, according to Bacon, and he refers to them as ‘idols of the mind.’ These idols 
“have taken deep root” in the understanding such that “truth can hardly find entrance.” 
And “even after entrance is obtained they will again . . . meet and trouble us, unless 
men . . . fortify themselves . . . against their assaults (XXVIII).” All perceptions, of the 
senses as well of the mind, “are according to the measure of the individual and not 
according to the measure of the universe.” The human understanding “is like a false 
mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things by 
mingling its own nature with it.” This (major) shortcoming “has its foundation in 
human nature itself,” in the race of men, hence, ‘idols of the tribe’ (XLI).  
 The human understanding is also prone to suppose “more order and regularity 
in the world than it finds . . . Hence the fiction that all celestial bodies move in perfect 
                                                
20 James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and J. M. Robertson, eds., The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon 
(London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1905), under “Preface,” 
https://books.google.com/books?id=jNM7AQAAMAAJ. 
Though the Novum Organum is a work introducing a new method for discovering truth, Bacon sensibly 
begins his work with problems of the intellect in reaching truth prior to suggesting his solution. If only 
this wisdom was shared more widely. 
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circles . . . Hence too the element of fire with its orb is brought in, to make up the square 
with the other three which the sense perceives. Hence also the ratio of density of the so-
called elements is arbitrarily fixed at ten to one. And so on of other dreams” (XLV). The 
human understanding once it has adopted an opinion “draws all things else to support 
and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be 
found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some 
distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious 
predetermination the authority of its former conclusions may remain inviolate” (XLVI). 
What is insightful in Bacon’s observations above is not just that the understanding 
resists the overthrow of adopted opinions, say through stubbornness, but that the 
understanding has distinct mechanisms to safeguard earlier opinions by neglecting, 
despising or setting aside. 
 Bacon also notes a tendency that was to be highlighted in twentieth century 
philosophy of science and made into its defining feature in opposition to the then 
prevailing view of science. Bacon presents it poetically: 
And therefore it was a good answer that was made by one who, when they showed him 
hanging in a temple a picture of those who had paid their vows as having escaped 
shipwreck, and would have him say whether he did not now acknowledge the power of the 
gods, — "Aye," asked he again, "but where are they painted that were drowned after their 
vows?" And such is the way of all superstition, whether in astrology, dreams, omens, divine 
judgments, or the like; wherein men, having a delight in such vanities, mark the events 
where they are fulfilled, but where they fail, though this happen much oftener, neglect and 
pass them by. But with far more subtlety does this mischief insinuate itself into philosophy 
and the sciences; in which the first conclusion colors and brings into conformity with itself 
all that come after, though far sounder and better.  
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Besides, independently of that delight and vanity which I have described, it is the peculiar 
and perpetual error of the human intellect to be more moved and excited by affirmatives 
than by negatives; whereas it ought properly to hold itself indifferently disposed toward 
both alike (XLVI). 
As one scholar put it, these passages could have been taken from Popper’s Conjectures 
and Refutations. Bacon also points out difficulties of the human intellect arising from 
forces within oneself such as desires and inclinations (Plato’s strings that ‘tug us 
about’?) which act on the understanding, infecting it and coloring its perceptions: 
The human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and 
affections; whence proceed sciences which may be called ‘sciences as one would.’ For what a 
man had rather were true he more readily believes. Therefore he rejects difficult things from 
impatience of research; sober things, because they narrow hope; the deeper things of nature, 
from superstition; the light of experience, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should 
seem to be occupied with things mean and transitory; things not commonly believed, out of 
deference to the opinion of the vulgar. Numberless, in short, are the ways, and sometimes 
imperceptible, in which the affections color and infect the understanding [XLIX].21  
Of particular note here is Bacon’s recognition that these affections infecting the 
understanding are sometimes “imperceptible.” Mischiefs affecting the understanding 
may not be completely transparent and may require deep scrutiny. Clearly, this has 
enormous implications for an education aiming for the cultivation of the intellect.  
 Problems of the intellect also have their source in the peculiar constitution of 
individuals. Bacon calls these ‘idols of the cave’: 
                                                
21 In mentioning “infusion from the will and affections” into the understanding, Bacon may be indebted 
here to Plato’s tripartite division of the soul: reason (understanding), spirit (will) and appetite (affections). 
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For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of 
his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature, owing either to his own proper and 
peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, 
and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of 
impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a 
mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted 
out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed 
as it were by chance (XLII). 
Personal idiosyncrasies are many and have an impact on how the ‘light of nature’ is 
reflected. Education and books may, in fact, hinder the intellect rather than ennoble it. 
Bacon also mentions problems stemming from fondness of and investments in one’s 
favorite subject where, having “bestowed the greatest pains upon them,” can “distort 
and color” other contemplations. This is to be noted, for example, in Aristotle who, 
having bestowed great pains in his logic, “made his natural philosophy a mere bond 
servant to his logic, thereby rendering it contentious and well-nigh useless (LIV).” Some 
minds have an “extreme admiration of antiquity, others to an extreme love and appetite 
for novelty.” But very few minds “are so duly tempered that they can hold the mean, 
neither carping at what has been well laid down by the ancients, nor despising what is 
well introduced by the moderns.” And this leads “to the great injury” of the sciences 
and philosophy since “antiquity and novelty” are “humors of partisans” rather than 
true judgments “and truth is to be sought for not in the felicity of any age, which is an 
unstable thing, but in the light of nature and experience, which is eternal . . . [hence] 
care must be taken that the intellect be not hurried by them into assent” (LVI). Given 
these ‘idols of the cave’ Bacon alludes to a (rudimentary) philosophy of education: 
“[L]et every student of nature take this as a rule: that whatever his mind seizes and 
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dwells upon with peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion, and that so much the 
more care is to be taken in dealing with such questions to keep the understanding even 
and clear” (LVIII). 
 Other idols have their source in the “intercourse and association of men with 
each other hence, ‘idols of the market place.’ One such idol is language: “For men 
believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react on the 
understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical 
and inactive” (LIX). The menace of words on the understanding are of two kinds. They 
result from “names of things which do not exist . . . which result from fantastic 
suppositions and to which nothing in reality corresponds” such as “Fortune” and 
“Prime Mover” or from “names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, 
and hastily and irregularly derived from realities” such as names of qualities, like 
“heavy, light, rare, dense and the like” (LX). 
 Lastly, Bacon notes, there are ‘idols’ which have “immigrated into men's minds 
from the various dogmas of philosophies . . . These I call Idols of the Theatre, because in 
my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays, representing worlds 
of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion” (XLIV). Of note here is Bacon’s 
observation how philosophies, as products of the understanding, tend to resemble neat 
stories rather than truths: “And in the plays of this philosophical theatre you may 
observe the same thing which is found in the theatre of the poets, that stories invented 
for the stage are more compact and elegant, and more as one would wish them to be, 
than true stories out of history” (LXII). 
 And this, because “there is taken for the material of philosophy either a great 
deal out of a few things, or very little out of many things . . . For the Rational School of 
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philosophers snatches from experience a variety of common instances, neither duly 
ascertained nor diligently examined and weighed, and leaves all the rest to meditation 
and agitation of wit” (LXII). At the other extreme, “the men of experiment” also exhibit 
an equally pernicious habit of the understanding:  
The Empirical School of philosophy gives birth to dogmas more deformed and monstrous 
than the Sophistical or Rational School. For it has its foundations not in the light of common 
notions . . . but in the narrowness and darkness of a few experiments 
 . . . the premature hurry of the understanding to leap or fly to universals and principles of 
things, great danger may be apprehended from philosophies of this kind, against which evil 
we ought even now to prepare (LXIV). 
 It is only fitting that we end Bacon’s meditations on problems of the intellect 
with an oft quoted and revealing metaphor where he compares the ills of the two types 
of men of sciences: “Those who have handled sciences have been either men of 
experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect 
and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own 
substance.” His own preference is the path and labors of the bee which “takes a middle 
course; it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but 
transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of 
philosophy” (XCV). Bacon concludes: “So much concerning the several classes of Idols 
and their equipage: all of which must be renounced and put away with a fixed and 
solemn determination, and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed; the 
entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than 
the entrance into the kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little 
child” (LXVIII). Purity of the intellect? 
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 Bacon’s influence on philosophy was immense ushering the empiricist school of 
philosophy commencing with John Locke. Locke, in his Of the Conduct of the 
Understanding (1706), begins his inquiry into reason by approvingly quoting Bacon’s 
criticism of Aristotelian and scholastic rules of logic in curing the mind of its afflictions:  
‘They,’ says he, ‘who attributed so much to logic, perceived very well and truly, that it was 
not safe to trust the understanding to itself, without the guard of any rules. But the remedy 
reached not the evil; but became part of it: for the logic which took place . . . has served to 
confirm and establish errors, rather than to open a way to truth.’22  
Locke continues adding to this observation: “A few rules of logic are thought sufficient 
in this case for those who pretend to the highest improvement, whereas I think there are 
a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment which are 
overlooked and wholly neglected.” Noting the insufficiency of logic, he proceeds, like 
Bacon, in documenting major problems: “And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty 
of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this faculty of the mind 
which hinder them in their progress and keep them in ignorance and error all their 
lives.”23 There are “three miscarriages that men are guilty of in reference to their reason, 
whereby this faculty is hindered in them from that service it might do and was 
designed for.” The first, Locke notes “is of those who seldom reason at all but do and 
think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbors, ministers, or who 
                                                
22 Francis Garforth, ed., John Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding (New York: Teachers College 
Press, 1966), 32-33. Excerpts of pertinent passages concerning reason and education from major 
philosophers treated here can also be found in Randall R. Curren, ed., Philosophy of Education: An 
Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publisher, 2007). 
23 Francis Garforth, John Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 34. 
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else they are pleased to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for the saving of 
themselves the pains and trouble of thinking and examining for themselves.” 
 The second miscarriage is “of those who put passion in place of reason, and 
being resolved that shall govern their actions and arguments, neither use their own nor 
hearken to other people’s reason, any farther than it suits their humor, interest, or 
party.” In this second miscarriage, as is apparent, we see traces of Plato, where reason 
becomes slave of passion as opposed to master. 24 
 The third miscarriage “is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but 
for want of having that which one may call large, sound, round-about sense, have not a 
full view of all that relates to the question and may be of moment to decide it. We are all 
short sighted, and very often see but one side of a matter; our views are not extended to 
all that has a connection with it.” Locke adds that no man is free of this defect as we all 
only know in part and hence conclude erroneously from these partial views.25 
                                                
24 Locke’s debt to Plato is clearer in his Some Thoughts Concerning Education:  
§ 33. As the Strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships, so also does that of 
the Mind. And the great Principle and Foundation of all Vertue and Worth is placed in this, That a 
Man is able to deny himself his own Desires, cross his own Inclinations, and purely follow what 
Reason directs as best, tho’ the appetite lean the other way.”  
John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, eds. John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton (Oxford 
University Press Oxford, 1989), 103. 
25 Francis. W. Garforth, ed. John Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding, (New York: Teachers College 
Press), 33. 
We might ask, why metaphor of ‘miscarriage’ of reason in Locke rather than metaphor of ‘false mirror’ as 
in Bacon? Reason, on Locke’s view, is a faculty of the ‘understanding’ likened to a touchstone. Much like 
Descartes, he refers to reason as ‘natural reason’ implying that the faculty of reason is in us naturally, it is 
part of our very make-up, and the problem lies not in it, but in its employment hence his choice of the 
metaphor of ‘miscarriage.’ He makes the latter clear when he says a little later that: “We are born with 
faculties and powers capable almost of anything such at least as would carry us farther than can easily be 
imagined: but it is only the exercise of those powers which give us ability and skill in anything and leads us 
towards perfection.” Ibid., 38. 
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 Apart from these ‘miscarriages of reason’ there is another problem related to the 
understanding which “misleads men in their knowledge.” This is the custom of taking 
up “principles that are not self-evident and very often not so much as true” such as for 
example, “the founders or leaders of my party are good men, and therefore their 
tenants are true” or “it has been long received in the world, therefore it is true” or “it is 
new, and therefore false.” Such principles are then taken as standards by the generality 
of men, “by which they accustom their understanding to judge.”26 Note echoes of Bacon 
here. Locke continues: “And thus they, falling into a habit of determining truth and 
falsehood by such wrong measures, it is no wonder they should embrace error for 
certainty and be very positive in things they have no ground for.”27 Locke brings it all 
together in one passage: 
Every man carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish 
substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances. And indeed the use 
and benefit of this touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed 
prejudices, overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds. The want of exercising it 
in the full extent of things intelligible, is that which weakens and extinguishes this noble 
faculty in us. 28 
In summary, problems surrounding reason, according to Locke, consist in individuals 
not using their reason but thinking and acting according to the example of others, being 
                                                
26 This is couched as an error in understanding, rather than specifically as a miscarriage of reason. Later, 
in his educational solutions, it is clear that the fault lies in not applying reason. 
27 Ibid., 33. 
28 Ibid., 38-39. 
  23 
governed by passion instead of reason, having only a partial view of matters and falling 
into the habit of determining truth and falsehood by faulty standards.  
 Though held in very high regard, the geography of the intellect, through the eyes 
of philosophers, is uneven, rocky and shaky in several respects. Instead of reason ruling 
in the soul, it is in danger of becoming captive to passion, it is liable to discolor the 
nature of things by reflecting poorly, it seeks more order and regularity than it finds, it 
draws all things else to support and agree with it, it neglects contrary evidence, (more 
perniciously) it is sometimes not used at all, it defers to education, authority, custom, 
and upbringing, judges by faulty standards, concludes from partial views, is entrapped 
by language, constructs whole erroneous systems, leaps to generalities from a few 
instances, and is beset with a primitive credulity. Education has a tall order. 
Goals of the intellect in education 
 Numerous philosophers since the Greeks have argued for the cultivation of 
reason in one form or the other as a goal of education. According to Plato, it is the 
‘instrument’ in the soul, whose value is beyond measure, which the object of education: 
It’s no easy task—indeed it’s very difficult—to realize that in every soul there is an 
instrument that is purified and rekindled by such subjects [e.g. arithmetic, geometry] when 
it has been blinded and destroyed by other ways of life, an instrument that it is more 
important to preserve than ten thousand eyes, since only with it can the truth be seen. [The 
Republic, 527d-e] 
Plato famously conceived of this education as one of ‘turning’ the soul rather than one 
of ‘putting sight into the blind’: 
But our present discussion, on the other hand, shows that the power to learn is present in 
everyone’s soul . . . 
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Then education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and 
with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn’t the craft of 
putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn’t 
turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it 
appropriately. [Republic 518c-d] 29 
In turning the soul, the educator leads prisoners, through an arduous journey from the 
darkness of the cave where prisoners only see shadows of objects but take them to be 
real to the clarity of day light. In the process, the entire soul is transformed such that it 
now lives by the light of true knowledge of the good rather than by the blind 
vicissitudes of passion and spirit. This noble end is to be achieved only through a sound 
and deliberate education focusing on reorienting reason: reorienting the instrument that 
is worth more than ten thousand eyes.  
 Locke equally emphasized education as a means of achieving the promise of 
reason: “Temples have their sacred images and we see what influence they have always 
had over a great part of mankind,” but more than this, “the ideas and images in men’s 
minds are the invisible powers, that constantly govern them and to these they all 
universally pay a ready submission.” Hence, “great care should be taken of the 
understanding, to conduct it right, in the search of knowledge, and in the judgments it 
makes.”30 But Locke notes “Nobody is under obligation to know everything.” What is 
essential is that men “should think and reason right about what is their daily 
employment.” 
                                                
29 See Losin, "Education and Plato's Parable of the Cave," 52. 
30 Francis. W. Garforth, ed. John Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 33. 
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 In his Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke emphasizes reasoning with 
children and educating them through the ‘instrument’: 
It will perhaps be wondered that I mention Reasoning with Children: And yet I cannot but 
think that the true Way of Dealing with them. They understand it as early as they do 
Language; and, if I misobserve not, they love to be treated as Rational Creatures sooner than 
imagined. ‘Tis a Pride should be cherished in them, and, as much can be, made the great 
Instrument to turn them by.”31 
No account of the goals of education with respect to reason can leave out Rousseau’s 
critical remarks, whose Emile, is partly a rebuttal to Locke:  
To reason with children was Locke’s great maxim . . . I see nothing more stupid than these 
children who have been reasoned with so much. Of all the faculties of man, reason, which is, 
so to speak, only a composite of all the others, is the one that develops with the most 
difficulty and latest. And it is this one that they want to use in order to develop the first 
faculties! . . . This is to begin with the end, to want to make the product the instrument. If 
children understood reason, they would not need to be raised.32 
Notice dramatic differences in conceptions of reason. In Locke, reason is ‘natural’ and 
hence simply needs to be employed whereas in Rousseau, it is developed hence one 
should not converse with children as if it is already developed. 
 Like Locke, Dewey emphasized an education focused on thinking. The goal of 
education is not to teach a multiplicity of subjects, but engendering in students a habit 
                                                
31 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 143. 
32 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or, On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979) 
quoted in Randal Curren, Philosophy of Education, 425-6.  
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of “reflective thought.” Reflective thought, according to Dewey, is an “active, persistent 
and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of 
grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends.” And this 
includes “a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of 
evidence and rationality.”33 
 Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of University of Chicago (1930-1945), put it 
forthrightly: “Every man has a function as a man. The function of a citizen or subject 
may vary from society to society. . . [b]ut the function of man as man is the same in 
every age and in every society, since it results from his nature as a man. The aim of an 
educational system is the same in every age and in every society where such a system 
can exist: it is to improve man as man.” Men are by nature ‘rational animals’ and it is 
this rationality that needs nurturing and development. Rational animals “achieve their 
terrestrial felicity by the use of reason.”34  
 “If education is rightly understood,” Hutchins continued, “it will be understood 
as the cultivation of the intellect. The cultivation of the intellect is the same good for all 
men in all societies. It is, moreover, the good for which all other goods are only means. 
Material prosperity, peace and civil order, justice, and the moral virtues are means to 
the cultivation of the intellect.” In this ‘rational’ scheme of education, Aristotle is center 
stage: “So Aristotle says in the Politics: ‘Now, in men reason and mind are the end 
towards which nature strives, so that the generation and moral discipline of the citizens 
                                                
33  Dewey, How We Think, 9. 
34 Robert Maynard Hutchins, “The Basis of Education,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Education, ed. John 
Martin Rich (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966), 17, 21. 
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ought to be ordered with a view to them.’ An education which served the means rather 
than their end would be misguided.’’35 Hence, according to Hutchins, the cultivation of 
the intellect is the supreme good and the ultimate goal of education. 
 Contemporary (and near contemporary) philosophers of education have also 
emphasized the cultivation of the intellect as a goal of education. Paul Hirst argued for 
the development of mind through a liberal education focused on ‘rational knowledge’: 
“A liberal education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge 
itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind . . .a liberal education is in a 
very real sense the ultimate form of education . . . It is an education concerned directly 
with the development of the mind in rational knowledge, whatever, form that freely 
takes.”36 Israel Scheffler, following in the footsteps of Hirst and Peters, stated: 
“Certainly, rationality is a fundamental cognitive and moral virtue and as such should, I 
believe, form a basic objective of teaching.37 Mathew Lipman wrote: “Education can be 
seen as the great laboratory for rationality, but it is more realistic to see it as a context in 
which young people learn to be reasonable so that they can grow up to be reasonable 
citizens, reasonable companions and reasonable parents.”38 And “the most important 
                                                
35 Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1995), 67. 
36 Paul Hirst, “Liberal Education and the Nature of knowledge” in Education and the Development of 
Reason, eds. Robert F. Dearden, Paul H. Hirst, and Richard S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1972), 402, 404. 
37  Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 78 
38  Lipman, Thinking in Education, 22. 
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thing we can do for children is teach them to think well.”39 Finally, Richard Paul 
emphasizes the improvement of thinking through education: “[E]ducation implies a 
self-motivated action upon one’s own thinking and a participation in the forming of 
one’s own character. Through it we cultivate self-directedness of thought and transform 
our values.”40 
 Most philosophers and philosophers of education agree that the cultivation of 
the intellect, in one form or the other, should form an important goal of education. 
However, there is no consensus on the nature of the intellect (what it is) nor on how it is 
to be cultivated. Major differences arise on how the goal of the cultivation of the 
intellect in education is to be achieved. [In the next chapter, I closely analyze three 
educational programs for the cultivation of the intellect in education]. 
Multiple conceptions of the intellect 
 The above survey into problems and goals of intellect, as theorized by 
philosophers, reveals a significant issue with respect to the implied conception of the 
intellect. Philosophers, including philosophers of education, have postulated numerous, 
divergent and sometimes contradictory notions of the intellect, reason and rationality. 
From the perspective of a philosophy of education aiming towards the cultivation of the 
intellect, this can be problematic as the true focus of the goals of education shift 
                                                
39 Brant, “On Philosophy in the Curriculum: A conversation with Mathew Lipman,” 34. 
40 Richard Paul, “Critical Thinking, What, Why, and How,” in Critical Thinking: Educational Imperative, ed. 
Cynthia Barnes (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 8-9. 
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drastically depending on the implied conception of the intellect despite surface 
agreement on the overall aims. 
 Plato, from the passages quoted above, clearly refers to reason as an ‘instrument.’ 
The cure for him, as we have seen, is not putting sight into the soul but orienting the 
soul in the right direction. Though Bacon considers reason as one of the faculties of the 
‘rational soul’ (the other two being memory and imagination), his focus is on “the 
understanding.” The understanding is analogous to a mirror with blemishes which 
reflects poorly. The solution lies in instituting a method for discovering truths (as ‘helps 
for the understanding’). Locke emphasizes reason, where reason is a ‘part’ or a ‘faculty’ 
of the understanding. It is a ‘noble’ and ‘natural’ faculty (most likely implying pure and 
complete). The remedy lies in using it. And with respect to its use, Locke, much like 
Descartes, sees reason as making links (loosely, inferences) between propositions 
(ideally with sure foundations) leading to demonstrative and probabilistic knowledge. 
Its use is modeled best in mathematics.41 Dewey, on the other hand dismisses all talk of 
a faculty of reason as a relic of the past, and makes no mention of the understanding but 
speaks instead of the nature of thought and thinking. According to Dewey, problems of 
thinking stem from natural tendencies of humans to accept “suggestions” of the mind 
prior to evaluating them for their evidentiary bases. Reasoning is essentially inferring. It 
is ‘thinking’ that is the wider notion and the target of education. Correction in thinking 
comes from implementing a method (conceived along the lines of scientific procedures) 
as in Bacon and fostering certain attitudes of mind. In Hutchins, the intellect is 
ultimately knowledge of “first principles” along Aristotelian lines. 
                                                
41 Francis. W. Garforth, ed. John Locke's Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 51-52. 
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 R. S. Peters and Paul Hirst move as far away as they can from any talk of reason 
as an instrument or faculty or distinct ability. Reason is to be understood as virtually 
equivalent to mind and mind is to be understood as defined and characterized by the 
intellectual products of a civilization, namely disciplinary knowledge in the various 
fields with special reference to ways of testing and evaluating claims. Scheffler takes on 
board Peters’ and Hirst’s notion but adds the notion of “principled thought and action” 
along Kantian lines, as a mark of reason and rationality. Scheffler emphasizes giving 
and seeking “reasons” based on principles as characterizing rationality. Paul Ennis 
stresses assessment and evaluation of arguments as routes to rationality and reasonable 
belief. Richard Paul emphasizes evaluation of “elements of thought.” 
 As is amply apparent, surface similarities in goals belies deeper disagreement on 
the fundamental nature of the intellect and the specific target of education. Hence, great 
care needs to be exercised in philosophy of education in determining what precisely is 
said to be educated and cultivated in calls for the cultivation of reason in education, both, at 
the level of goals and at the level of the actual educational programs. In the next 
chapter, I critically examine, in detail, three contemporary educational programs for the 
cultivation of reason in education; their goals as well as their educational methods. In 
the background of my critique are the many problems of the intellect noted above, the 
question of the efficacy of their programs and the implied conception of reason. 
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Chapter 2 
Contemporary Educational Programs for the  
Cultivation of the Intellect in Education 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I critically and closely examine three influential and 
contemporary educational programs advocated in philosophy of education for achieving 
the goal of the cultivation of reason and rationality in education, namely, i. through 
‘critical thinking,’ ii. through ’fairminded critical thinking’ and iii. through ‘initiation 
into the disciplines.’ Each is presented here by persons who have helped shape the 
contours of the program. Each continues to be refined and promoted by their original 
advocates or by others who build on their foundations. Finally, each develops out of 
rich debates in twentieth century educational thought regarding the cultivation of the 
intellect. In what follows, I present this historical context out of which these programs 
emerge. Following this, I examine each of the three educational programs in detail for 
their efficacy in cultivating the intellect in education. 
 Towards the turn of the century, noting the proliferation of subjects offered in 
secondary schools at the time (where some forty different subjects were offered), the 
famous Committee of Ten was appointed by the National Council of Education, led by 
the then President of Harvard, Charles W. Elliot. The aims of the committee were to 
consider the whole issue of secondary school curriculum. When published in 1894, 
under the aegis of the United States Bureau of Education, the report was perceived as a 
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watershed in American curricular reform.42 The then National Commissioner of 
Education praised the report as “the most important educational document ever 
published in this country.”43 James C. Mackensie, one of the ten members, commented 
that the report “represents the best judgment, not alone of the Committee of Ten, but of 
some ninety educators chosen from all classes of schools and colleges, East, West and 
South—venerable eastern universities, modern state endowments, great city high 
schools, historic academies, vigorous private schools.” Mackensie was hopeful that the 
scheme for secondary schools suggested in the report will be “commended as the best 
working theory thus far proposed for the organization and conduct of our secondary 
schools, public and private.”44 
 The report prided itself on its “bold excision of useless studies.”45 In its stead, the 
report recommended a four-year high school curriculum composed of Latin, Greek, 
English, French, German, Mathematics (Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry), General 
History, Natural History and Physical Geography (Astronomy, Meteorology, Botany, 
Zoology and Physiology, Geology, Ethnology), Physics and Chemistry.46 Menkensie 
notes that these were to be taught in such a manner that they “secure from every subject 
                                                
42 National Education Association of the United States, Report of the Committee of Ten on Secondary School 
Studies with the Reports of the Conferences Arranged by the Committee (New York: American Book Company 
(for the NEA), 1894), https://archive.org/details/reportofcomtens00natirich. 
43 James C. Mackensie, “The Report of the Committee of Ten,” The School Review 2, no. 3 (1984): 147.  
44 Ibid., 147-148. 
45 Ibid., 155. 
46 National Education Association of the United States. Report of the Committee of Ten, 36. 
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pursued genuine mental training.”47 Mental training was based on the then current 
notion that the mind consistent of powers, much like distinct muscles, which could be 
strengthened by exercising them. One important power of the mind was said to be 
‘reasoning’ which could then be exercised in various ways through the learning of 
subject matter (including learning the languages, French, German and Latin): 48 “The 
Conferences have abundantly shown how every subject which they recommend can be 
made a serious subject of instruction, well fitted to train the pupil’s powers of 
                                                
47 James C. Mackensie, “The Report of the Committee of Ten,” 147 (emphasis added). 
48 National Education Association of the United States, Report of the Committee of Ten, 43. 
The Report of Committee on Other Modern Languages justified the learning of languages in terms of the 
development of these powers:  
We are of the opinion that there should be introduced into the grammar schools an elective course in 
German or French . . . We make the above recommendation . . . in the firm belief that the educational 
effects of modern language study will be of immense benefit to all who are able to pursue it under 
proper guidance. It will train their memory and develop their sense of accuracy; it will quicken and 
strengthen their reasoning powers by offering them, at every step, problems that must be immediately 
solved by the correct application of the results of their own observations. Ibid., 96 (emphasis added). 
A clear statement came from the Committee on Geography:  
While various activities of the mind are called into exercise in geographical work, the committee 
would advise that the systematic development of the three classes of these should largely control the 
arrangement of the work, viz., (1) the powers of observation, (2) the powers of scientific imagination, 
and (3) the powers of reasoning. Ibid., 214. 
So entrenched were the notions of mental powers and their development in education through subject 
matter, that the report recommended that teachers should  
definitely associate the topics they are endeavoring to teach with the mental powers they bring into 
exercise, so that there shall be ever present in the mind as an object of endeavor not only the mastery 
of the subject-matter but the acquisition of improved mental powers. Ibid., 216. 
Noting that in England, France and Germany, students start to learn Latin at a much earlier age and for 
many more hours, the conference recommended an earlier start age for the teaching of Latin in American 
schools on the basis of its greater efficacy in ‘training the mind’ in countries where Latin was taught for a 
lengthier time:  
The explanation of the undeniable fact that, in the countries just named [England, France and 
Germany], Latin has been more successfully employed than with us “as an instrument for training 
the mind to habits of intellectual conscientiousness, patience, discrimination, accuracy, and 
thoroughness,—in a word, to habits of clear and sound thinking,” doubtless lies partly in the more 
liberal allowance of time. Ibid., 61. 
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observation, expression, and reasoning.” That the above subjects were necessary for the 
training of the powers of the minds appears as a foregone conclusion in the minds of 
the approximately ninety eminent men participating in the report. However, while 
mental training might have been the underlying rationale, the disciplines, each in their 
own way, were seen as necessary in achieving it. It was through the disciplines that 
mental training was to achieved. Disciplinary knowledge was sacrosanct.  
 It was just after the committee’s recommendations of a firmly subject specific 
curriculum that John Dewey, one of the first philosophers in modern history to focus on 
education, began his vast critique of education. His influence looms large in US 
educational thought. Many of his works critique the then emphasis on the disciplines, 
which he saw as mere products. In its stead, he emphasized inquiry, the process of 
acquiring this knowledge, and the fruits of this inquiry in terms of experience and the 
growth of experience as final goals of education. In 1910 he published How We Think 
with a second edition in 1933. Noting a proliferation of subjects in schools, he 
recommended a principle of unity for education: “Our schools are troubled with a 
multiplication of studies, each in turn having its own multiplication of materials and 
principles.” Unless, this situation should lead into “distraction,” he continues, “some 
clew of unity, some principle that makes for simplification, must be found.” Dewey 
found the principle in the scientific method much as Bacon had found experiment and 
induction as ‘helps’ for the understanding: “This book represents the conviction that the 
needed steadying and centralizing factor is found in adopting as the end of endeavor 
that attitude of mind, that habit of thought, which we call scientific.” Moreover, this 
attitude, according to Dewey, fits hand and glove with the natural proclivities of the 
child: “[T]he native and unspoiled attitude of childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, 
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fertile imagination, and love of experimental enquiry, is near, very near, to the attitude 
of the scientific mind.”49 
 How We Think emphasized an education in thinking rightly, away from 
superstition and a tendency to believe things simply because they are fashionable or 
interesting or vividly presented. As noted in Chapter 1, he cited Bacon’s ‘idols of the 
mind’ and Locke’s observations of the miscarriages of reason as endemic problems in 
human thinking. To overcome these shortcomings, Dewey emphasized reflective thinking 
as an aim of education which he defined as an “active, persistent, and careful 
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of grounds that 
support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” and includes “a conscious and 
voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of evidence and rationality.”50 
 Dewey was writing in changing times in American education. In 1893, when 
the Committee of Ten published its report, the high school served a small elite. Within a 
period of thirty years, from 1890 to 1920, high school enrollment rose sevenfold—from 
360,000 to 2.5 million.51 In 1913, the National Education Association appointed yet 
another committee to examine the school curriculum, aptly named: ‘The Commission 
on the Re-organization of Secondary Education.” In 1918 the commission published its 
report unambiguously stating that secondary education “should be determined by the 
needs of the society to be served, the character of the individuals to be educated, and 
                                                
49 Dewey, How We Think, v. 
50 Ibid., 9. 
51 Sol Cohen, “The Transformation of the School” in Foundations of Education, ed. George F. Kneller (New 
York: Wiley. 1971), 33.  
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the knowledge of educational theory and practice available.”52 The report overtly 
rejected what had been taken for granted by the Committee of Ten. It rejected the notion 
of ‘general discipline’ along with mastery of subject matter as goals of secondary 
education. In its stead, the Commission proposed seven ‘Cardinal Principles of 
Education’—Heath, Command of Fundamental Processes, Worthy Home Membership, 
Vocation, Citizenship, Worthy Use of Leisure, and Ethical Character. 53 As an 
educational historian observed, “intellectual capacity nor the mastery of secondary-
level subject matter was ever mentioned.”54 Education, the report declared, “must be 
conceived as a process of growth. Only when so conceived and so conducted can it 
become a preparation for life. In so far as this principle has been ignored, formalism and 
sterility have resulted.”55 Education along progressive lines had swept the nation—an 
education that proponents argued should be based on children’s needs rather than on 
the basis of subject matter content. Though Dewey was later to disown much of the 
excesses he saw in progressive education, Dewey and progressive education were 
linked and their influence continued well into the latter part of the twentieth century. 
 As a contemporary philosopher of education notes, it was John Dewey who 
was the inspiration for the progressive education critical thinking movement in 
                                                
52 National Education Association of the United States, Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education: A report 
of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education (Washington: Government. Printing Office, 
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education.56 In the 1930’s, the Progressive Education Association’s “Eight-Year Study” 
included tests under such titles as Application of Principles of Science” and Application of 
Principles of Logical Reasoning.”57 However, the launching of Sputnik by the Russians led 
to a reassessment and content knowledge, especially the sciences were once again 
emphasized, according to Ennis. Support for critical thinking, “suddenly exploded” 
around 1980; the Commission of Humanities emphasized critical thinking and the 
College Board, as a body which oversees the SAT, “specified reasoning as one of its six 
basic academic competencies.” Most significantly, in 1983, the California State 
University System “required that in order to graduate from one of the State University 
units, a student must have had nine hours of instruction in communication and in 
critical thinking.” Ennis also notes that during this time the “American Philosophical 
Association’s Board of Officers (1985) urged philosophers to help with attempts to test 
for critical thinking and attempts to include critical thinking in elementary and 
secondary curricula.”58 The push for critical thinking continues into the twenty first 
century, Ennis notes, where “emphasis on critical thinking increased in colleges and 
universities, at least in mission statements.”59  
 Most recently, the Common Core, the newly adopted national elementary and 
middle school standards for English Language Arts and Math, and the most sweeping 
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57 Ibid., 6. 
58 Ibid., 7. 
59 Ibid., 8. 
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curriculum reform in recent memory, stresses critical thinking skills: “Across the 
English language arts and mathematics standards, skills critical to each content area are 
emphasized. In particular, problem-solving, collaboration, communication, and critical-
thinking skills are interwoven into the standards.”60 The ELA/literacy standards 
“include critical-thinking skills and the ability to closely and attentively read texts in a 
way that will help them understand and enjoy complex works of literature. Students 
will learn to use cogent reasoning and evidence collection skills that are essential for 
success in college, career, and life.”61 
 Over the last three decades, philosophers of education have suggested several 
conceptions of and programs for critical thinking but moving away from Dewey’s 
emphasis on scientific enquiry. I examine two of these influential conceptions in the first 
two sections of the present chapter: the conception of critical thinking development by 
Paul Ennis and the conception developed by Richard Paul. 
 With the growing influence of Dewey and the tide of progressive education 
which focused more and more on children’s needs to the perceived neglect of 
worthwhile subject matter came a severe backlash. Progressive education came to be 
seen as serving only present needs, focusing more on means rather than on ends to the 
detriment of perennial values. And no one expressed this more strongly, in the early 
1930’s, than Robert Maynard Hutchins. Hutchins was dismayed at what he took to be 
an erroneous direction in American education. Fundamentally, education for him was 
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not about the current needs of children as some progressives had maintained nor was it 
a specialized education, nor a pre-professional education, nor a utilitarian education. 
These were all dependent on society and were essentially ephemeral, he argued. He 
was also critical of the gradual encroachment and increasing influence of the sciences in 
academia:  
If we are to set about developing the intellectual powers of men through having them 
acquire knowledge of the most important subjects, we have to begin with the proposition 
that experimentation and empirical data will only be of limited use to us, contrary to the 
convictions of many American social scientists, and that philosophy, history, literature, and 
art give us knowledge, and significant knowledge, on the most significant issues. 62  
A disease had infected US education, according to Hutchins: “Relativism, scientism, 
skepticism, and anti-intellectualism, the four horsemen of the philosophical apocalypse, 
have produced that chaos in education which will end in the disintegration of the 
West.” 63 This erroneous and destructive path was laid, in part, according to Hutchins, 
by none other than William James and John Dewey, representatives of what he took as 
the new anti-intellectualism infecting education both at the secondary and college level.  
 Instead, Hutchins argued, education should be conceptualized on the basis of the 
function of man, qua man. Men are by nature ‘rational animals.’ Rational animals 
“achieve their terrestrial felicity by the use of reason.”64 But this rationality needs to be 
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educated. And the final goal of education should be understood as the cultivation of the 
intellect where “[m]aterial prosperity, peace and civil order, justice, and the moral 
virtues are means to the cultivation of the intellect.”65 Hence, education is to be 
composed “principally of the permanent studies because these studies draw out the 
elements of our common human nature, because they connect man with man, because 
they connect us with the best that man has thought, because they are basic to any 
further study and to any understanding of the world.”66 What are the permanent 
studies, according to Hutchins? “They are in the first place those books which have 
through the centuries attained to the dimensions of classics . . . A classic is a book that is 
contemporary in every age. That is why it is a classic. The conversations of Socrates 
raise questions that are as urgent today as they were when Plato wrote.”67 
 An ideal university “would consist of three faculties, metaphysics, social science, 
and natural science. The professors would be those who were thinking about the 
fundamental problems in these fields. The teaching would be directed to understanding 
the ideas in these fields, and would have no vocational aim.”68 Post Hutchins, and his 
sometimes public and lengthy criticism of Dewey and Progressivism, the disciplines 
were once again back in the debate on how best to educate and how best to cultivate the 
intellect. 
                                                
65 Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America, 67. 
66 Ibid., 77. 
67 Ibid., 78. 
68 Ibid., 116. 
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 It was in the midst of this sometimes acrimonious and contentious debate on the 
fundamentals of American education which led another president of Harvard, James 
Bryant Conant, to set up “The Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a 
Free Society” in 1943. Two years later, the committee published its full report, General 
Education in a Free Society, and was presented to the Department of State.69 Noting that a 
statement on the aims of American education is nothing less than a “philosophy of 
American education”70 the Harvard report steered a middle course between Dewey and 
Hutchins:  
The true task of education is therefore to reconcile the sense of pattern and direction 
deriving from heritage with the sense of experiment and innovation deriving from science 
that they may exit fruitfully together . . . Education can therefore be wholly devoted neither 
to tradition nor to experiment . . . It must uphold at the same time tradition and 
experiment.71 
In determining the aims of education, according to the report, a philosophy of 
education should look both “to the nature of knowledge and to the good of man in 
society.”72 And the good of man in society is embodied in certain traits and 
characteristics. The report emphasized four such abilities: “to think effectively, to 
communicate thought, to make relevant judgments, and to discriminate among values.” 
                                                
69 Harvard University, General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1945). 
70 Ibid., 42-43. 
71 Ibid., 50-51. 
72 Ibid., 64. 
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Effective thinking consisted of three phases of thinking, logical, relational, and 
imaginative. But these were to be developed through the traditional disciplines: “It may 
be noted that the three phases of effective thinking, logical, relational and imaginative 
correspond roughly to the three divisions of learning, the natural sciences, the social 
studies and the humanities.”73 The Harvard Report interpreted the aims of education as 
effecting a balance: “[L]earning . . . is for the sake of cultivating basic mental abilities; in 
short to foster the power of reason in man . . . Yet reason while an end is a means as 
well—a means to the mastery of life. The union of knowledge and reason in the 
integrated personality—that is the final test of education.74  
 The Harvard Report did not go far enough to members of a new group of 
philosophers of education in England. And American progressivism, the emphasis on 
‘critical thinking’ along with Dewey’s concepts of growth and experience came under 
severe criticism abroad. Richard Peters, across the Atlantic noted: “There have been 
many like Dewey who have attacked the notion that education consists in the 
transmission of a body of knowledge. Stress is placed instead on critical thinking, 
                                                
73 Ibid., 67. 
74 Ibid., 168. 
In qualifying and expanding on this view the Harvard Report intimates Plato’s division of soul into parts 
and its internal struggles and invokes Plato’s chariot:  
We are not now denying the central position of reason or knowledge as ministering to reason; we are 
only urging that reason is or must strive to become a master of a highly complex inner kingdom 
consisting of many and diverse members, all of which go into the making of a complete man . . . 
While traditionally man has been viewed as primarily a rational animal, recent thinking has called 
attention to his unconscious desires and sentiments which becloud and sometimes sway his reason. 
To be sure, classical philosophers recognized the existence of the passions, but they tended to regard 
the latter as alien intrusions and an unwanted complication. Yet passions, although dangerous 
because primitive and even savage, are a source of strength if properly guided; they supply the 
driving forces for achievement . . . According to the ancient myth, reason is the charioteer that directs 
but it is not the horse that pulls the chariot. In the complete man we look for initiative, zest and 
interest, strength of resolution, driving power. Ibid 168-9. 
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individual experimentation and problem solving,”.75 In the early sixties, through the 
work of Richard. S. Peters, Paul Hirst and Robert Dearden, a rigorous program in 
analytical philosophy of education began to emerge in the midst of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language that had taken root in England. They were soon joined by Israel 
Scheffler at Harvard and others. On the basis of a conceptual analysis of education, 
Peters argued that education cannot be understood in terms of such inner notions as 
growth and experience nor in terms of general thinking abilities, such as ‘critical 
thinking.’ Inner processes require public criteria. What it is to think critically is 
dependent on public forms of knowledge:  
The emphasis on ‘critical thinking’ was salutary enough, perhaps, when bodies of 
knowledge were handed on without any attempt being made to hand on also the public 
procedures by means of which they had been accumulated, criticized, and revised. But it is 
equally absurd to foster an abstract skill called ‘critical thinking’ without handing on 
anything concrete to be critical about. For there are as many brands of ‘critical thinking’ as 
there are disciplines, and in the various disciplines such as history, science, and philosophy, 
there is great deal to be known before the peculiar nature of the problem is grasped.76 
The tendency of American Pragmatism and behaviourism, Peters argued, “is to 
assimilate thinking to doing . . . But an educated man is distinguished not so much by 
what he does as by what he ‘sees’ or ‘grasps’. . . education involves ‘knowing that’ as 
well as ‘knowing how.’”77 In other words, subject matter knowledge is essential. In like 
                                                
75 Peters, “Education as Initiation,” 103. 
76 Ibid., 103-104. 
77 Ibid., 100-101. 
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manner, Peters’ colleague and collaborator, Paul Hirst argued that the development of 
mind, reason and the intellect was not to be gauged by the development of general 
thinking skills such as for example ‘effective thinking’ as the Harvard Report had 
indicated. Mind is defined and understood only in light of and through the public 
‘forms of knowledge.’ Hence, it is these forms of knowledge, namely the traditional 
disciplines, that ought to characterize education. These public forms of knowledge are 
forms of understanding human experience. Reason and rationality are to be understood 
as initiation into these forms of knowledge in which assertions are tested and validated. 
Israel Scheffler, building on Peters and Hirst’s program, put it well in his Reason and 
Teaching:  
What unites the several studies [in the collected volume] is not a special method or 
technique but a common striving to develop forms of critical understanding, to define and 
progressively test criteria of rational judgment and associated principles of generalization 
and evaluation. This striving is embodied in the several traditions of thought, each 
providing a realization of the associated concepts of ‘reason’ and ‘principle’ within its 
sphere. To become rational is to enter into these traditions, to inherit them and to learn to 
participate in the never ending work of testing, expanding, and altering them for the 
better.78  
Rationality through the disciplines, as originally formulated by Peters and Hirst and 
elaborated by Scheffler, is the subject of the last section of this chapter.  
 In the present chapter, I closely evaluate the three programs for the cultivation of 
reason and rationality in education. In my critique, I have been inspired by the 
                                                
78 Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 2. 
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historical philosophical literature on problems of reason and rationality as reviewed in 
Chapter 1. To my dismay, few philosophers of education today, working in the field of 
reason and education, make reference to this rich history. I have also been inspired by a 
recent manuscript by Mansour Morteza on the philosophy of reason where he argues 
that: 
 The idea of reason is not limited to argument and evaluation of argument. The idea of 
reason includes reason in itself, the use of reason, the problems of reason, contents, reality, 
the reasoner, their relationships, and other elements. An adequate understanding of the idea 
of reason needs to take into account these elements and the relationships among them.79 
This broader idea of reason, has also helped deepen my understanding and 
appreciation of the philosophical history of reason itself.  
 My critique of current educational programs is focused on the overriding 
question of sufficiency. Are these programs sufficient for the cultivation of reason and 
rationality in education given the problems of reason (as documented in Chapter 1) and 
the desirability of the goal of cultivating reason in education? My analysis is organized 
around five major questions: What problems of reason in education do these programs 
acknowledge (if they do)? What goals of education with respect to reason and 
rationality do they advocate? What methods do they advocate for achieving these 
goals? What is the implied conception of reason in the goals and in the methods 
advocated? Are the methods efficacious and adequate for the full cultivation of the 
intellect in education? 
  
                                                
79 Monsour Morteza, “Philosophy of Reason” (unpublished manuscript, May 31, 2016), Word file. 
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Chapter 2.1 
Rationality Through Critical Thinking Skills 
Introduction 
 
 Robert Ennis’s early paper in the Harvard Education Review, “A Concept of 
Critical Thinking,” published just over half a century ago (1962), was one of the first 
thorough attempts by a philosopher of education in modern times to define the scope of 
critical thinking.80 One critic attributes the popularity of critical thinking in 
contemporary education to this work.81 In this early article, Ennis defined critical 
thinking as “the correct assessing of statements.”82 Over the many years since that 
publication he has refined his conception and now defines it as “reasonable reflective 
thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do.”83 According to Ennis, this two-
fold conception, emphasizing both belief and action, is inspired by Dewey and 
somewhat reflects the usage of critical thinking in the critical thinking movement. 84 
More importantly, and also according to Ennis, critical thinking, as defined above, 
should have a definite place in education: “I think that reasonable and reflective 
thinking focused on what to believe or do should be a very important part of our 
                                                
80 Robert H. Ennis, “A Concept of Critical Thinking,” Harvard Education Review 32, no. 1 (1962): 81-111. 
81 Michael Roth as mentioned by Ennis. Robert H. Ennis, “Critical Thinking: Reflection and Perspective: 
Part 1,” 6. 
82 Ibid., 9. 
83 Ibid., 10. 
84 Furthermore, the phrase ‘reflective thinking’ is indebted to Dewey who had argued for ‘reflective 
thinking’ as an aim of education. 
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personal, civic, and vocational lives, and should receive attention in our education 
system.”85 In what follows, I present and critically analyze Ennis’ program for critical 
thinking in education with respect to goals of critical thinking and methods for 
achieving these goals. I end with an observation and comment on the overall pedagogy 
in Ennis’ program and a summary of his arguments. 
Goals of critical thinking 
 According to Ennis, critical thinking is “reasonable reflective thinking focused on 
deciding what to believe or do” and in deciding what to believe or do “one is helped by 
the employment of a set of critical thinking dispositions and abilities.” Hence, it is these 
dispositions and abilities that “can serve as a set of comprehensive goals for a critical 
thinking curriculum and its assessment.”86 The dispositions of critical thinkers are as 
follows:87  
1. Care that their beliefs be true, and that their decisions be justified; that is, care to "get it 
right" to the extent possible;  
2. Care to understand and present a position honestly and clearly, theirs as well as others'; 
3. Care about every person. (This one is an auxiliary, not constitutive, disposition. Although 
this concern for people is not constitutive, critical thinking can be dangerous without it.)  
And critical thinking abilities are as follows:88  
                                                
85 Ibid., 10. 
86 Ibid., 15. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., 16-17. 
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(Basic Clarification, 1 to 3)  
1. Focus on a question 
2. Analyze arguments 
3. Ask and answer clarification and/or challenge questions 
(Two Bases for a Decision: 4 and 5) 
4. Judge the credibility of a source 
5. Observe, and judge observation reports 
(Inference, 6 to 8) 
6. Deduce, and judge deduction 
7. Make material inferences (roughly “induction”) 
8. Make and judge value judgments 
(Advanced Clarification, 9 and 10)  
9. Define terms and judge definitions, using appropriate criteria  
10. Attribute unstated assumptions 
(Supposition and Integration, 11 and 12)  
11. Consider and reason from premises, reasons, assumptions, positions, and other 
propositions with which they disagree or about which they are in doubt, without letting the 
disagreement or doubt interfere with their thinking ("suppositional thinking")  
12. Integrate the dispositions and other abilities in making and defending a decision 
13. Proceed in an orderly manner appropriate to the situation 
14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophistication of others 
15. Employ appropriate rhetorical strategies in discussion and presentation (oral and 
written), including employing and reacting to "fallacy" labels in an appropriate manner. 
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Examples of fallacy labels are "circularity," "bandwagon," "post hoc," "equivocation," "non 
sequitur," and "straw person” 
 
These are then the sub-goals of a curriculum which aid the final goal of “reasonable 
reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do.” Of course, the crucial 
question from a curricular point of view is how are these sub-goals to be achieved and 
realized in an educational setting. What are the actual strategies for inculcating/ 
developing these dispositions and abilities, according to Ennis?89 
Curricular strategies, methods 
 Unlike many other philosophers of education, Ennis has developed a detailed 
critical thinking textbook for use by teachers and students in order to foster critical 
thinking. We can safely take this textbook as his recommendation of how to cultivate 
critical thinking dispositions and abilities. This is supported by his statement in his 
textbook that “[t]he primary purpose of this book is to help you decide in a reasonable 
way what to believe and what to do.”90 The focus of the curricular methods as 
presented in the textbook is on identifying, analyzing and assessing arguments. Lest 
there is any doubt about this focus, Ennis makes it quite clear: 
You depend on your beliefs, whether you are deciding what to do or deciding what to 
believe. Decisions about belief, then are fundamental. A key feature in decisions about 
beliefs is often an argument. You will be examining others’ argument and developing your own.91 
                                                
89 I am indebted to M. Morteza for the pertinent question of how the proposed programs lead to the 
cultivation of the intellect. 
90  Robert H. Ennis, Critical Thinking (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1996), 1. 
91 Ibid., 1-2 (emphasis added). 
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Chapters in Ennis’ textbook are organized around the critical thinking abilities listed 
above. For example, Chapter 1 is entitled ‘Introduction: Decision and Argument,’ 
Chapter 2 ‘Argument Analysis: Identifying Conclusions and Reasons,’ Chapter 3 ‘The 
Credibility of Sources,’ Chapter 4 ‘Observation,’ Chapter 5 ‘Deduction: Class Logic’ and 
so on until Chapter 14 which is entitled ‘Applying Critical Thinking.’  
 As an overall checklist for critical thinking, Ennis recommends checking for 
Focus, Reasons, Inference, Situation, Clarity and Overview. The ‘FRISCO’ approach, in 
short: 
Focus: The first thing to do in approaching any situation is to figure out the main point, the 
issue, question, or problem. Ask yourself such questions as ‘What is going on here?’  . . . 
What is this person trying to prove? . . . In an argument, the focus is ordinarily the 
conclusion. Consider the argument . . . 
My client is innocent of the charge of murder because she was defending herself against 
attack. 
The conclusion—and the focus—is ‘My client is innocent of the charge of murder.’ 
Reasons: You must know the reason(s) offered in support of a conclusion and decide 
whether the reasons are acceptable before you can make a final judgment about an 
argument. In the argument we have been considering, there is only one reason given: ‘She 
was defending herself against attack.’ It alone is offered in direct support of the conclusion. 
Inference: Suppose that the reason were true. Would it have been sufficient to establish the 
conclusion? . . . The question under the I in FRISCO is whether the reason, if it is acceptable, 
would support the conclusion, and how strongly. In the jury situation, it seemed to me that 
the reason, even though it was not acceptable, would have been sufficient, that is, that the 
inference is a good one. To say that the inference is a good one is to say that the step from 
the reason (s) to the conclusion is a reasonable one; in other words, that it is one we are 
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entitled to make. In still other words, the reasoning (though not necessarily the reason) is 
acceptable. 
Situation: When thinking is focused on belief and decision, it takes place in some broad 
situation that gives it significance and provides some of the rules. The situation includes the 
people involved and their purposes, histories, allegiances, knowledge, emotions, prejudices, 
group memberships, and interests . . . These things are relevant not only to the significance 
of the thinking activity and some of the rules that guide it, but also to the meaning of what 
the thinker is doing or judging. A crucial feature of the courtroom situation was that the 
burden of proof was on the State, not the defense attorney. The State had to prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense attorney had to show only that his case was a 
reasonable possibility. 
Clarity: When you write and speak, it is important to be clear in what you say. . . The 
defense attorney’s conclusion (‘My client is innocent of the charge of murder’) and reason 
(‘She was defending herself against attack’) seemed clear to me in that situation. But in 
judging the inference from the reason to the conclusion, it was important to know what he 
meant by the word attack. If he had meant the word broadly, so that verbal abuse counted 
as an attack, then I believe that the inference would not have been a good one. That is, the 
reason, if true, would not have been enough to establish the conclusion . . . On the other 
hand, if by the word attack he meant attempted physical violence, then the inference from 
reason to conclusion seems to be more plausible . . . A good clarity slogan is “Say what you 
mean, mean what you say, and try to get others to do so as well.” 
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Overview: The sixth element in critical thinking, overview, calls for you to check what you 
have discovered, decided, considered, learned, and inferred. Put it all together and see 
whether it all still makes sense.92 
 Each of these elements serves as a broad guideline for reflecting on one’s 
thinking. In Ennis textbook, key concepts and terms are defined, followed by a listing 
and explanation of criteria for their application and some examples. Each chapter ends 
with a series of exercises with true or false questions and short, medium and long 
answer questions where students can apply the concepts discussed. For example, 
Chapter 2: Argument Analysis: Identifying Conclusions and Reasons, begins with a 
description of what an argument is and how to identify its elements: “Before you can be 
confident in your judgment about an argument, you must know what the argument is . 
. . The first thing to do is to determine the focus (the F in FRISCO) . . . So the first thing 
to do is to identity the conclusion. Generally, the second thing to do is to identify the 
reasons (the ‘R’) offered in support of the conclusion. In preparation for judging the 
inference (the ‘I’), it is also usually helpful to make a deliberate effort to see how the 
conclusion and the reason fit together.”93  
 The chapter then has a description of a particular courtroom trial that the author 
was part of with an example of summary arguments. The text then introduces criteria 
for identifying conclusions, such as ‘therefore,’ ‘hence,’ ‘thus,’ ‘so,’ ‘it follows that,’ and 
‘the following is my conclusion.’ This explanation is followed by true/ false questions 
and short answer questions. The pattern of the rest of the chapters is roughly the same. 
                                                
92 Ibid., 5-8. 
93 Ibid., 17. 
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The beginning chapters are focused on identifying arguments and the later chapters on 
appraising arguments. Chapter 2 is basic. Later chapters are much more intricate 
making lots of fine distinctions and introducing students to numerous criteria for 
identifying and appraising a variety of arguments, deductive and inductive (inference 
to the best explanation). This is essentially Ennis’s educational program for the 
development of critical thinking in students. Presumably, the various readings, 
explanations, examples and exercises are designed to foster the abilities and 
dispositions of a critical thinker (as outlined by him and listed on pages 47 and 48 
above). 
Evaluation 
 Ennis’ program for critical thinking has tremendous value. His critical thinking 
textbook is a vast improvement over traditional logic and critical thinking texts that 
simply emphasized deductive and inductive arguments and their attendant fallacies.94 
Though early on Ennis began with a very narrow definition of critical thinking as one of 
“the correct assessing of statements” his current definition, “reasonable, reflective 
thinking focused on what to believe and do,” is much broader and perhaps much more 
reflective of rationality. Ennis does not directly address what he means by ‘reflective 
thinking’ but Dewey, as noted earlier, defined it as “[a]ctive, persistent, and careful 
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of grounds that 
                                                
94 See for instance, Max Black, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1952). 
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support it and the further conclusions to which it tends.”95 In Ennis, as noted earlier, we 
see a definite emphasis on examination of evidence, inferences and conclusions. 
 We would rightly consider a person rational (at-least in part) if he/she engaged 
in an appropriate amount of such thinking in the appropriate circumstances. If a person 
never or seldom engaged in such examination we would rightly call that person 
irrational. Ennis has rightly added dispositions necessary for calling someone a critical 
thinker as when he says that critical thinkers ‘care that their beliefs be true and that 
their decisions be justified’ for example. If individuals didn’t care that their beliefs were 
true we would be hesitant to consider them critical thinkers or rational thinkers in 
general, though we might consider them critical and rational in specific circumstances. 
Furthermore, as far as I know, his is the most detailed account of necessary dispositions 
and abilities in the critical thinking literature. Each disposition is further broken down 
into sub-dispositions. Under Disposition 1, for example, ‘Care that their beliefs be true 
and that their decisions be justified’ Ennis lists five sub-dispositions: 
a) Seek alternative hypotheses, explanations, conclusions, plans, sources, etc.; and be open 
to them 
b) Consider seriously other points of view than their own 
c) Try to be well informed 
d) Endorse a position to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified by the 
information that is available.  
e) Use their critical thinking abilities.96 
                                                
95 Dewey, How We Think, 9. 
96 Ennis, “Critical Thinking: Reflection and Perspective: Part 1,” 15. 
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Each ability is further broken down into sub-abilities, and / or criteria as in the ability 
to ‘Observe, and judge observation reports’: 
a) Minimal inferring involved  
b) Short time interval between observation and report 
c) Report by the observer, rather than someone else (that is, report is not hearsay) 
d) Provision of records 
e) Corroboration 
f) Possibility of corroboration 
g) Good access 
h) Competent employment of technology, if technology applies 
i) Satisfaction by observer 97 
 In addition to dispositions, abilities and criteria, Ennis also rightly includes the 
necessity of good judgment in applying the criteria: “One cannot expect the application 
of criteria to yield a result automatically, except in mathematics and deductive logic . . . 
So good judgment in applying criteria is needed as well.” Finally, “[c]riteria used in 
making a good judgment are generally aided by Sensitivity, Experience, Background 
Knowledge and Understanding of the Situation that is “SEBKUS.”98 With respect to 
thoroughness and detail, Ennis’ breakdown of critical thinking into dispositions, 
abilities and criteria is enviable. 
 
 
                                                
97 Ibid., 16. 
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A targeted curriculum: efficiency  
 The project as a whole, that of having a curriculum for the improvement of 
thinking and reasoning skills through a curriculum that targets thinking skills is itself 
laudatory. If there are indeed general thinking dispositions (e.g. caring that one’s beliefs 
are in general true) and general abilities (e.g. ability to identity arguments and analyze 
their constituent parts, premises, inferences, conclusions) then it makes eminent sense 
to target these directly instead of trying to improve them somewhat indirectly and 
intuitively through a curriculum, say, on the disciplines.99 If the aim of teaching and 
learning the disciplines is to improve general thinking skills, then it is not at all an 
efficient method for improving them.100 Moreover, proceeding somewhat intuitively 
with regards to what these general skills are and somehow hoping that they will be 
improved through subject matter runs the great of risk of missing them entirely. Hence 
targeting them, through a tailor made curriculum seems eminently worthwhile. 
Specific and detailed goals hence specific curricula and sharper assessment 
 The detail in Ennis’ account of critical thinking is very helpful, in part. His pain 
staking work in further analyzing dispositions and abilities makes very clear exactly 
what it is that is required of true critical thinkers. While it is very helpful to know that 
critical thinkers “[c]are that their beliefs be true and that their decisions be justified,” it’s 
even more important to know what this entails, as Ennis makes clear: that they seek 
alternative hypotheses and explanations; that they seriously consider other points of 
                                                
99 A lively debate surrounds whether there are in fact general thinking skills. For a recent discussion, see 
Stephen Johnson, Harvey Siegel, and Christopher Winch, Teaching Thinking Skills, 2nd ed. (London: 
Continuum, 2010). 
100 I am indebted to Monsour Morteza for this point. 
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view than their own and that they only endorse a position to the extent and only to the 
extent that it is justified by the information available. These further subdivisions can 
serve as meaningful and specific goals for a curriculum designed to fostering effective, 
critical, rational, thinking. These detailed breakdowns can also serve as specific 
assessment criteria for a curriculum geared towards the improvement of thinking. 101 
His criteria are also very helpful. While a critical thinker ‘Observes and Judges 
observation reports’ it is helpful to know the criteria for doing this: minimal inferring, 
short time interval between observation and report, corroboration, etc. Ordinarily, we 
tend to do evaluate and judge somewhat intuitively. But Ennis has helped to make 
these intuitions explicit and conscious which again helps to set specific goals for a 
curriculum and design specific assessment instruments. 
Skills in identifying and assessing arguments 
 Certainly, part of what it means to think critically, rationally, reflectively, 
effectively, is that one can identify a conclusion in an argument, the reasons for the 
argument and assess the strength of reasons for the conclusion. Given a paragraph or a 
conversation or a scholarly work, if a person is not able to organize the ideas in terms of 
claims and evidence and is not able to ask pertinent questions regarding the warrant of 
claims, we would be reluctant to call this person a critical, rational thinker. Part of being 
critical, rational, reflective is to ask questions of evidence. This in itself seems reasonable 
because claims that have evidence are more likely to be true than claims based on very 
poor evidence (e.g. hearsay) or no evidence at all (merely personal conviction, biases, 
                                                
101 This is not an accident. Ennis’ PhD dissertation was on assessment of critical thinking. See Robert 
Ennis, “Critical Thinking: Reflection and Perspective: Part 1,” 6. 
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distorted observations, mis-readings, rhetoric). Evidence tracks truth hence being able 
to ask questions regarding evidence is a mark of a rational person and a critical thinker. 
There is tremendous value in being able to organize information that one receives and 
that one presents in terms of the schema of an argument: reasons, inferences and 
conclusions. So much of learning in schools emphasizes understanding and 
constructing arguments. In a philosophy class it isn’t sufficient to know Descartes 
claimed ‘I think therefore I am.’ If a student only knew that he would not have learned 
much philosophy. But it is also important to know and understand why Descartes 
makes that claim, his reasons for this claim. In science, it’s one thing to know that litmus 
paper turns blue in acidic conditions but better to know the reasons why. Academic 
papers in school often emphasize identifying and appraising arguments. This is what is 
meant, in part, by teachers urging students to write analytical papers rather than merely 
descriptive ones. Having the schema of an argument may also help students organize 
papers more logically (i.e. here is what I am arguing for and here are my reasons). Skills 
to evaluate arguments is also useful for lawyers and debaters and in many ways 
argument evaluation is exemplified in a court of law (hence, Ennis’ running example of 
summary arguments in court). Argument assessment skills are also essential for such 
tests as the SAT. And it is much better if students have a ready schema, with slots for 
evidence, conclusions and judgments of strength of inference, so that they can 
consciously and with ease apply the schema to any given content. 
Is a program in argument identification and assessment necessary in the first place? 
 However, like many other contemporary scholars, Ennis does not outline 
problems students face in thinking critically. This raises the question of the need of a 
critical thinking curriculum (as outlined by Ennis). Instead, he says: “Although 
  59 
everybody is already at least somewhat proficient at critical thinking, the material here 
should help you improve your abilities, to be reflective about them, and to develop 
your critical thinking dispositions.” No source is provided as to how we know people 
are already somewhat proficient at critical thinking but, more importantly, no 
documentation is provided to show to what extent people are not proficient in thinking 
critically and in which specific areas. From a curricular rationale point of view there is a 
massive step missing here. Without a clear understanding of specific problems students 
face in reasoning it is virtually impossible to know whether (i) critical thinking (as 
defined) is at all necessary, and (ii) whether taking a course in critical thinking will 
make a difference. This state of affairs indicates a prior commitment to the value of a 
critical thinking course and a prior conviction that it will make a difference. Data can be 
gathered post facto. 
The exclusive focus on arguments 
 While the goal of critical thinking defined as “reasonable and reflective thinking 
focused on deciding what to believe or do” is laudable and reflective of rationality, the 
educational means proposed by Ennis to achieve this goal relies almost exclusively on 
improving competencies in argumentation. While the various abilities which are said to 
aid critical thinking are broader in scope than merely argument identification and 
assessment, such as for example, abilities to focus on a question, ask and answer 
clarification questions, judge the credibility of a source and others they all appear to be 
in the service of argument identification and assessment. The end goal appears to be 
evaluation of given claims with respect to their evidence and the provision of 
appropriate evidence when making claims. Following from these abilities is a textbook 
curriculum (definitions, explanations, examples and exercises) which essentially teaches 
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students how to identify premises, inferences, conclusions and provides guidelines for 
appraising arguments. As noted earlier, Ennis makes the focus on arguments quite clear 
at the beginning of his textbook: “A key feature in decisions about beliefs is often an 
argument. You will be examining others’ argument and developing your own.”102 This 
focus is also eminently clear in the FRISCO approach to critical thinking that he 
suggests which is essentially a checklist for examining arguments: Focus, Reasons, 
Inference, Situation, Clarity and Overview. 
 Argument analysis and appraisal is just fine in its own right and has a definite 
place in education as discussed above. It is also an ingredient in rationality. The key 
question from the perspective of the present work is, ‘Is the focus on argument 
assessment sufficient for the cultivation of rationality, good thinking, reflective thinking, 
in general?’ Would we consider a person rational who could only analyze arguments 
and appraise them? There appears to an enormous gap between the ability to identify 
and appraise arguments and the abilities and dispositions we would consider 
constitutive of a fully rational person. A rational person, we might say, is one who 
actually thinks rather than one who simply goes through the motions or someone who 
plans before undertaking a task or who is mindful of consequences of courses of action 
or who proceeds with foresight or one who does not let his passions cloud his 
judgments. It is not at all clear that all of these ways of being rational are simply ways of 
competently assessing and presenting arguments, reasons and evidence. 
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Giving reasons but not reasoning: a problem of reason 
 With the focus on arguments, the strong implication in Ennis’ critical thinking 
educational program (as presented in his textbook) and indeed in critical thinking 
programs in general is that problems of reasoning are primarily problems of argument 
analysis and evaluation. In the previous chapter, several problems of reason were 
presented. For example, John Locke acutely observed a major ‘miscarriage of reason’ 
where the reasoner does not use his reason (instrument, intellect, thinking power) at all 
but relies on others’ reasonings. Two arguments on paper may look exactly the same yet 
one could simply be the product of parroting someone else’s reasoning. The real issue 
here is not the argument per se but the lack of true engagement—with the lack of true 
reasoning on the part of the reasoner despite presenting an argument. Much the same is 
the case in instances of rationalization. Though one gives reasons, one’s reason giving 
activity is being determined not so much by the facts of the matter but by preconceived 
conclusions. In neither of these cases would we consider persons rational though the 
arguments they give may be judged quite reasonable according to criteria of good 
arguments (as presented by Ennis and others). Exclusive attention to quality of 
arguments may conceal deeper problems of reason and rationality. 
  As a further illustration of a lack of true engagement despite giving reasons 
consider an experiment done on Stanford students. Students who had previously 
indicated that they either strongly believed capital punishment was a deterrent or that it 
was worthless as a deterrent were given two putatively authentic studies to read (with 
methods and results sections) on the effects of capital punishment. One study 
supported their position and the other was contrary to their position. Each participant 
was given a ‘panel’ design study (comparing murder rates before and after adoption of 
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capital punishment) and a ‘concurrent’ design study (comparing murder rates during 
the same time period for states with capital punishment and states without capital 
punishment). For half the subjects it was the panel design that supported their position 
and the concurrent design that opposed it. For the other half it was the reverse. Nisbett 
and Ross present the results: 
Subjects found whichever study supported their own position to be significantly “more 
convincing” and “better conducted” than the study opposing their position. If it was the 
panel study that supported their position and the concurrent one that opposed it, the 
subjects could see clearly the superiority of a panel design . . . over the sloppy technique of 
the concurrent design . . . If it was the concurrent study that supported their position, the 
subjects could readily appreciate the wisdom of a design that held time period constant, and 
found no trouble in exposing the flaws in a design that compared one state with itself. 103  
Nisbett and Ross capture this dire situation in a most appropriate metaphor: 
“Supporting evidence was handled with kid gloves; opposing evidence was mauled.” 
In the footnote they add a humorous but revealing comment: “Any resemblance 
between the behavior of subjects in this experiment and that of any professional 
scientist, living or dead, is purely coincidental.” 
 Nisbett and Ross interpret these findings in terms of the tendency to maintain a 
theory despite contrary evidence. But from the perspective of the present work, where 
the interest is in reason and reasoning, and from the perspective of the broader view of 
                                                
103 Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 170. 
Even more disturbingly, Nisbett and Ross report:  
After reading about both studies—one that supported their initial position and one that opposed their 
initial position . . . the subjects were more convinced of the correctness of their initial position than 
they were before reading about any evidence. Ibid., 171, (emphasis in the original). 
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the idea of reason as articulated by Morteza and cited in the introduction to this 
chapter, where “[t]he idea of reason is not limited to argument and evaluation of 
argument [but] . . . includes reason in itself, the use of reason, the problems of reason, 
contents, reality, the reasoner, their relationships, and other elements” we can see 
something much more.104 First, these are Stanford students who, we would expect, 
have rather strong skills in argument identification and argument evaluation. In all 
likelihood, these skills are reinforced in most of their undergraduate courses where 
there is likely to be an emphasis on ‘analytical’ and ‘critical thinking.’ No doubt, if given 
a test in informal logic/ critical thinking, most would do very well. However, though in 
all likelihood proficient in argument identification and assessment, in this case, they 
clearly have great difficulty in objectively assessing the evidence that is presented to 
them. Evidence that is in line with their prior belief is accepted and evidence which is 
contrary to their prior belief is rejected. And even more perniciously, they think they are 
being completely objective and rational in rejecting and accepting evidence as they can 
clearly “see” faults in the design of the study that happens to be contrary to their beliefs 
and “see” no faults in the study that happens to conform to their beliefs. Their prior 
belief is hijacking the evidence presented. No matter what is presented, it is being 
interpreted only in accordance with their prior belief.  
 Hence, the problem of reason, in this case, is not a problem of a lack of skills in 
argument assessment. The problem is the interference of a prior belief. Furthermore, and 
also from the perspective of the broader idea of reason, though it looks like they are 
reasoning in that they are analyzing studies, giving reasons for accepting and rejecting, 
                                                
104 See Introduction in Chapter 2, page 45 and Introduction in Chapter 3, page 123 of the present work. 
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they are not truly reasoning. Their reason giving activities are not on the basis of the 
evidence they see in front of them, i.e. they are not on the basis of what is actually there, 
in reality, since what is there, in reality, is that they are presented with equal evidence 
for both views. Rather, it is on the basis of the prior beliefs. In other words, reason is not 
in control but held hostage to the belief. Hence, though they are giving plenty of 
reasons, they are not really reasoning but think they are where their conclusions are 
being pre-determined by their prior beliefs. 
 This situation echoes problems of reason noted by Bacon, (indeed, Nisbett and 
Ross open their chapter with a quote from Bacon) where he says that once the mind 
adopts an opinion it will draw all things to support it. Even more specifically, it 
illustrates Bacon’s ‘idols of the cave,’ where a prior belief in the mind colors what enters 
the mind: “For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a 
cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature.” These are 
grave problems of reason that seem immune to dosages of argument identification and 
assessment. In Chapter 3, I show how a closely analogous situation obtains in a cultural 
context where certain cultural beliefs short-circuit reasoning. 
Lacking the right dispositions? 
 Can the above problem of reason be overcome by having the right kinds of 
dispositions? Ennis rightly points out that critical thinkers have certain dispositions 
without which they could not be considered critical thinkers, namely that they (i) ‘care 
their beliefs be true and that their decisions be justified’ and (ii) ‘care to understand and 
present a position honestly and clearly, theirs as well as others.’’ Perhaps having these 
dispositions may help in overcoming the grip of prior beliefs? But there is nothing in 
the situation, as described by Nisbett and Ross, to suggest that these Stanford students 
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don’t care that their beliefs be true. In all likelihood, if this experiment were to be 
repeated, say, in other universities and with other students, we would probably get 
similar results and it would be a gross generalization to suggest that participants in all 
these experiments simply didn’t care. 
 Ennis further subdivides the first disposition ‘care their beliefs be true and that 
their decisions be justified’ into a) seek alternative hypotheses, explanations, 
conclusions, plans, sources, etc. and be open to them, b) consider seriously other points 
of view than their own, c) try to be well informed, d) endorse a position to the extent 
that, but only to the extent that, it is justified by the information that is available. Unless 
the criteria for “seek,“ “consider” and “endorse” are tied to successful outcomes (in 
which case no one really seeks, considers and endorses unless he gets it right), what is 
really meant here is that individuals who care that their beliefs be true will “try to seek 
alternate hypotheses,” “try to consider other points of view,” “try endorse a position to 
the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified by the information that is 
available.” 
 Once again, there is nothing in the situation to suggest that Stanford students are 
not trying to seek alternative hypotheses and explanations, and trying to consider 
seriously other points of view. From all appearances, it seems they are indeed trying 
since they are not simply rejecting evidence that is contrary to their beliefs but 
providing putatively legitimate reasons for their rejection, namely that the methods by 
which the evidence was collected was faulty. This state of affairs suggests that, at-least 
to themselves, they have good reasons to reject evidence that happens to be contrary to 
their beliefs. In short, there is nothing in the situation to suggest that their reasonings 
are not sincere. Rather, the real difficulty lies elsewhere, deep within themselves—a 
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difficulty that they are not even aware of but which taints their interpretations despite 
their best intentions.105 
Dispositions: how are they developed? 
 The dispositions (i) ‘care their beliefs be true and that their decisions be justified’ 
and (ii) ‘care to understand and present a position honestly and clearly, theirs as well as 
others’’ are, of course, laudable. And since these dispositions are part of the ultimate 
goals of a critical thinking curriculum, another curricular question arises: ‘How are 
these dispositions to be cultivated? As pointed out above, Ennis’ critical thinking 
curriculum (with respect to the methods) essentially involves identifying and 
appraising arguments. Can these dispositions be developed by identifying and 
appraising arguments? To care that one’s beliefs be true, if one doesn’t care already, 
seems to involve a massive transformation of a person’s entire outlook and being. And 
similarly with considering seriously other points of view than just one’s own. These 
dispositions seem to require humility, empathy, imagination, willingness, autonomy 
and scrutinizing to the nth degree one’s own convictions and worldviews. If a person 
does not already have these attitudes and character traits, is the cure a good dose of 
argument analysis and evaluation?  
 Here, I am alluding to the overlooked gap between knowing how and wanting to. 
For example, we don’t normally think knowing how to lose weight generates a 
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disposition to want to lose weight and live a healthy lifestyle. Those who join weight 
loss classes are those who already want to lose weight. Something more is required to 
want to lose weight than merely knowing how to lose weight. To learn how to stop 
smoking is something altogether different than not wanting to smoke. In summary, 
knowing how to assess arguments is insufficient for cultivating the critical thinking 
dispositions outlined by Ennis. I return to this difficulty in the next section where 
Richard Paul’s critical thinking program hinges on the cultivation of appropriate 
dispositions.  
More than knowing how: for the right reasons, at the right time, in the right manner 
 The critical thinking curriculum as outlined by Ennis (argument identification 
and analysis) appears to be insufficient for rationality for other reasons as well. 
Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, in the context of a discussion of practical wisdom, 
notes that moral virtue is concerned with passions (fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, 
pleasure, pain) and actions and in these there is excess, defect and the intermediate. 
And the mark of virtue is “to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right 
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way 
[Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b].”106Without taking on board Aristotle’s theory of the 
mean, there is an important point being made here with respect to rationality. 
 In Ennis’ critical thinking textbook we are given situations (e.g. courtroom 
proceedings) and arguments (e.g. defense attorney’s arguments) to analyze. Let’s 
assume that after a thorough course in identifying and analyzing arguments we leave 
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the confines of the lecture room and enter the real world. In daily life, we come across 
lots of different arguments, by lots of different people, in lots of different circumstances, 
but there is no textbook note to say focus on this argument and not that one. A person 
who analyzed every argument that came his way during the day, from one given by a 
vagrant to work, one given in a commercial on the radio (buy this product and you will 
get the girl), one given by a student, one given by a spouse (if you come late, we won’t 
have time), one given by a grandmother (treat your wife well if you want to keep her) 
would be considered irrational, almost mad. The disposition to care for truth, if 
unchecked, may, in fact, make matters worse. Taking a clue from Aristotle, we might 
say, what is desirable from the point of view of rationality, is not just the ability and the 
disposition to evaluate arguments but do so at the right time, towards the right 
arguments, with the right motive, in the right manner and many other ‘rights.’ And 
what is required in achieving this (reasonable action overall) is an inquiry into which 
argument, what time, in what manner, with what kind of motive and the like. This 
might seem like a philosopher’s quibble in that, of course, what is required is some 
common sense inquiry. But the quibble illustrates an important point. Unless we make 
these judgments unthinkingly, which also would be irrational, the inquiry into these 
matters (of appropriateness) is of an entirely different order than an inquiry into the 
merits of an argument. It implies a broader notion of the use of reason than just one of 
assessing reasons.  
 As mentioned earlier, Ennis recognizes that critical thinking takes place in 
specific situations and it is these situations that provide the rules: “When thinking is 
focused on belief and decision, it takes place in some broad situation that gives it 
significance and provides some of the rules.” For example, Ennis points out: “A crucial 
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feature of the courtroom situation was that the burden of proof was on the State, not the 
defense attorney. The State had to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
defense attorney had to show only that his case was a reasonable possibility.”107 The 
courtroom situation provided the rules for how arguments are to be evaluated. But 
herein is the difference. In the courtroom case, the rules are provided. In daily life, the 
rules are not always provided but have to be discovered through inquiry. And this 
process of discovery is not a process of evaluation of arguments but it is nonetheless a 
process of reasoning. Furthermore, the discovery begins with an inquiry—an inquiry 
into which is not one of merely giving reasons. Reasoning is more than giving reasons. 
Overall pedagogy 
 A final note on the overall teaching approach in Ennis’ program. The pedagogy 
in each of the chapters begins with an introduction to the chapter, followed by 
definition of key terms and concepts and /or presentation of and explanation of criteria, 
then a summary of the chapter. After the end of the chapter, students are encouraged to 
do a series of exercises so that they can practice their newly learnt skills. These exercises 
are in the form of true/ false, and short, medium and long answer format. Here are 
some examples from Chapters 1, 2 and 3: 
True / False: 
1:15: When examining an argument, it is generally a good idea to try and identify the 
conclusion right away. 
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1:17: Asking whether the reasons are themselves believable is generally confusing and a 
waste of time. 
1:21: In deciding whether to believe a conclusion, the primary issue is whether the reasons 
are acceptable. 
Short answer exercises: 
For each of the following items, apply one or more of these labels [A-E] (remember that in 
applying the label you are not committed to calling the item a fallacy) 
A. Transfer 
B. Appeal to authority 
C. Testimonial 
D. Personal-attack argument 
E. No reason for thinking that it is any of the above 
3:20: A friend says, “The early-morning Amtrack train is the best way to get to Chicago, all 
things considered.” 
3:21: Another friend says, “My sister, who should know because she sometimes rides that 
train, tells me that the early morning train is not the best way to get to Chicago.” 
3:22: The first friend says. “Don’t pay any attention to her---she is prejudiced.” 
Medium length answer exercises: 
1:24: Suppose that the defense attorney had been using the word attack to mean the giving of 
either verbal or physical abuse, and that he had shown that the victim was calling the 
defendant nasty names. How would that affect your judgment as a juror about whether the 
reason was sufficient to establish the innocence? Why? 
Longer answer exercises: 
2:113: Find an argument in a short editorial, a “Dear Abby” selection, or a letter to an editor. 
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a. Underline the final conclusion twice 
b. Bracket the propositions and assign letters to them. 
c. Represent the argument pictorially in an arrow diagram. 
Several observations can be made on this pedagogy. Ennis’ textbook itself is about four 
hundred pages and the organization and size is quite typical of American textbooks 
which focus on skills and provide numerous exercises for practicing skills. As a 
comparative note, Japanese textbooks on the other hand tend to be very slim 
emphasizing key principles and not details. Stigler and Heibert note, for example, that 
American teachers, in the context of mathematics, emphasize skills whereas Japanese 
teachers emphasize seeing relationships between ideas. 108 Hence, is it possible that 
merely cultural elements have driven the very design of a textbook on ‘critical thinking’ 
that urges the examination of one beliefs and assumptions? But perhaps the textbook is 
well suited for an American audience? 
 More importantly, there is the question of need raised at the beginning of this 
chapter. For example, how many students would get the following question wrong? 
1:17: Asking whether the reasons are themselves believable is generally confusing and a 
waste of time. 
And the same for many of the explanations and exercises in the text. Perhaps some 
aspects of critical thinking, out of the many aspects outlined by Ennis, may not need to 
be taught at all as students may already be well versed in them. What would be useful 
is a study of areas of need. Where precisely do students have difficulty? Is it in 
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organizing material, in making certain kinds of inferences or in assessing reasons? If the 
latter, what about assessing reasons is difficult? A study along these lines could provide 
a rationale for the inclusion of specific subject matter in a course on critical thinking. 
Finally, do we know whether these exercises are efficacious? How useful is it for a 
student learning to ignore non-relevant comments to learn to label them, as when the 
textbook exercise asks students to label, A, B, C, or D (as above) the following 
statement:  
3:22 The first friend says. “Don’t pay any attention to her---she is prejudiced.” 
Does labelling help one learn to avoid errors? The design of the textbook and hence the 
educational program appears to be based more on the elements of critical thinking (as 
defined) rather than on a careful examination of what is needed and what will actually 
make a difference in students’ learning.  
In summary 
 Ennis’ treatment of critical thinking, as mentioned towards the beginning of the 
chapter, is perhaps the most detailed analysis of critical thinking in contemporary 
philosophy of education. Critical thinking, according Ennis is “reasonable reflective 
thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do.” This ideal is aided by certain 
abilities and dispositions, extensively outlined by Ennis, which can serve as goals for a 
critical thinking curriculum. His own textbook is a suggested program for cultivating 
these abilities and dispositions. The focus and overriding emphasis in the textbook is 
the development of skills in argument identification and assessment. Argument 
analysis and assessment is an essential aspect of rationality and is especially valuable 
for academic learning. Having an explicit schema for identifying and assessing 
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arguments facilitates comprehension of academic subject matter and certainly the 
writing of academic papers.  
 While the overall ideal of critical thinking is laudable and reflective of rationality, 
it is unclear how an educational program dedicated to the development of abilities in 
argument identification and evaluation leads to ‘reasonable and reflective thinking 
focused on what to believe and do.’ Reasonable and reflective thinking is not exhausted 
by these abilities. Considering arguments themselves, reasonable thinking seems to 
demand inquiry into, for example, ‘which arguments’ and in ‘what manner’ but these 
are not inquiries into argument evaluation. 
 Furthermore, for example, Stanford students purportedly are assessing evidence. 
But though they are giving reasons and defending their critique of studies, something 
seems to be drastically amiss as their reason giving activities are not actually based on 
the merits of the evidence but on prior belief. Hence, from another, wider perspective of 
reason and its uses, a perspective that includes in its conception such elements as the 
reasoner, reason, reality, uses of reason and contents, Stanford students aren’t really 
reasoning at all, as their reason giving activities are hijacked by their prior beliefs—their 
reason is not in charge and their evaluations are not based on what is there, in reality, 
but on what is merely in their minds. 
 Finally, there appears to be a major gap between a program in argument 
assessment and the cultivation of laudable dispositions such as caring that one’s beliefs 
be true. The latter requires deep transformation of the self if one does not have such 
dispositions already. It is unclear how dispositions can develop out of exercises in 
argument identification and evaluation. Though Ennis, over the course of a few years, 
has refined his conception of critical thinking from one confined to ‘the correct assessing 
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of statements’ to ‘reasonable and reflective thinking focused on deciding what to 
believe or do,’ the underlying approach, the suggested educational program for critical 
thinking is very much focused on just that, assessment of statements. This approach 
unduly limits the scope of true reflective thinking, reasonableness, reasoning and 
rationality. In the next section of the chapter, I present an educational program in 
critical thinking which recognizes some of the problems of critical thinking mentioned 
here and attempts to overcome them through a slightly different program. 
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Chapter 2.2 
Rationality Through Fairminded Critical Thinking 
 
Introduction 
 Concerned that critical thinking, as it was being defined in the literature, 
emphasized mastery of arguments, which could then be used to simply reinforce 
existing preconceptions, Richard Paul set out to provide a broader view of critical 
thinking, ‘fair-minded critical thinking’— a sophisticated and intricate proposal for 
cultivating critical thinking that seeks to overcomes self-centered perspectives. In this 
section of the chapter, I begin by noting problems in thinking and reasoning that Paul 
notes which provide a rationale for his conception. I then move to a critical analysis of 
his conception of critical thinking and the suggested educational program/methods for 
cultivating fairminded critical thinking. In my assessment, I question whether he in fact 
transcends the argument emphasis in critical thinking, whether the educational 
program he suggests is necessary, in the first place, and whether the program leads to 
the cultivation of rationality in education. 
Problems of reason 
 While Ennis, in the previous section, claimed “everybody is already at least 
somewhat proficient at critical thinking,” Richard Paul begins by stating grave 
problems in thinking: 
The mind doesn’t naturally grasp the truth. We don’t naturally see things as they are. We don’t 
automatically sense what is reasonable and what is unreasonable. Our thought is often 
biased by our agendas, interests, and values. We typically see things as we want to. We twist 
reality to fit our preconceived ideas . . . In addition, much of our perspective is unconscious 
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and uncritical and has been influenced by many forces—including social, political, 
economic, biological, and psychological influences. Selfishness and narrow-mindedness are 
deeply influential in the lives of most people.109 
Paul forthrightly states, for example, that though everyone thinks and it is in our nature 
to do so, “much of our thinking, left to itself, is biased, distorted, partial, uninformed, or 
down-right prejudiced.”110 As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, Paul categorizes 
problems in thinking into problems of ‘egocentric thinking’ and ‘sociocentric thinking’: 
Egocentric thinking results from the unfortunate fact that humans do not naturally consider 
the rights and needs of others. We do not naturally appreciate the point of view of others 
nor the limitations in our own view . . . We do not naturally recognize our egocentric 
assumptions, ways we use information, the egocentric ways we interpret data, the source of 
our egocentric concepts and ideas, the implications of our egocentric thought. We do not 
naturally recognize our self-serving perspective.111 
Sociocentric thinking results from individuals uncritically internalizing “the dominant 
prejudices of their society or culture.” This is the state of being “culture bound” and 
includes such problems as: “The uncritical tendency to place one’s culture, nation, 
religion above all others . . . The uncritical tendency to select self-serving positive 
descriptions of ourselves and negative descriptions of those who think differently from 
us . . . The uncritical tendency to internalize group norms and beliefs, take on group 
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identities, and act as we are expected to act—without the least sense that what we are 
doing might reasonably be questioned . . . The tendency to blindly conform to group 
restrictions (many of which are arbitrary or coercive) . . . The failure to think beyond the 
traditional prejudices of one’s culture.”112 In summary, we use ‘psychological 
standards’ in our thinking instead of intellectual ones such as “it’s true because I believe 
it,” “it’s true because we believe it,” “it’s true because I want to believe it,” “it’s true 
because I have always believed it” and “it’s true because it is in my selfish interest to 
believe it.”113 
 This is an impressive list of problems in thinking most of which could seriously 
jeopardize good reasoning and thinking. It is an open question whether his list of 
problems is exhaustive or representative of problems surrounding reason. For example, 
he fails to note what Locke noted, the tendency of individuals not to think/reason at all. 
Nonetheless, Paul is on the mark with respect to his overall approach in beginning with 
problems. Very few other philosophers of education begin with problems. Starting with 
problems sets the stage for Paul (and for us) for a rationale for an education in reasoning: 
“thinking left to itself is biased, distorted, partial, uninformed or downright prejudiced.” 
Hence, “[e]xcellence in thought . . . must be systematically cultivated.”114 We now have 
at-least some rationale for a program in education for cultivating good thinking/ 
reasoning. We also have some potential outcomes as measures for the success of the 
educational program, namely, individuals who go through the program will be less 
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egocentric and less socio-centric in their thinking in that they will be more likely to 
think beyond their own prejudices and beyond of their cultures’ prejudices. Starting 
with problems has the virtue of providing a focus to the educational program where the 
program ideally targets known problems in thinking. 
Goals: Fairminded critical thinking 
 Given problems in thinking and reasoning, the goal, according to Paul, is 
“critical thinking.” Critical thinking is: 
self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It requires 
rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of their use. It entails effective 
communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcoming our native 
egocentricism and sociocentricism. 115 
This view of critical thinking is exemplified by fairminded critical thinkers who are to 
be distinguished from other kinds of thinkers, namely the ‘naïve thinker’ and ‘the 
selfish critical thinker.’ Naïve thinkers “don’t see why it is important to work on their 
thinking. They don’t want to be bothered with developing their minds.” Selfish critical 
thinkers “are people who use their thinking to get what they want, without considering 
how their actions might affect other people. They are good at thinking, and they know 
it. But they are also very selfish. They may be greedy and unkind as well.” In contrast, 
“[f]airminded critical thinkers work to improve their thinking whenever they can. They 
want things for themselves, but they aren’t selfish. They want to help other people. 
They want to help make the world better for everyone. They are willing to give things 
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up to help others (when it makes sense to). They don’t always have the right answers, 
but they work to improve their thinking (and action) over time.”116  
 As is clear from the above description of thinkers, critical thinking is linked to 
certain character traits. Paul makes these character traits explicit and calls them 
‘intellectual habits or traits’ and they form an integral part of his conception of 
fairminded critical thinkers. It is the development of these character traits that appear to 
be the final goals of fairminded critical thinking. According to Paul, there are eight such 
desirable character traits: ‘intellectual humility,’ ‘intellectual autonomy,’ ‘intellectual 
integrity,’ ‘intellectual courage,’ ‘intellectual,’ ‘perseverance,’ ‘confidence in reason,’ 
‘intellectual empathy,’ and ‘fairmindedness.’ The trait of intellectual autonomy, for 
instance, is:  
Having rational control of one’s beliefs, values, and inferences. The ideal of critical thinking 
is to learn to think for oneself, to gain command over one’s thought processes. It entails a 
commitment to analyzing and evaluating beliefs on the basis of reason and evidence, to 
question when it is rational to question, to believe when it is rational to believe, and to 
conform when it is rational to conform. 
And fairmindedness, one of the most important character traits in Paul’s scheme, is: 
Having a consciousness of the need to treat all viewpoints alike, without reference to one’s 
own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or vested interests of one’s friends, 
community or nation; it implies adherence to intellectual standards without reference to 
one’s own advantage or the advantage of one’s group.117 
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Paul’s conception of critical thinking and critical thinkers with their character traits 
provide an impressive and thorough picture of ideal rational thinkers. Even if thinkers 
only had rational control over their beliefs, values and inferences it would take them a 
long way towards becoming first-rate thinkers.  
 Of course, the all-important question from an educational point of view is ‘How 
do we get there?’ How can we cultivate such fairminded critical thinkers? In their Guide 
to Critical Thinking, Linda Elder and Richard Paul state: “This guide focuses on the 
essence of critical thinking concepts. For teachers it provides a shared concept of critical 
thinking. For students it introduces critical thinking and provides strategies for 
developing one’s own critical thinking.” Hence, we can take the strategies outlined in 
this guide (and their other related guides) as their prescriptions for the cultivation of 
critical thinking and, by extension, critical thinkers. 
Strategies / educational program to achieve the goals of critical thinking 
 The fundamentals of Paul’s strategies/educational program are built on what he 
calls ‘elements of thought in reasoning.’ According to Paul, every case of reasoning can 
be broken down into eight elements of thought consisting of:  
1. Purpose (goals, objectives) 
2. Question at issue (problem, issue) 
3. Information (data, facts, reasons, observations, experiences, evidence) 
4. Interpretation & inference (conclusions, solutions) 
5. Concepts (theories, definitions, laws, principles, models) 
6. Assumptions (presuppositions, axioms, taking for granted) 
7. Implications & consequences  
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8. Points of view (frames of reference, perspectives, orientations) 118 
These elements lay the foundation for an education in critical thinking. Critical thinking 
is realized by applying what Paul calls ‘universal intellectual standards’ to these eight 
elements of thought. On Paul’s view, there are eight intellectual standards:  
1. Clarity 
2. Accuracy 
3. Precision 
4. Relevance 
5. Depth 
6. Logic 
7. Significance 
8. Fairness 
These intellectual standards, according to Paul, “are standards which should be applied 
to thinking to ensure its quality.” They must be taught, and students should be 
encouraged to apply them to their thinking with the ultimate aim that they become 
“infused in the thinking of students, forming part of their inner voice, guiding them to 
reason better.”119 Appling these standards to elements of thought results in a rough 
checklist of criteria which can be applied to any reasoning situation [next page]: 
  
                                                
118 Ibid., 3. 
119 Ibid., 8. 
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Checklist: Criteria for evaluating reasoning (elements of thought) 
1. Purpose: What is the purpose of the reasoner? Is the purpose clearly stated or clearly 
implied? Is it justifiable? 
 
2. Question: Is the question at issue well-stated? Is it clear and unbiased? Does the 
expression of the question do justice to the complexity of the matter at issue? Are the 
question and purpose directly relevant to the each other? 
 
3. Information: Does the writer cite relevant evidence, experiences, and /or information 
essential to the issue? Is the information accurate? Does the writer address the 
complexities of the situation? 
 
4. Concepts: Does the writer clarify key concepts when necessary? Are the concepts used 
justifiably? 
 
5. Assumptions: Does the writer show a sensitivity to what he or she is taking for granted 
or assuming? (Insofar as those assumptions might reasonably be questioned?) Does the 
writer use questionable assumptions without addressing problems which might be 
inherent in those assumptions? 
 
6. Inferences: Does the writer develop a line of reasoning explaining well how s/he is 
arriving at her or his main conclusions? 
 
7. Point of View: Does the writer show a sensitivity to alternative relevant points of view 
or lines of reasoning? Does s/he consider and respond to objections framed from other 
relevant points of view? 
 
8. Implications: Does the writer show a sensitivity to the implications and consequences of 
the position s/he is taking? 120  
                                                
120 Ibid., 12. 
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Bringing it all together, Paul represents his educational program for cultivating critical 
thinking as follows: 
 
 
Standards must be applied to the 
‘elements of thought’ (below) 
 
 
 
 
 
As we learn to develop ‘intellectual  
traits’ (below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Standards 
 Clarity    Precision  
 Accuracy    Significance 
 Relevance    Completeness 
 Logicalness   Fairness 
 Breath    Depth 
The Elements 
 Purposes   Inferences 
 Questions   Concepts 
 Points of View   Implications 
 Information   Assumptions 
Intellectual Traits 
Intellectual Humility  Intellectual Perseverance 
Intellectual Autonomy Confidence in Reason 
Intellectual Integrity  Intellectual Empathy 
Intellectual Courage  Fairmindedness 
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In summary, standards are applied to elements of thought which then results in 
intellectual traits. The ultimate goal is the full realization of these traits whose exercise 
results in fairminded critical thinking.121 
Evaluation 
 Paul, unlike many other philosophers of education, is acutely conscious of 
shortcomings in reasoning and presents them prior to presenting his program. Unlike 
Ennis’ program this gives his program a firm rationale. Humans are egocentric and 
sociocentric in their thinking. Hence what is called for is ‘fairminded’ critical thinking. 
Paul also provides a full picture of the ultimate goals of critical thinking, namely, the 
intellectual virtues. These are outlined clearly and also seem to capture what we would 
consider constitutive characteristics of rational persons. What sets him apart from other 
philosophers of education and others who have constructed curricula for critical 
thinking is his fresh starting point. He does not start with arguments but rather with 
‘elements of thought.’ Thought is a much more general category providing a wider, 
more panoramic view of the terrain of the objects of reasoning. 
 Paul’s program also has structural appeal in that he provides a logical, well 
connected system for critical thinking with ‘elements of thought,’ ‘intellectual standards’ 
and ‘intellectual virtues’ as the key components and where standards are applied to 
elements leading to the virtues. Metaphorically, I see his system for critical thinking as 
one where all thought (elements) is to be put through a mill (rigorous standards) which 
separates the chaff from the kernels (good thinking) eventually leading us to become 
good millers (we develop intellectual virtues). This makes his program very teachable, 
                                                
121 Ibid., 19. 
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in contrast to the massive amount of detail and overwhelming lists in Ennis’ 
educational program. The program is also completely portable. It’s no surprise that 
many of his works are in the form of booklets and miniature guides. The formula fits in 
a pocketbook. The system he lays out is also very general and, hence, applicable to 
many areas but especially to school/academic learning. Students can apply the system 
to evaluate and critique academic material and to organize the presentation of their 
own ideas. 
Still in the grip of argument and evaluation?  
 Paul’s project starts with an analysis of thought. As mentioned earlier, this is a 
move in the right direction as critical thinking ought to be more than just production 
and analysis of argument. If successful, this way of proceeding could substantially 
expand the realm of critical thinking. However, though Paul starts with this fresh and 
unique perspective, in presenting his elements of thought and their analyses, it appears 
that he may still be operating under the grip of argument. Most of his elements of 
thought/ reasoning can be seen as perfect elements of an argument namely premises, 
inferences and conclusions. Element 3 (‘Information’) are essentially premises, Element 
6 (‘Assumptions’) are the implicit premises, Element 5 (‘Concepts’) are further premises 
or what premises are composed of, Element 4 (‘Interpretation & Inference’) are the 
inferences and conclusions. The argument is motivated by Element 1 (‘Purpose’) and 
Element 2 (‘Question at Issue’). So perhaps argument still haunts in the background. 
What seems to be somewhat unique is the addition that these elements may reflect 
narrow perspectives, egocentric and socio-entric thinking, [Element 8 (Point of View)] 
and that the elements may have ‘Implications and Consequences’ (Element 7). Elements 
7 and 8 are not usually dealt with explicitly in programs that emphasize argument 
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identification and assessment. Nonetheless, in the final analysis, the underlying 
organizational schema appears to be that of argument. 
Is the recommended educational program needed in the first place? 
 Paul’s educational program essentially consists in specifying for students the 
elements of thought/ reasoning then encouraging them to apply the suggested 
intellectual standards on them. For example, after having raised a question (an element 
of thought) in their reasoning, and after having gathered information (another element 
of thought), students are encouraged to ask the following questions regarding these 
elements: 
1. Question: Is the question at issue well-stated? Is it clear and unbiased? Does the 
expression of the question do justice to the complexity of the matter at issue? Are the 
question and purpose directly relevant to the each other? 
 
2. Information: Does the writer cite relevant evidence, experiences, and /or information 
essential to the issue? Is the information accurate? Does the writer address the 
complexities of the situation? 
And the same for the rest of the six elements of reasoning. This is essentially the remedy 
suggested for thinking critically. But we might ask, ‘Is there a problem in these areas in 
the first place?’ Do we know whether students have trouble formulating, clear, 
unbiased, relevant, sophisticated questions? Do we know whether students have 
trouble citing relevant evidence, experiences, and doing this accurately and 
appropriately fitting the complexity of situations? If so, no problems of this sort have 
been documented by Paul as part of the rationale for an entire curriculum on evaluating 
elements of thought. The problems of reasoning documented by Paul are problems to 
do with egocentricism and sociocentricism. Perhaps students have absolutely no 
problems formulating good questions and providing sound information. In which case, 
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entire chunks of the program may be redundant. If so, these suggested remedies are a 
bit like taking vitamins when we may not really need them. But vitamins are cheap. 
Education is costly. This, I believe, reveals a larger problem in the very method of 
designing instruction in critical thinking and in other educational endeavors more 
generally—the design of educational materials appears to be based primarily on an 
analysis of the subject matter in question rather than on an inquiry into which aspects of 
this subject matter in fact needs an educational program for their realization. 
Evaluation: sufficient for rationality? 
 As shown above, what Paul’s program calls for is an evaluation of elements of 
thought. For the element of “Information” he recommends asking such questions as 
“Does the writer cite relevant evidence, experiences, and /or information essential to 
the issue? Is the information accurate? Does the writer address the complexities of the 
situation? While evaluation is an important aspect of rationality does it encapsulate all 
of rationality? Even if we take rationality to be defined by the intellectual virtues Paul 
himself outlines, the virtues are much more extensive than the abilities and propensities to 
evaluate. For example, the virtue of “having rational control of one’s own beliefs, values 
and inferences” seems to involve so much more than merely evaluating. It seems to 
involve an exercise of the will, self-control, vigilance, strength and awareness. Having 
“a consciousness of the need to treat all viewpoints alike, without reference to one’s 
own feelings or vested interests” seems to imply more than acts of evaluation. It seems 
to involve ethics, concern for others and detachment none of which are acts of 
evaluation.  
 In Paul’s system for cultivating critical thinking we seem to have a major gap 
between the recommended educational program (evaluation of elements of thought 
  88 
according to intellectual standards) and the ideals of rationality. There seems to be an 
enormous gulf between skills of evaluation and the eventual goals of acquiring the 
virtues. [This is related to the gap between learning evaluation skills and developing 
dispositions in Ennis’ account]. The implication throughout Paul’s program is that it is 
through this evaluation process, that we develop and realize the intellectual virtues. No 
argument is presented as to how this gulf is to be bridged. It appears to have been 
assumed that engaging in acts of evaluation according to the intellectual standards will 
lead to the intellectual traits. 
 In my mind, this is an illicit assumption. As mentioned in the last section, it is 
like saying that by learning how to lose weight one will develop the willingness to lose 
weight. Learning how to swim (ability to evaluate) and learning to want to swim 
regularly, say for good health (learning to develop a rational character), are different 
kinds of learnings and it is not clear at all that one seamlessly and readily leads to the 
other. The first is a matter of skill and the second is a matter of a change in one’s 
outlook and aspirations, which may come about through appreciation of values of 
health, conviction that swimming leads to health, reordering of one’s priorities in life, 
struggling to overcome counter desires, steadfastness, and perhaps several other things.  
 Consider an experiment by Ross, Lepper and Hubbard that speaks to the 
difficulty in realizing intellectual virtues such as intellectual autonomy defined by Paul 
as ‘having rational control of one’s beliefs.’ In their experiment, participants were 
presented with the task of distinguishing authentic suicide notes from inauthentic 
suicide notes. Following these tasks participants were provided with false feedback 
from the experimenter indicating that they were either below average level, average 
level or above average level in distinguishing these notes. They were then later told that 
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the feedback from the experimenter (that they were below average, average or above 
average in their performance) was actually completely random and had no connection 
to how they had actually performed. They were also shown the experimenter’s 
instruction sheet which had already pre-assigned them to one of three feedback levels. 
After this debriefing, subjects were asked to estimate their own actual level of 
performance in the task, to predict how they might perform on related future tasks and 
to estimate their abilities at distinguishing authentic from in authentic suicide notes.  
 Nisbett and Ross report that results “revealed a remarkable degree of 
postdebriefing perseverance.” Even after a thorough debriefing participants who had 
been assigned to the above average condition “continued to rate their performance and 
abilities far more favorably” than subjects assigned to the average condition. And 
subjects assigned to the below average condition “showed the opposite pattern of 
results, continuing to rate themselves as unsuccessful and lacking ability for the 
experimental task and for other, similar ones.” Nisbett and Ross interpret these results 
as indicating belief perseverance despite debriefing.122  
 How might we interpret this study from the perspective of the present study, 
specifically, in light of the question of developing the intellectual virtues? We see here 
that the participants’ own judgments regarding their abilities, are not based on their 
own estimation of their abilities at all. Rather, they are based on the experimenter’s 
estimation. Why is it that we see this phenomena? In the absence of the experimenter’s 
judgment participants would estimate their abilities based on their own judgments. But 
                                                
122  Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980), 176-77. 
  90 
having inserted the experimenter’s judgment in their minds, they can no longer make 
their own estimation and own judgment. From the perspective of the broader idea of 
reason mentioned and explicated earlier,123 the belief implanted by the experimenter is 
blocking their own investigation into the matter—it is blocking their own reasoning into 
their true abilities. Their own reason is now enslaved to the experimenter’s. They are 
not reasoning. They are not using their own reason but going by that of the 
experimenter’s. Instead of exploring for themselves their own abilities and seeing what 
they make of them, they “see” their own abilities through the lenses of the 
experimenter. Even more disturbingly, they think they are reasoning all the while and 
basing their judgments on their own estimations. The real power of lenses lies in their 
invisibility. The participants are indeed evaluating in that they are asking questions 
regarding their abilities. But unbeknownst to them they are not truly reasoning. 
 And nothing here turns on whether they happen to hit upon a true estimation of 
their abilities. Through a process of ‘evaluation’ they may arrive at a true belief 
regarding their abilities. But if this evaluation is undertaken under the grips of the belief 
implanted by the experimenter, it would not count as a belief arrived at by a process of 
reasoning. Something more needs to be in place before acts of evaluation can be 
considered true acts of reasoning. Namely, a true engagement of one’s own reason. The 
broader idea of reason includes within it the notion of the instrument of reason and also 
the reasoner. In this case the reasoner is not truly engaged; he is not truly using his 
reason. This state of affairs is reminiscent of Plato’s succinct remark that we are pulled 
by cords and strings. And this speaks to the enormous difficulty of realizing the 
                                                
123 See above, page 45 and below, page 123 of the present work for the broader view of reason. 
  91 
intellectual virtues. In the above case, the participants (in the particular case of judging 
suicide notes) are not in any way intellectually autonomous in that they do not have 
‘rational control of over their own beliefs.’ It’s the experimenter who has control over 
their beliefs. 
 Now the question remains “How do we become intellectually autonomous?” The 
route prescribed by Ennis and strongly implied by Paul is through critical thinking. 
And critical thinking according to both is fundamentally an exercise in evaluation of 
arguments, reasons, questions, and other elements. In fact, Paul, in describing 
intellectual autonomy continues: “It entails a commitment to analyzing and evaluating 
beliefs on the basis of reason and evidence.” But we see here that it is not a lack of 
commitment ‘to analyzing and evaluating beliefs’ on the part of the participants. The 
participants seem very much committed to giving reasons for their beliefs. Indeed, they 
think they are doing just that. The problem lies in their difficulty in removing the 
stranglehold of the experimenter on their minds once a belief has been implanted. 
Moreover, they are not even aware of this difficulty—of the stranglehold on their 
minds. The remedy does not seem to be more evaluation but a method for bringing 
awareness of this dire state of affairs and removing the stranglehold. Developing 
intellectual autonomy is no small matter and evaluation seems to be an insufficient 
means. 
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Conflating skills to evaluate elements of thought with skills to generate elements of thought? 
 In an early and influential publication on critical thinking, Max Black compared 
the qualities of a good reasoner with the qualities of good critic.124 Just as a good critic 
is able to judge a piece of music or fine cuisine and is able to spell out the criteria by 
which he judges, a good reasoner evaluates a piece of reasoning and spells out his 
criteria. Good reasoning, according to Black, is analogous to critiquing well. This 
wonderful analogy, of course, conceals the all-important point that good reasoning does 
not just consist in evaluating reasoning but also in generating it as well. In line with the 
broader view of reason explicated earlier, a view which does not limit the use of reason 
to argumentation and evaluation, we would not consider someone a good reasoner who 
could only evaluate reasoning but not able to generate his own. In this sense, a good 
reasoner is not like a critic but rather like a first rate musician or a first rate chef.125 And 
the skills required of a musician and a chef are vastly different from the ones required 
of a critic of music and a critic of cuisine. Critiquing cuisine will not eventually make 
                                                
124 Black makes the analogy clear: 
A well-trained critic of music ‘understands what it is all about.’ He is in a position to appreciate what 
the performer was trying to achieve, how successful he was in overcoming the particular limitations 
and difficulties of the instrument, and so on. The critic’s judgment of the value of the piece of music 
(or omelet, or a piece of reasoning) is grounded in knowledge of principles and standards 
appropriate to the subject matter. Max Black, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific 
Method (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952) 7. 
A good critic of music is able to give reasons for his judgments. Most importantly, these judgments are 
grounded in knowledge of appropriate principles and standards. Similarly,  
To be in a position to improve reasoning means to be in a position to distinguish good reasoning 
from bad. A man who judges cattle has some specifications before him (often in a precise form) of 
what constitutes a good specimen of the breed he is judging. A thinker who tries to improve his 
thinking must, likewise, have in mind some standard for discriminating good thinking from bad. To 
put the matter in another way, the art of logic, like all arts, involves the use of ideals. Ibid., 7-8. 
125 I am indebted to M. Morteza for the potent analogy of the reasoner as a first rate musician.  
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one a fine chef and critiquing music will not eventually make one a concert pianist. A 
quality controller is not an engineer and does not become one from doing more quality 
controlling. A vast chasm separates the two kinds of skills involved. The best critic may 
make the worse music and the worse meal. Paul’s and Ennis’ educational path for 
critical thinking resembles the path of a critic not the path of a practitioner or producer. 
This unduly restricts the range and scope of reasoning and worse, it forces the 
straightjacket of evaluation and critique on all forms of reasoning. Good reasoning is 
more than a critique of reasoning. 
 This important fact is amply demonstrated by none other than the paragon of 
rationality. Susan Langer, in her underappreciated Philosophy in a New Key, shows how 
the real genius of a great philosophy lies in the formulation of new questions and 
problems. A new philosophy’s questions “make the frame in which its picture of facts is 
plotted . . . they give the angle of perspective, the palette, the style in which the picture 
is drawn.”126 Nothing exemplifies this better than Socrates’ profound questions: 
Socrates did not continue and complete Ionian thought; he cared very little about the 
speculative physics that was the very breath of life to the nature-philosophers, and his 
lifework did not further that ancient enterprise by even a step. He had not new answers, but 
new questions, and therewith he brought a new conceptual framework, an entirely different 
perspective, into Greek philosophy . . . [N]ot "Which answer is true?" but: "What is Truth?" 
"What is Knowledge, and why do we want to acquire it?" His questions were disconcerting 
because they contained the new principle of explanation, the notion of value. Not to describe 
the motion and matter of a thing, but to see its purpose . . . From this conception a host of 
                                                
126 Susan Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art (New York: 
New American Library, 1948), 2 
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new inquiries were born. What is the highest good of man? Of the universe? What are the 
proper principles of art, education, government, medicine? To what purpose do planets and 
heavens revolve, animals procreate, empires rise? Wherefore does man have hands and eyes 
and the gift of language? 127 
It is unlikely that this new frame in philosophy, an entirely new palette, was born from 
Socrates’ gift in evaluating elements in reasoning. A whole world is implicated in a 
profound question and its asking requires deep thought, perspicuity, and prescience—
skills that far surpass evaluation of elements in reasoning. 
 Though Paul begins with a more inclusive framework for conceptualizing critical 
thinking when he begins with elements of thought as opposed to argument, what 
ultimately emerges from his program are methods for evaluating reasoning. This is, of 
course, welcome especially as it is a program that seeks to evaluate more general 
elements of thought such as purposes, points of view and implications, rather just than 
merely evaluation of arguments. But it is unclear how learning and applying skills of 
evaluation develop the intellectual virtues integral to rationality such as intellectual 
autonomy. To simply gain ‘rational control over one’s beliefs’ is no small task. 
 Though Paul rightly begins with documenting acute problems in thinking and 
reasoning, in all likelihood, Paul has not appreciated how deep egocentric and socio-
centric thinking really goes or has overestimated the power of his evaluation tools. 
Furthermore, perhaps Paul makes the illicit assumption that skills to evaluate are 
similar in kind to skills for producing or that that leaning and applying the former lead 
to the latter. But a world separates the two kinds of skills. 
                                                
127 Ibid., 4-5. 
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 But Paul’s program is well suited for school learning. What emerges from the 
actual suggested educational program is a method for critiquing and learning academic 
subject matter. That the underlying focus of the educational program is on academic 
subject matter is reinforced by comments such as “[f]or students it is a critical thinking 
supplement to any textbook for any course. Students can use it to improve their 
learning in any content area. Its generic skills apply to all subjects . . . When this guide is 
used as a supplement to the textbook in multiple courses, students begin to perceive the 
usefulness of critical thinking in every domain of learning.”128 But good reasoning 
surpasses academic learning where students are, on the whole, mainly consumers 
rather than producers and where learning is confined to the acquisition of knowledge 
more than the transformation of the quality of ones thinking. Lastly, the pedagogy, like 
Ennis,’ relies on telling, urging and encouraging students to evaluate (according to a 
number of standards). Whether this pedagogy is effective is an area that needs 
investigation. Its efficacy has been unwittingly assumed. 
  
                                                
128 Paul and Elder, The Miniature Guide Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools, front cover.  
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Chapter 2.3 
Rationality Through Initiation into the Disciplines 
Introduction 
 As noted in the introduction to this chapter, critical thinking, especially as 
conceptualized and influenced by John Dewey, came under severe criticism across the 
Atlantic. In their newly formed philosophy of education program at the University of 
London, Richard Peters and Paul Hirst argued for a return to a liberal education (along 
Greek lines) focused on knowledge of the disciplines in lieu of education along 
progressive lines and in contrast to the development of critical thinking skills. More 
recently, John McPeck, an arch critic of the critical thinking movement, argues along the 
lines of Peters and Hirst in his emphasis on the disciplines and criticism of generalizable 
critical thinking skills.129 Israel Scheffler in the United States built on the work of Peters 
                                                
129 John McPeck makes his view of critical thinking quite clear:  
[T]he arguments in each of these essays are pieces, or subplots, of a more general point of view about 
critical thinking. That general view is, briefly, that specific subject content determines the required 
ingredients for thinking critically in each case. One of the more unwelcome consequences of this view 
is that the notion of “general critical thinking skills” is largely meaningless. Therefore, the great bulk 
of critical thinking programs which exist today are seriously misguided, in my view. 
John McPeck, Teaching Critical Thinking (Routledge: New York, 1990), xiv. 
He also argues for subject matter knowledge along the lines indicated by R. S. Peters: 
[A]t the moment, however, I see no competitive substitute for a liberal education. In particular, I am 
talking about the rational perspective which comes from an informed study of natural and social 
sciences, together with history, mathematics, literature, and art. We have yet to devise any 
comparable package which can yield the same breath of cognitive perspective. Whether by design or 
by folly, our education system has been more or less on the right track. In its own stumbling, 
bumbling, bureaucratic way, it may after all be trying to do the right thing. Its failures should not 
blind us to the potential for success. This point of view about education is hardly new. I refer you to 
the work of R. S. Peters, Paul Hirst, and perhaps Jerome Bruner for a sustained defense of it. Ibid., 16. 
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and Hirst and argued for the cultivation of rationality through the traditional 
disciplines. 130 
 In this section of the chapter, I present the educational program for the 
cultivation of rationality through the disciplines as originally conceived by Israel 
Scheffler. According to Scheffler, “[r]ationality is . . . the ability to participate in critical 
and open evaluation of the rules and principles in any area of life. To initiate the child 
into the rational life is to engage him in critical dialogues that relate to every area of 
civilization: to science and art, morality, and philosophy, history and government.”131 I 
begin with the question of problems in thinking and reasoning that such an education 
program seeks to overcome. I then outline Scheffler’s program, then evaluate its merits. 
His program, I argue, highlights an important aspect of rationality. But it is too narrow. 
His view of rationality and its close connection to the disciplines leads to some counter 
intuitive conclusions regarding reason, rationality and their cultivation. 
Problems of reason 
 Scheffler does not mention any problems in thinking and reasoning hence it is 
unclear what lacuna will be overcome through an education in rationality. However, in 
the background, I believe, Scheffler has in mind an implied problem of reason (and a 
deep one at that). In the context of his discussion of the nature of teaching, Scheffler 
quotes from R. S. Peters’ inaugural lecture, Education as Initiation, delivered at the 
                                                
130 Harvey Siegel, in developing his notion of critical thinking, draws inspiration from Scheffler’s notion of 
rationality. See Harvey Siegel, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking and Education (New York, 
Routledge, 1988). Siegel’s emphasis is on a defense of a conception of critical thinking inspired by 
Scheffler. Siegel may or may not endorse Scheffler’s educational program as presented here. 
131 Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 62. 
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University of London in 1963. Behind Scheffler’s notion of rationality through initiation 
is Peters’ views on the aims of education articulated in this lecture. It is in this lecture 
that Peters criticizes Dewey, critical thinking, reflective thinking and progressive 
education in the US and proposes an alternate conception of what it means to be an 
educated person. It is here that we see a problem of reason. As briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 1, in his lecture, Peters remarks:  
No man is born with a mind; for the development of mind marks a series of individual and 
racial achievements. A child is born with an awareness not as yet differentiated into beliefs, 
wants and feelings. All such specific modes of consciousness, which are internally related to 
types of objects in the public world, develop later pari passu with the pointing out of 
paradigm objects . . . Gradually the child comes to want things which are means of 
obtaining instead of threshing round beset by unruly and unrealistic wishes . . . He learns to 
name objects, to locate his experience in a spatio-temporal framework . . . In the beginning it 
was not at all like this. Such an embryonic mind is the product of initiation into public 
traditions enshrined in a public language, which it took remote ancestors centuries to 
develop. 132 
Peters reinforces the implications for education of this view of the mind:  
Further differentiation develops as the boy becomes initiated more deeply into distinctive 
forms of knowledge such as science, history, mathematics, religious and esthetic 
appreciation, and into the practical types of knowledge involved in moral, prudential and 
technical forms of thought and action. Such differentiation is alien to the mind of a child and 
primitive man—indeed to that of a pre-seventeenth-century man. To have a mind is not to 
enjoy a private picture show or to exercise some inner diaphanous organ; it is to have an 
                                                
132 Peters, “Education as Initiation,” 102-3. 
  99 
awareness differentiated in accordance with the canons implicit in all these inherited 
traditions. ‘Education’ marks out the processes by means of which the individual is initiated 
into them.133 
Man is born with an awareness but not a mind as this awareness is not yet 
differentiated, according to Peters. To have a mind is essentially to have a differentiated 
consciousness in accordance with public criteria. Further differentiation of 
consciousness develops through an initiation into ‘forms of knowledge’ such as science 
and history for example, hence, the necessity of an education into the disciplines. This 
(radical) view emerges out of the then current philosophical air. The move away from 
inner processes of mind and the emphasis instead on public criteria are indebted to 
Wittgenstein, especially as he was interpreted by Gilbert Ryle, in his enormously 
influential Concept of Mind—a work that Peters and Scheffler both reference. Gilbert 
Ryle had argued that talk of inner processes of the mind likened one to talking about a 
‘ghost in the machine.’ Processes of the mind are to be understood not as private, inner, 
inaccessible happenings but by (external) public and shared criteria.  
 Peters view of education also emerges in reaction to progressive philosophies of 
education that had taken root in the United States. In the same lecture, Peters notes, for 
example, that “[t]here have been many like Dewey who have attacked the notion that 
education consists in the transmission of a body of knowledge. Stress is placed instead 
on critical thinking, individual experimentation and problem-solving.” He continues by 
remarking how he saw lessons in America where critical thinking was slavishly 
applied—where a teacher used poetry simply for the purposes of critical thinking. Lost 
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in this process, according to Peters, was an appreciation of poetry itself along with 
history itself when they were used simply as a means for teaching critical thinking: 
“The notion that poetry should be listened to, or that one has to be, to a certain extent, a 
historian in order to understand a historical problem, was an alien one.”134 
Furthermore, Peters cast doubt on whether there might be any generalizable critical 
thinking skills at all and thereby making a case for the indispensability of the 
disciplines: 
The emphasis on ‘critical thinking’ was salutary enough, perhaps, when bodies of 
knowledge were handed on without any attempt being made to hand also the public 
procedures by means of which they had been accumulated, criticized, and revised. But it is 
equally absurd to foster an abstract skill called ‘critical thinking’ without handing on 
anything concrete to be critical about. For there are as many brands of ‘critical thinking’ as 
there are disciplines, and in the various disciplines such as history, science, and philosophy, 
there is a great deal to be known before the peculiar nature of the problem is grasped.135 
This, together with the view noted above regarding the mind as initially undeveloped 
and the role of civilization in forming the mind, Peters states his philosophy of 
education bluntly:  
[Children] start off in the position of the barbarian outside of the gates. The problem is to get 
them inside the citadel of civilization so that they will understand and love what they see 
when they get there.136 
                                                
134 Ibid., 103. 
135 Ibid., 103-4. 
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Returning to Scheffler, as stated earlier, he does not mention problems of mind, reason 
and rationality but in the background he may have R. S. Peters’ notion of children 
lacking minds in the full sense and hence lacking rationality.  
The educational program for the cultivation of rationality 
 Scheffler’s education program for the cultivation of rationality builds on Peters’ 
notion of mind and civilization. He begins by defining rationality: 
It seems to me, moreover, that the concept of rationality is even broader than that of 
intelligence, involving simply the capacity to grasp principles and purposes, and to evaluate 
them critically in the light of reasons that might be put forward in public discussion. 
Rationality is thus, as I view it, the ability to participate in critical and open evaluation of the 
rules and principles in any area of life.137 
Note his emphasis on “public discussion,” a concept indebted to Wittgenstein and Ryle. 
In explicating his philosophy of education with respect to rationality, we see traces of 
Peters’ notion of education as initiation in the disciplines argued for in his inaugural 
lecture: 
To initiate the child into the rational life is to engage him in critical dialogues that relate to 
every area of civilization: to science and art, morality, and philosophy, history and 
government. It is to nourish his curiosity and critical judgment as well his responsibility for 
choices of belief and conduct. Such a conception goes far beyond the notion of academic 
mastery of factual subject matter, and far beyond the transmission model.138 
                                                
137 Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 62 (emphasis in the original). 
138 Ibid., 62. 
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Scholarship in history is subject to an analogous interpretation [to that of science, discussed 
in an earlier passage], for beyond the formal demands of reason, in the sense of consistency, 
there is a concrete tradition of technique and methodology defining the historian’s 
procedure and his assessment of reasons for or against particular historical accounts. To 
teach rationality in history is, in effect, here also to introduce the student to a live tradition 
of historical scholarship. Similar remarks might be made also with respect to other areas, 
e.g., law, philosophy, and the politics of democratic society. The fundamental point is that 
rationality cannot be taken simply as an abstract and general ideal. It is embodied in multiple 
evolving traditions, in which the basic condition holds that issues are resolved by reference to 
reasons, themselves defined by principles purporting to be impartial and universal. These 
traditions should, I believe, provide an important focus for teaching.139 
 If clarity is a virtue, then Scheffler has certainly exemplified it. To initiate a child 
into the rational life is to initiate him into the live and evolving traditions of science, 
history, law and the like. Rationality is not simply an abstract and general idea but it is 
‘embodied’ in multiple and evolving traditions where the basic condition holds that 
‘issues are resolved by reference to reasons, themselves defined by principles purporting 
to be impartial and universal.’ The ultimate aim of the educational program is to foster 
rationality defined as ‘the ability to participate in critical and open evaluation of the 
rules and principles in any area of life.’ In this notion of the cultivation of rationality in 
education, Scheffler makes clear that it is not just rational abilities that are important but 
also a character that embodies rational dispositions.140 Hence the “[t]he job of education 
                                                
139 Ibid., 79. 
140 This point is made clear in the following passage:  
Rationality has just been characterized as a precious instrument for assessing truth and for gauging 
the trustworthiness of courses of action. It must, however, also be conceived as an autonomous 
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is to develop character in the broadest sense, that is, principled thought and action, in 
which the dignity of man is manifest.”141 
Evaluation 
 There is tremendous merit in Scheffler’s educational program for the fostering of 
rationality. First, with regards to the eventual goal, we would not call a person rational 
if he did not have the ability to evaluate rules and principles in life, whatever they may 
be. If he had tremendous difficulty evaluating beliefs, principles, courses of action we 
would certainly see something amiss with respect to his reason and rationality. And if 
this difficulty is endemic and generalized and leads to him hold rules and principles 
without evaluating them, we would certainly not be unjustified in calling him 
somewhat irrational. Conversely, if we did find someone who displayed the ability to 
evaluate rules and principles, we would rightly say of this person that he was really 
able to think and reason. So Scheffler is quite right to characterize rationality (at-least) in 
terms of “the ability to . . . participate in critical and open evaluation of the rules and 
principles in any area of life.” 
 Scheffler’s educational program, the means through which rationality is to be 
fostered, also has merit. Since rationality (at-least) consists in the ability to evaluate 
principles, rules and reasons and if students do not have this ability to begin with, it 
seems reasonable that students should be given opportunities to give reasons, and 
evaluate rules and principles in an educational context. Furthermore, providing this 
                                                
character trait. That is to say, that it is not just a tool used by a developed ego to solve its problems in 
the world . . . If rationality is an instrument, it can be regularly used only by those whose characters 
embody rational dispositions. Ibid., 28. 
141 Ibid., 77. 
  104 
opportunity in the context of the disciplines has the advantage of introducing students 
to various areas of human civilization, science, law, history, and the like. This 
introduction no doubt widens their outlook, expands their horizons, helps them 
appreciate achievements and struggles in these areas and introduces them to possible 
avenues of further pursuit. And in the context of reasoning, if they were to reason, for 
example, on aspects of law, they would have some content knowledge and some 
principles and some rules to go by in their activities of evaluation. They would also 
have some appreciation of the challenges, problems, questions and goals within these 
areas, which, no doubt, would further stimulate their reasonings in these areas. One 
who did not have this background would find it difficult to get started. And the same 
for the rest of the areas of civilization. Hence, in Sheffler’s educational program, en 
route to learning how to evaluate (reasons, principles, and rules), students also gain 
specific knowledge of principles, rules, and reasons in addition to a factual base within 
the disciplines. 
The question of necessity of the educational program 
 But if rationality is fundamentally “an ability to participate in critical and open 
evaluation of the rules and principles in any area of life,” do we not have this ability to 
begin with or will it not emerge through a process of maturation? This point also 
pertains to R. S. Peters’ notion of children not really having minds until they are 
brought into the ‘citadel of civilization.’ 
 To take a very simple example, we often hear kids at a very young age, say: ‘That 
is not fair.’ This is clearly an instance of giving reasons on the basis of principles (in this 
case, no less than on the ethical principle of fairness!). Harold Garfinkel makes an acute 
observation in the area of sociology. Social actors, on Garfinkel’s view, are always 
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giving reasons and engaging in justifications. Indeed, it is part and parcel of being a 
social actor that one engages in activities of justification and it is this very activity that 
partly defines ethnomethodological studies which “analyze everyday activities as 
members’ methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-reportable-for-all-
practical-purposes, i.e., “accountable,” as organizations of commonplace everyday 
activities.”142 
 Has this ability to give and evaluate reasons on the basis of principles been 
learned in schools? There is quite a bit of anthropological evidence showing non-literate 
societies and societies with no formal education whatsoever routinely engaging in 
reason giving practices. Evans-Pritchard, to name just one anthropologist, famously 
showed how the Azande give reasons and explanations for certain happenings on the 
basis of principles, namely, consulting the poison oracle where poison is administered 
first to one chicken, then to another for confirmation. Evans-Pritchard once remarked 
how he found the Azande system quite self-consistent and somewhat livable, even for 
an English man: “I found it strange at first to live among Azande and listen to naive 
explanations of misfortunes which, to our minds, have apparent causes, but after a 
while I learnt the idiom of their thought and applied notions of witchcraft as 
spontaneously as themselves in situations where the concept was relevant.”143 
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143 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937) 
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 Unless we wish to define legitimate reasons, rules, and principles as those learned 
in the context of a liberal education in schools, the ability to give reasons and the 
propensity to determine them, verify them, validate them on the basis of principles is 
wide spread around the world in cultures that have no formal schooling and education 
as numerous ethnographies would attest. This raises the question ‘Why should an 
education be concerned with the goal of developing rationality conceptualized as “an 
ability to participate in critical and open evaluation of the rules and principles in any 
area of life”? Remedies are better justified when there is an illness.  
 Does the justification hang on the phrase “critical and open” with the implication 
that it is an education in the disciplines and in schools that makes one “critical and 
open” but not when enculturated in a culture without formal education in the 
disciplines? A stronger justification seems in order, especially because “critical and 
open” evaluation may itself be in short supply, anywhere. I return to this point later in 
the chapter. 
Rationality as an instrument for assessing truth and rationality as embodied 
 Scheffler makes some perplexing remarks regarding rationality perhaps resulting 
from a deep confusion surrounding reason. On the one hand, Scheffler says 
“[r]ationality has just been characterized as a precious instrument for assessing truth 
and for gauging the trustworthiness of courses of action.”144 In another place he says: 
“But I am, after all, not suggesting that it [rationality] belongs to a special faculty of 
mind called Reason . . . Rationality, as I see it, is a matter of reasons, and to take it as a 
fundamental educational ideal is to make as pervasive as possible the free and critical 
                                                
144 Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 28. 
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quest of reasons, in all realms of study.”145 It’s not quite clear what he means when he 
says reason is an instrument, but it is not Reason. If there is an acknowledgement of 
such an instrument why not call it Reason or simply reason? Perhaps it is simply 
unfashionable today to talk of an ‘instrument’ since it alludes to what is pejoratively 
described as ‘faculty psychology’? He also says, as noted earlier: 
The fundamental point is that rationality cannot be taken simply as an abstract and general 
ideal. It is embodied in multiple evolving traditions, in which the basic condition holds that 
issues are resolved by reference to reasons, themselves defined by principles purporting to be 
impartial and universal. These traditions should, I believe, provide an important focus for 
teaching.146 
 According to this passage, rationality is ‘embodied’ in the evolving traditions, 
hence the call for an education in the various disciplinary traditions. However, it is 
unclear how an instrument is embodied in something else let al.one in traditions of 
enquiry. How is a hammer, as an instrument, embodied in the nails or in the house 
framing which is being nailed? But perhaps Scheffler does not mean that reason is 
literally an instrument. His ambivalence was noted above. So perhaps what he means is 
that the activity of giving reasons and evaluating them is embodied in the different 
traditions, in that we give reasons primarily in a discipline. But even this is not quite 
right. Reason giving seems to be a general activity far transcending the disciplines 
which, at times, and by some people, and after a certain historical period, is applied to 
disciplinary subject matter. We give reasons and justifications in daily life, in the family, 
                                                
145 Ibid., 62 (emphasis in the original). 
146 Ibid., 79 (emphasis in the original). 
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at work, in social and civic contexts where there might not be any connections to 
particular disciplines. Courts of law, where matters are ideally decided with an appeal 
to reasons and principles, are not disciplines. There were forms of conflict resolution in 
cultures and societies much prior to the formation of the disciplines. Is it not more 
natural to say that the ability and propensity to evaluate reasons on the basis of rules 
and principles is applied to the disciplines? And hence, reason is applied to various areas 
of life as opposed to being embodied in certain traditions? 
 Besides the possibility of incorrect nomenclature, there are more serious 
educational problems stemming from this confusion. Where exactly in the disciplines is 
rationality embodied and how much of the learning in the disciplines is necessary to be 
educated in rationality? In giving examples of the disciplines, Scheffler lists science, 
history, and law, and others. But science can be further divided into physics and 
biology, biology into neurology and physiology and further down. When is an 
education in the disciplines sufficient? Is it enough to have some experience in 
validating claims in biology but not in physics? If physics is not necessary, why is 
history necessary? And so on. Historiography is a second order discipline reflecting on 
historians and the writing of history. In historiography one often detects blinders of 
particular historians especially when different historians’ accounts on the same period 
are compared with each other. It is a common historiographical insight, for instance, 
that historians project concerns of their own times onto the past and that their social, 
theoretical lenses color what they see in history. From the perspective of an education in 
rationality, one would think, historiography is better suited. Aren’t history of science 
and philosophy of science better suited than science? Historians of science are more 
acutely aware of the machinations of scientists in messaging the data to fit a strongly 
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held theory than are practicing scientists. How much is necessary? If the final objective 
is an appreciation of reasons and their evaluation, say in science, wouldn’t one intensive 
course in science be sufficient? Do we need 12 years of history to know how historians 
given and defend reasons?147  
Problematic notion of rationality in a particular field 
Scheffler argues in terms of rationality in specific areas: 
Rationality in natural inquiry is embodied in the relatively young tradition of science, which 
defines and redefines those principles by means of which evidence is to be interpreted and 
meshed with theory. Rational judgment in the realm of science is, consequently, judgment 
that accords with such principles, as crystallized at the time in question. To teach rationality 
in science is to interiorize these principles in the student, and furthermore, to introduce him 
the live and evolving tradition of natural science, which forms their significant context of 
development and purpose.148 
So teaching and learning rationality in science means to interiorize principles (which 
determine how evidence is to be meshed with theory) which have been developed in 
the course of the history of the discipline. This means that rationality consist in learning 
the principles which are said to determine how evidence is to mesh with theory. This 
implies that a person cannot be rational in science unless he learns these principles, and 
not rational in history unless he learns those principles which are said to be unique to 
history. Since principles are unique to disciplines, does this not mean that a person can 
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148 Ibid., 79 (emphasis in the original). 
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never be considered rational in general, but only rational in science, history, art and 
government?  
 Furthermore, science is a composite of numerous disciplines: astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, neurology, psychology, etc. Supposedly, the said principles are different in 
each of these sub-disciplines as they have very different developmental trajectories. So a 
person can be rational in chemistry but not in physics. Physics itself has many braches: 
particle physics, general physics and other subdivisions. Principles that hold for large 
bodies don’t hold for small bodies. So one can be rational in general physics but not in 
particle physics? 
 Scheffler implies that principles are developed over time and may change over 
time (e.g. ‘evolving tradition of natural science’). If a student were to learn the principles 
of say, astronomy, that were current a thousand years ago and used those to mesh 
evidence with theory, he would not be considered rational since this is not how 
evidence is meshed with theory today. This would imply that an astronomer, living a 
thousand years ago, is no longer rational, but was very rational at the time! 149 
 I believe Scheffler is led into these counter intuitive and contradictory position 
because of his pre-existing loyalties to the disciplines together with a limited notion of 
reason and rationality. One the one, hand he argues for a general, non-relative, notion 
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truth he means relative truth. Indeed, a major aspect of Scheffler’s project in Reason and Teaching and 
indeed in other works is to argue against forms of relativism. Ibid., 27. 
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of rationality as the ability to evaluate reasons based on principles. The whole tenor of 
Scheffler’s work with respect to rationality is towards generalizability, universality and 
against relativism. But to justify initiation into the disciplines he links rationality to the 
specificities of the disciplines. Is Scheffler a victim of a deeply held cultural belief in the 
value of the disciplines? The nearly ninety eminent men of the Committee of Ten, 
starting with a firm belief in the value of the disciplines, subsequently justified them in 
terms of ‘mental training.’ Peters justified them in terms of ‘development of mind,’ 
Hirst in terms of ‘development of reason’ and Scheffler in terms of ‘rationality.’ 
Idealization of the disciplines and the disciplines as disciplining 
 Perhaps the most serious oversight on the part of Scheffler and others who call 
for an education in the disciplines for the inculcation of rationality is the smuggling of a 
sanitized conception of the disciplines in which ‘open and free’ assessment of reasons 
supposedly takes place. When I was doing my master’s degree in philosophy of 
education we read Dewey but not Tagore and not Rousseau, nor Mary Wollstonecraft. 
We studied epistemology and education, ethics and education but not reason and 
education. It’s unclear how open and free my education was. I ended up writing my 
dissertation on ethics and objectivity advocating a Wittgensteinian perspective on 
ethics. The Wittgensteinian perspective was no genius of mine. My advisor was an avid 
Wittgensteinian. There were Wittgensteinians everywhere. Talk of Platonic essences 
was suspect, inner processes required public criteria, philosophy entailed analyzing 
language, there were no real problems in philosophy only confusions of language. The 
business of philosophy was to show the fly the way out of the bottle. At the time, I 
simply thought I was seeing the light. It took me several years to see how blind I had 
actually become and through a first rate education to boot.  
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 Academia and practices within the disciplines, when viewed from the 
perspective of the real world, the world of real practitioners, scholars, professors, 
researchers, and sources of funding, the actual world in which students are to be 
initiated and not an idealized world where ”the basic condition holds that issues are 
resolved by reference to reasons, themselves defined by principles purporting to be 
impartial and universal” is fraught with selectivity, partial perspectives, staunchly held 
views, pet theories, egos, defensive maneuvers, fights, fashions, parades (conferences), 
insults and ideologies. One does not simply learn to give reasons and evaluate them. 
One learns to give them as a Marxist, Weberian, a Durkheimian, and Parsonian. 
Wearing Marxist lenses one sees revolutions everywhere, as Popper so rightfully 
remarked. Weberians see meanings everywhere. Kuhn observed early on how science 
textbooks induct students into a way of seeing the world— in a word, into a dogma. 
Experiments in textbooks play the role of demonstration rather than genuine tests. 
When school laboratory results don’t pan out as predicted, something is wrong with the 
experiment or the procedures, not the theory—since the theory is now the ‘truth’ just as 
Newtonian mechanics, the heliocentric universe and the four elements were taught as 
truths at one time.150 It was Aristotle’s logic, accepted for centuries, and taught in the 
best educational institutions of the day, that Bacon complained about and referred to as 
idols of the theatre which, according to Bacon, later come to resemble fables: “And in the 
plays of this philosophical theatre you may observe the same thing which is found in 
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the theatre of the poets, that stories invented for the stage are more compact and 
elegant, and more as one would wish them to be, than true stories out of history.”151 
 Reason giving, evaluation of evidence, production of evidence within the 
disciplines are done within a world view and which, after a certain time, is held 
somewhat dogmatically resulting in irrationality. Far from removing ideologies, 
disciplines are often the most efficient ways for students to become more encrusted in 
them and with a good dose of critical thinking, they can defend them too. It’s a 
mammoth task removing the shackles of disciplinary effects of the disciplines and 
requires a mammoth use of reason and in so many different ways than simply giving 
reasons. 
Rationality and the ‘free and critical’ quest of reasons 
 “’Rationality,’ Scheffler notes, “is a matter of reasons, and to take it as a 
fundamental educational ideal is to make as pervasive as possible the free and critical 
quest for reasons, in all realms of study.”152 A much earlier writer than Scheffler said 
something very similar. William Sumner wrote: 
The critical faculty is a product of education and training . . . Education is good just so far as 
it produces well-developed critical faculty . . . A teacher of any subject, who insists on 
accuracy and a rational control of all processes and methods, and who holds everything 
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open to unlimited verification and revision, is cultivating that method as a habit in the 
pupils.153  
Notice, “make as pervasive as possible the free and critical quest of reasons, in all 
realms of study” in Scheffler and “holds everything open to unlimited verification and 
revision” in Sumner. These calls have an aura of nobleness about them. What can be 
more rational than the injunction to seek verification of all of ones’ beliefs? If there are 
criteria of rationality, surely, this is one of them. But as argued in the previous section 
something larger is missing from this account. Is the route away from dogmatism 
(irrationality) ‘free and critical quest of reasons, in all realms of study’ and ‘unlimited 
verification and revision’? Should a student question everything he has ever learned in 
science, history, geography and mathematics from first grade to graduate school? How 
many arguments and reasons has he been exposed to and how many has he 
‘uncritically accepted’ and how many has he uncritically rejected and how many has he 
ignored? Something more in the area of rationality is required than the disposition and 
ability to seek reasons and critically evaluate them. 
Rational principles: judging by and abiding by 
 In the previous two sections we noted a chasm between learning critical skills of 
evaluation and developing appropriate dispositions and character traits that was 
overlooked by both Ennis and Paul. Scheffler too seems to be unaware of the great gulf. 
Consider Scheffler’s implied sense of principles in this passage on rationality:  
                                                
153  William Graham Sumner, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, 
Mores, and Morals. William Lyon Phelps and Albert Galloway Keller eds. (New York: Ginn and Company, 
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The whole concept of argument, moreover, rests upon the ideal of rationality—of 
discussion not in order to move or persuade, but rather to test assumptions critically by 
a review of reasons logically pertinent to them.154  
From his remarks throughout his text, we know that reasons are to be evaluated by 
principles. Now consider another passage: 
A rational man is one who is consistent in thought and in action, abiding by impartial and 
generalizable principles freely chosen as binding upon himself.155 
Here we have two senses of principle (one implied, one explicit) but considered as one 
in Scheffler’s text. The original source is Kant.156 To evaluate on the basis of a principle 
in order to determine warrant is one thing. To abide by principles in one’s actions seems 
to be something altogether different. They are not both rational in the same sense.157 A 
first rate (rational) scientist of the highest caliber may unflinchingly make judgments in 
his field on the basis of reasons and principles pertinent in his area of scholarship. 
However, with respect to his actions outside of the laboratory, in family, social and civic 
life he could be acting out of self-interest. To abide by principles in the realm of action 
                                                
154 Scheffler, Reason and Teaching, 22. 
155 Ibid., 77. 
156 This is how Scheffler expresses his debt to Kant:  
In the work of the great eighteenth-century philosopher, Immanuel Kant, we find a clear conception 
of rationality as the basis not only of the intellectual but also of the moral life. Rationality, for Kant, 
means impartiality and fairness of judgment; the conforming of one’s actions to general rules which 
one has freely accepted for oneself. Ibid., 63. 
For Kant, the primary philosophical emphasis is on reason, and reason is always a matter of abiding 
by general rules or principles. Reason stands always in contrast with inconsistency and with 
expediency, in the judgment of particular issues. In the cognitive realm, reason is a kind of justice to 
the evidence, a fair treatment of the merits of the case, in the interests of truth. Ibid., 76. 
157 Scheffler registers this difference in one place where he calls one cognitive and the other moral. But 
the distinction is glossed over and moreover there is a strong tendency to see both as essentially the same.  
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implies, not acting out of convenience, or expediency, or desire, or temporary gain, or 
weakness, or temptation but to remain steadfast and resolute and to act only out of 
principle. Are the abilities to judge from principles and abilities to act from principles in 
the realm of action one and the same kind of abilities? Does the one lead to the other? 
There is a strong implication in Scheffler and in many other theorists that an initiation 
into the disciplines which are characterized as places for the free and open quest of 
reasons based on principles makes one a principled person. A vast gulf separates the two 
virtues. 
 Scheffler’s account of rationality through an initiation into the disciplines suffers 
from these numerous problems because of faulty starting points and an erroneous 
notion of reason tied to the disciplines and defined only as the practice of giving and 
seeking reasons based on principles. In his account, Scheffler, as indicated earlier, does 
not mention problems of reason that can be overcome through an education in the 
disciplines. But he cites R. S. Peters who, as we have seen, holds the view that children 
essentially have no minds until they are inducted into the achievements of civilization. 
This view seems patently mistaken as argued above and combined with an allegiance to 
the disciplines interpreted in idealized ways, results in some very counter intuitive 
conclusions such as that we have an instrument of reason but we don’t, we can be 
rational in physics but not in particle physics, a historical personality was rational but is 
no longer, children are not rational until inducted in the disciplines, a man who judges 
on the basis of principles in science is rational in the same sense as a man who acts of 
out principle in action and many other conclusions. On the other hand, having an 
expanded notion of the idea of reason, which includes the reasoner, reason, content and 
reality and their dynamic relationships with each other could alleviate some of these 
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problems. The instrument (reason) may or may not be applied to a discipline (content), 
the reasoner may or may not be engaged and instead might be going by someone else’s 
reasoning (closed instead of ‘open and critical’) and even though the reasoner is giving 
reasons he may not be reasoning (under the spell of dogma). This suggests the necessity 
of a much broader idea of reason than just evaluation of reasons and principles. 
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Chapter 2 
Conclusion 
 Current educational endeavors in the area of the cultivation of reason, whether 
through critical thinking or through the disciplines, are commendable with respect to 
their goals. Ennis defines the goal as ‘reasonable, reflective thinking on what to believe 
and what to do,’ Paul as ‘self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-
corrective thinking’ and Scheffler defines it as ‘the ability to participate in critical and 
open evaluation of the rules and principles in any area of life.’ These are all marks of a 
rational person. However, with respect to their educational programs, the educational 
means and strategies for achieving rationality, they focus exclusively on issues of 
evaluation—Ennis on evaluation of arguments, Paul on evaluation of ‘elements of 
thought’ and Scheffler on evaluation of reasons based on principles. From the 
perspective of the broader idea of reason, as articulated by Morteza, where “[t]he idea 
of reason is not limited to argument and evaluation of argument” but “includes reason 
in itself, the use of reason, the problems of reason, contents, reality, the reasoner, their 
relationships, and other elements”158 we can see that a focus on evaluation is much too 
narrow. This narrow focus presents numerous difficulties with respect to the full 
cultivation of reason in education. In this chapter I have indicated some of these 
difficulties. 
 While it is worthwhile to know how to evaluate arguments, what is also required 
from the perspective of rationality is to exercise one’s reason in coming to understand 
which arguments are important to analyze and assess, when it is appropriate, and in 
                                                
158 Monsour Morteza, “Philosophy of Reason” (unpublished manuscript, May 31, 2016), Word file. 
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what manner. A person who did not discriminate but analyzed every argument, far 
from being rational, would be considered mad. Exercising one’s reason in this way is 
not a matter only of evaluating arguments. 
 For all three educational endeavors, I noted the gulf between the lofty but 
admirable dispositions and virtues that each program calls for and their educational 
program. It is one thing to know how to analyze arguments with respect to truth and 
reasonableness and quite another to have the disposition to care for truth (Ennis), have 
the intellectual traits of autonomy, confidence in reason and fairmindedness (Paul) and 
have a principled character (Scheffler). I have tried to show that an illicit assumption 
has been made that learning to evaluate arguments (Ennis), learning to evaluate 
‘elements of thought’ (Paul) and giving and seeking reasons based on principles 
(Scheffler) will lead to these noble character traits. 
 I pointed out a distinction between evaluation and construction. It is not at all 
obvious that the abilities of the former are sufficient for abilities for the latter. A 
competent reasoner is not like a critic of music but more like a competent concert 
pianist and has many other abilities than simply judging the quality of music. To be 
rational is also to construct and produce and not just to evaluate. Furthermore, it is not 
just about producing good arguments. Socrates’ genius, which is held as mark of 
rationality, lies not only in his ability to evaluate and produce good arguments only but 
to introduce a new way of thinking altogether. The latter is not simply a function of 
evaluating arguments. 
 The narrowness of the conception of reason can also be seen through two 
examples mentioned in the chapter—Stanford students who are asked to evaluate 
evidence regarding the efficacy of capital punishment and participants who are asked to 
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estimate their abilities in distinguishing true from false suicide notes. Though 
participants were evaluating evidence and giving plenty of reasons it was clear that 
there was something drastically amiss in their reasonings. This suggests that a 
conception of reason that only highlights reason giving and evaluation is inadequate. In 
order to fully understand a situation such as this, we ought to include, in our 
conception, the reasoner, his reason, uses of reason, contents of reasoning, problems of 
reason and reality in the equation. Including these in the conception of reason we can 
say, though they were giving reasons they were not reasoning (uses of reason), their 
reason was not engaged, they were not in control of their reason, they were not really 
giving reasons on the basis of what was in front of them (reality) rather on the basis of 
their own beliefs (problems with the reasoner). The wider view of reason helps explain 
many of the anomalies faced by the narrow conception.  
 In the next chapter, I explore reasoning in a cultural context to demonstrate the 
wider view of reason mentioned in this chapter. Consider for a moment if we were to 
give the following premises to members in different cultures: ‘All men are mortal,’ and 
‘Socrates is a man.’ Members in all cultures would have no trouble concluding that 
‘Socrates is mortal.’ They would be able to see the premises for what they are and be able 
to conclude rightly on the basis of these premises. In short, cultural actors everywhere 
are competent at, at-least, simple argument analysis and assessment. Given a critical 
thinking course in each culture, it is quite likely that many members in each culture 
would master argument analysis and evaluation. But now consider asking them to 
reason about deeply cultural matters—to reason on the basis of culturally pregnant 
premises. Would they all conclude the same? Differences in their conclusions suggests 
that something else besides competencies in arguments needs to be taken into account 
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in explaining differences in their conclusions, for they will all conclude in a similar way 
given a syllogism of the kind mentioned above. What is going on in the reasoning 
process of individuals when they are reasoning about cultural matters but not when 
they are reasoning about culturally neutral matters like Socrates and his mortality? This 
is the driving question in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3  
Culture and Reasoning: The Role of Cultural Lenses 
Introduction  
 In Chapter 2, I noted several merits in three prominent educational programs for 
the cultivation of reason in education. Alongside these merits, I also noted what I take 
to me a major shortcoming, namely limiting the use of reason to evaluation. 
Furthermore, I showed that problems of reason are not confined to problems of 
argument and evidence. In conclusion, I pointed out, that the three contemporary 
programs for the cultivation of reason in education, given their restrictive view of the 
idea of reason and other problems are insufficient for the full cultivation of reason in 
education. 
 In this chapter, I begin with the broader idea of reason introduced in Chapter 2, 
namely, that the idea of reason includes amongst other things reason, the use of reason, 
the reasoner, problems of reason, contents and reality and their relationships. Through 
an investigation of two empirical case studies in the area of culture and education, I 
exemplify this broader idea of reason. Most particularly, I explore the relationships 
between culture and reasoning. For my analysis of this relationship, I have found 
aspects of Morteza’s insights into culture and reason (articulated in his manuscript on 
the philosophy of reason), namely “culture as a lens, culture as a barrier, and culture as 
grips in reasoning”159 extremely illuminating, opening for me fresh vistas in which to 
see the workings of culture on the reasoning process. Most particularly, I have come to 
                                                
159 Monsour Morteza, “Philosophy of Reason” (unpublished manuscript, May 31, 2016), Word file. 
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appreciate from his philosophy how cultural lenses, at times, may inhibit and block 
reasoning all together. Through these insights, I have also come to see fruitful 
connections between culture and scientific theories and reasonings especially as the 
they have been studied in recent social studies of science and technology.  
 In my view, approaching areas of reasoning with the broader idea of reason and 
the role of culture mentioned above widens our horizons of rationality as well as 
deepens our appreciation of subtle but real problems in reasoning; problems which 
educators will need to wrestle with, along with many other problems, in constructing 
programs and philosophies for the full cultivation of reason in education. 
 In this chapter, I begin with an exploration of reasoning in the context of cultural 
notions surrounding mathematics education, most particularly what Stevenson and 
Stigler call “effort” vs. “ability” emphasis in the United States and in Japan and China. 
Here I explore how these notions impact parents’, teachers’ and students’ reasonings 
regarding mathematical competencies and educational practices. For my second case 
study, I explore reasonings in the context of cultural differences in views of preschool 
ideals and practices in Japan, US and China as documented in Tobin, Wu, and 
Davidson’s Preschool in Three Cultures. Here, I explore, for example, reasonings 
surrounding explanations of misbehavior in a classroom, notions of ideal class size, 
educational goals of preschool and views of fighting in young children. Stevenson and 
Stigler and Tobin, Wu, and Davidson, in their respective studies, do not schematize 
students,’ parents,’ and teachers’ reasoning (though at times they imply them). Their 
interests are in cultural differences in belief and their impact on practice, not necessarily 
on reasoning. In the present study, I use the results of their studies to throw light on the 
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question of the role of culture in reasoning especially its role in short-circuiting 
reasoning. 
 In the following, I use the word ‘culture’ to mean generally beliefs and values 
that participants have acquired as a process of enculturation. But cultures are not 
monolith entities—some have more diversity within them than others. Perhaps there is 
more diversity in certain beliefs than others. In this study, I am relying on salient 
cultural notions, beliefs and values identified by educational anthropologists. But, in the 
last analysis, the examples used illustrate a larger point namely, the utility of a broader 
idea of reason. This study does not hinge on any specific beliefs and values which may 
not be generally shared within a particular culture. 
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Chapter 3.1  
 
Case Study I:  
Reasoning about Competencies in Mathematics:  
United States, Japan and China 
 
 In an early and landmark study of cultural notions surrounding mathematics 
achievement in elementary schools, Harold Stevenson and James Stigler noted drastic 
differences in student achievement in mathematics between students in the US, on the 
one hand, and students in China and Japan on the other.160 They compared several 
schools in each of the metropolitan cities of Beijing (China), Sendai (Japan), Taipei 
(Taiwan) and Chicago (USA) in the first grade and also in the fifth grade. Results were 
dramatic. In the first grade, average scores of American schools somewhat overlap with 
those of their counter parts in Japan and China. However, by the fifth grade, dramatic 
differences begin to appear. The highest achieving American school scored lower than the 
lowest achieving Japanese and Chinese schools. To check for the possibility that perhaps 
some American students may be scoring very high despite the low overall average, 
Stevenson and Stigler analyzed the scores of the top one hundred highest scoring 
students. What they found was equally striking. Of these one hundred top scoring 
students, only one was from the US, eleven were from Taiwan and eight-eight were 
from Japan. And these mathematical achievement tests did not just test for say, low 
level computation abilities but for a variety of competencies including mathematical 
operations, ability to apply knowledge to solve meaningful problems, facility with 
number concepts, interpretations of graphs and tables, estimation and measurement 
                                                
160 Harold W. Stevenson and James W. Stigler, The Learning Gap: Why our Schools are Failing and What we 
Can Learn from Japanese and Chinese Education (New York: Summit Books, 1992). 
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skills and spatial reasoning. In nearly every category, the mean score of American 
students was the lowest. What was also striking was the range of scores in each of these 
countries. There was a marked difference between the highest performing American 
student and the lowest performing American student. In contrast, in China and Japan 
the range was much less, where many more students performed at a higher level. These 
achievement patterns continue to the present day. The most recent results from the 
well-known Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS: 2011) show 
that the Asian countries of Singapore, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, 
and Japan all scored significantly higher than all other countries including the US.161 Of 
course, our interest in this work is not the scores nor the disparities themselves but the 
wider cultural contexts within which these achievements and shortfalls are realized. 
More specifically, it is the impact of wider cultural beliefs on the reasoning of students, 
teachers and parents within a culture and, perhaps most importantly, how these 
cultural beliefs and values determine a nation’s philosophy of education itself.  
 Stevenson and Stigler note marked differences in beliefs with respect to 
children’s abilities between Americans, on the one hand, and the Japanese and Chinese, 
on the other: “We and others have found that American children, teachers, and parents 
emphasize innate abilities as a component of success more strongly than their Chinese 
and Japanese counterparts do. All three societies acknowledge that accomplishment 
cannot occur without work, but they differ in their beliefs about what people can 
achieve by work alone.”162 Stevenson and Stigler’s acute observations of the tendency 
                                                
161 Data from TIMMS, https://nces.ed.gov/TIMSS/table11_2.asp. 
162 Stevenson and Stigler, The Learning Gap, 94-95. 
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to emphasize innate abilities in America versus a tendency to emphasize effort or 
struggle in Asian cultures have recently been corroborated by Jan Li of Brown 
University. Li has been recording and analyzing conversations between American 
mothers and their children and Taiwanese mothers and their children. Her work, along 
with Stigler’s were the subject of a recent story on National Public Radio (NPR) where 
some of these recordings were aired.163 Li’s recordings are revealing with respect to 
deep cultural beliefs. Below are some relevant excerpts with Alix Spiegel as the NPR 
correspondent: 
CHILD [Excerpts of a Recording]: Guess what? We had a Harriet Tubman book. 
MOTHER [Excerpts of a Recording]: You really like Harriet Tubman, too, huh? 
 
CHILD: Mm-hmm. 
 
ALIX SPIEGEL [NPR Presenter]: This is one of [Professor] Li's recordings. In it, an American 
mother talks to her eight-year-old son about school. The son is a great student who loves to 
learn. He tells his mother that he and his friends talk about books even during recess. And 
the mother responds with this. 
 
MOTHER: Do you know that that's what smart people do - smart grown-ups? 
CHILD: I know. 
 
MOTHER: They just keep... 
CHILD: Talk about books. 
 
MOTHER: Yeah. So that's a pretty smart thing to do, to talk about a book. 
CHILD: And yeah... 
 
                                                
163 “Why Eastern and Western Cultures Tackle Learning Differently”: 
http://www.npr.org/2013/09/02/218067142/why-eastern-and-western-cultures-tackle-learning-
differently. 
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SPIEGEL: It is a small exchange, a moment. But in this drop of conversation, there is a whole 
world of cultural assumptions and beliefs. Essentially, the American mother, Li says, is 
communicating to her son that the cause of her son's success in school is his intelligence - he 
is smart - which, Li says, is a very common American view. 
 
JIN LI: The idea of intelligence is believed, in the West as a cause. She is telling him there's 
something in him, in his mind that enables him to do what he does. 
 
SPIEGEL: But most people in Asian cultures, she says, don't think this way. Academic 
success is not as much about whether a student is smart. Academic success is about whether 
a student is willing to work and to struggle. 
 
LI: It resides in what they do, but not who they are. 
 
‘A smart thing to do’ and ‘something in his mind’ as opposed to something arising out 
of ‘hard work and struggle.’ What might be the effects of these beliefs on the mother’s 
reasoning? And on the child’s reasoning (through inescapable enculturation)? On a 
schools’ reasoning? On a nation’s philosophy of education? Let’s continue with the NPR 
story:  
 
CHILD 2: [Excerpt of recording: Foreign language spoken] 
MOTHER 2: [Excerpt of recording: Foreign language spoken] 
SPIEGEL: This is another conversation, this time between a Taiwanese mother and her nine-
year-old son. They are talking about the piano. The boy won first place in a competition and 
the mother is trying to explain to him why. 
 
MOTHER 2: [Excerpt: Foreign language spoken] 
SPIEGEL: You practiced and practiced with lots of energy, she tells him. It really got hard, 
but you made great effort. You insisted on practicing yourself. 
 
PROFESSOR LI: So the focus is on the process of persisting through it, despite the 
challenges, not giving up, and that leads to the success. 
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SPIEGEL: So all this is important because the way that you conceptualize the act of 
struggling with something profoundly affects your actual behavior. Obviously, if struggle 
indicates weakness to you - for example, a lack of intelligence - it makes you feel bad. So 
you're less likely to put up with it. But if struggle indicates strength - the ability to face 
down challenge - you are much more willing to accept it.  
 
Stevenson and Stigler refer to these major differences between these cultures as an 
emphasis on ‘ability’ versus an emphasis on ‘effort.’ And they note some insidious 
consequences of an over emphasis on ability. Children who believe they have high 
abilities have little reason to work hard and worse, children who believe they have low 
abilities and doubt the efficacy of hard work also have little reason to persevere.164 
Under these cultural notions, Stevenson and Stigler note: “A student who is ‘bright’ is 
just expected to ‘get it’ and duller students are assumed to lack the requisite abilities to 
ever master certain kinds of material.”165 We might add here whether the recent rise in 
the US of categorizing students as ‘gifted,’ at one extreme and the rise in categorizing 
students as having ‘disabilities’ of some kind, especially Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (ADHD), at the other extreme, are manifestations of this same cultural 
phenomena namely, either you have it or you don’t. Recent data from the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) indicate that by 2011 more than 1 in 10 (11%) 
of US school-aged children had received an ADHD diagnosis by a health care provider. 
                                                
164 Stevenson and Stigler, The Learning Gap, 95. 
165 Ibid., 102. 
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And diagnosis of ADHD by a health care provider increased by 42% between 2003 and 
2011. 166  
 Ian Hacking, philosopher and historian of science, points out a ‘looping effect’ of 
what he calls ‘human kinds’ as opposed to ‘natural kinds.’ Human kinds are human 
categories which are ‘interactive’—they not only describe the world but, once created, 
interact with individuals that are so categorized. Individuals begin to see themselves in 
terms of these categories with further profound consequences to these individuals.167 
McDermott and Herve, in discussing the incessant practice of categorizing and of 
labeling students as disabled, aptly entitled their article “Culture as Disability.”168 
 In contrast, according to Stevenson and Stigler, Asian students are confident that 
their efforts will pay off and work long hours at academic mastery: “[R]egardless of 
one’s current level of performance, opportunities for advancement are always believed 
to be available through more effort.”169 Stevenson and Stigler asked fifth graders in 
Sendai, Taipei, and Minneapolis to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement “The tests you can take show how much or how little natural ability you 
                                                
166 Key Findings: Trends in the Parent-Report of Health Care Provider-Diagnosis and Medication 
Treatment for ADHD, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/features/key-findings-adhd72013.html. 
167 Ian. Hacking, “Taking Bad Arguments Seriously,” London Review of Books 21, August (1997): 14-16. 
168 Ray McDermott, and Varenne Hervé, "Culture ‘as’ Disability," Anthropology and Education Quarterly 
26, no. 3 (1995): 324-48. Labelling and the effects of labelling is reminiscent of Bacon’s observation on 
reason and language noted in chapter 1:  
[M]en believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react on the 
understanding (LIX) . . . [The menace of words on the understanding is of two kinds] . . . names of 
things which do not exist . . . which result from fantastic suppositions and to which nothing in reality 
corresponds . . .names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and 
irregularly derived from realities. [Aphorisms LIX, LX] 
169 Stevenson and Stigler, The Learning Gap, 95. 
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have.” Given deep cultural differences, results were not surprising. Students in Sendai 
and Taipei, were more likely to disagree with this statement than students in 
Minneapolis, revealing that Chinese and Japanese children were less likely than 
American children to believe that tests reveal natural ability.170 
 How do these differences enter into the reasoning process? The impact of these 
radically different conceptions of native intelligence vs. effort on reasoning are 
foreshadowed in the NPR commentary presented above. A simple piece of reasoning in 
the child’s mind (with profound consequences) when working on an academic problem 
at school, might go something like this: 
[Reasoner’s mind] 
 “Success is about having intelligence . . .” [Unvoiced background belief, deep within the 
individual’s mind, perhaps even unconscious] 
 [Child working on a problem …] 
 [Child then facing difficulty…] 
“This is really hard . . .”  
“I don’t know how long I ought to work on this . . . Perhaps I am just not smart enough.” 
____________ 
“I think it’s time I stopped working on it.” 
 
Faced with the same situation we can readily imagine an individual reasoning with a 
different cultural belief/assumption: 
 
“Success has a lot to do with hard work . . .” [Unvoiced background belief, deep within 
the individual’s mind, perhaps even unconscious] 
 [Child working on a problem …] 
                                                
170 Ibid., 99. 
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 [Child then facing difficulty…] 
“This is really hard . . .”  
“I’ll need to put more effort into this . . . If others can do it, I can do it.” 
____________ 
“I’ll put in a little more time . . . I should be able to solve it soon . . .” 
 
 
An individual who places more emphasis on native intelligence reasons that he need 
not spend too much time on a task if it seems very difficult (‘If I have the ability I will 
get it’) while the individual who believes it’s a matter of hard work reasons that he 
needs to spend more time. Stigler observed just this outcome with respect to time spent 
on a difficult task in the two cultures: 
 
STIGLER: We did a study many years ago with first grade students. We decided to go out 
and give the students an impossible math problem to work on. And then we would measure 
how long they worked on it before they gave up. 
 
SPIEGEL: So the American first graders that Stigler studied... 
 
STIGLER: Worked on it less than 30 seconds on average and then they basically looked at us 
and said, we haven't had this. 
 
SPIEGEL: But the Japanese students? 
 
STIGLER: Every one of them worked for the entire hour on the impossible problem and 
finally we had to stop the session because the hour was up. 
 
 
Hence, we have a young American reasoner in the grips of a cultural belief of inherent 
limitations in his intelligence who reasons that he needn’t spend much time on the 
problem because if he had it in him he would have got it by now. If he does not get it 
soon, he reasons that he won’t. We have a Japanese reasoner in the grip of his belief in 
the efficacy of effort, who reasons that he ought to keep working on the problem until it 
is solved since it’s just a matter of effort.  
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 Stepping back from both cultures, and noting the impact of their beliefs or 
“lenses” on their reasonings and eventual actions, could we ask: ‘But how should they 
reason?’ The relevance and appropriateness of the question, I believe, can be 
appreciated if we consider the reasonings of American and Japanese parents and 
teachers. Their reasonings are far more consequential than the reasoning of a student 
since parents are in a position of influencing an entire generation and teachers in a 
position of influencing hundreds of students, if not thousands, over the length of their 
careers. The relevance of the question can also be appreciated, I believe, through a 
closer analysis of their reasonings from a wider notion of reason. 
 Stevenson and Stigler asked mothers in Sendai, Taipei, and Minneapolis to weigh 
the importance of effort vs. ability vs. difficulty of task vs. luck. The results were not 
surprising given the foregoing discussion. “All three groups of mothers gave the 
greatest number of points to effort, but Asian mothers gave more points to effort than 
did American mothers. When it came to assigning points to ability, American mothers 
assigned significantly more points than did the Chinese and Japanese mothers.”171 We 
can construct a possible ‘American teacher reasoning situation’ given the above cultural 
beliefs: 
“Success has a lot to do with effort but ability is quite important too . . .” [Unvoiced 
background belief, deep within the American teacher’s mind, perhaps even unconscious] 
 [Student working on a problem …] 
 [Then student facing difficulty…] 
STUDENT: “This is really hard . . .”  
TEACHER: “Try a little harder . . .” 
                                                
171 Stevenson and Stigler, The Learning Gap, 99. 
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CHILD [after a lapse of sometime]: “I don’t know how long I ought to work on this . . . 
Perhaps I am just not smart enough.” 
TEACHER: [Begins to suspect child may not have ‘ability.’] 
____________ 
 TEACHER: “Here, try this one. It’s a little easier.” 
  
We can extrapolate the (severe) consequences. Teachers’ beliefs begin to reinforce 
students’ proclivities. Vast differences in achievement within one school begin to 
appear [as clearly indicated in Stevenson and Stigler’s data on US students’ 
performance on comparative math tests] and labels are ready at hand: gifted, average 
ability, student with disability, special needs, etc. From microcosmic reasonings’ of 
individual teachers, together with consistent institutional norms and practices which 
reinforce teachers’ practices, tracking begins its menace on the education system. The 
pervasiveness of tracking in American schools has been extensively documented in 
educational scholarship.172 Conversely we can construct a possible ‘Japanese teacher 
reasoning situation’ given Japanese cultural beliefs: 
“Although ability plays a part, success has a lot to do with effort . . . ” [Unvoiced 
background belief, deep within the Japanese teacher’s mind, perhaps even unconscious] 
 [Student working on a problem …] 
 [Student then facing difficulty…] 
STUDENT: “This is really hard . . .”  
TEACHER: “Try a little harder . . .” 
STUDENT: “I’ll put in a little more time . . . I should be able to solve it soon . . .” 
TEACHER: [Encourages student to try other ways of solving the problem. Does not let the 
student off the hook]. 
_______ 
                                                
172 Jeannie Oakes, Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality. 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2005). 
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Teacher continues to insist on more effort until student gets it. 173 
We already have a glimpse of the consequences and they are dramatic. Many more 
students achieve at a higher level and differences between high and low achievers is 
reduced dramatically.  
 Now, a closer examination of these ‘reasonings.’ In the foregoing exposition, I 
have characterized students’, teachers’ and parents’ thinking on these matters as cases 
of reasoning. But from a broader idea of reason introduced earlier, namely, an idea of 
reason that includes, reason, the reasoner, content, reality and their relationships and 
other uses of reason besides just evaluating arguments, we can ask whether, in the 
above situations, the Japanese and American participants are truly reasoning though they 
are giving plenty of reasons and arguments.  
 Recall for a moment the Stanford student case, as presented and analyzed in the 
previous chapter, where participants’ prior beliefs regarding the efficacy of capital 
                                                
173 Stigler and Heibert note cultural beliefs about mathematics itself and how these also influence what 
teachers do:  
 
The U.S. lesson is consistent with the belief that school mathematics is a set of procedures. Although 
teachers may believe that there are other things that must be added to these procedures to get the 
complete definition of mathematics, many act as if it is a subject that is useful for students, in the end, 
as a set of procedures for solving problems. As noted in the accompanying article, we asked teachers 
who participated in the videotape study to identify the “main thing” they wanted students to learn 
from the lesson. Sixty-one percent of U.S. teachers described skills: They wanted the students to be 
able to perform a procedure, solve a particular kind of problem, and so on . . .  
 
Japanese lessons appear to be generated by different beliefs about the subject. Teachers act as if 
mathematics is a set of relationships between concepts, facts, and procedures. These relationships are 
revealed by developing methods to solve problems, studying the methods, working toward 
increasingly efficient methods, and talking explicitly about the relationships of interest . . . In 
response to the same question, 73 percent of Japanese teachers said the main thing they wanted their 
students to learn from the lesson was to think about things in a new way, such as seeing new 
relationships between mathematical ideas . . . The teachers also encourage students to keep 
struggling in the face of difficulty, sometimes offering hints to support students’ progress. Rarely do 
teachers show students, midway through the lesson, how to solve the problem.  
 
James W. Stigler and James Hiebert, “Teaching is a Cultural Activity,” American Educator, Winter 1998: 2-
4. 
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punishment as a deterrent for violent crimes (‘it is effective’ vs. ‘it is useless’) prevented 
them from examining fresh evidence presented to them by the experimenters. Whatever 
evidence was presented was interpreted by the participants in accordance with their 
prior belief rather than on the merits of the evidence—the evidence that was actually in 
front of them. In other words, from the perspective of the broader idea of reason, the 
belief prevented the participants from truly reasoning on the matter at hand; the belief 
hijacked their reasoning. Equally disturbingly, all the while, the participants thought 
they were reasoning and being very rational as they were clearly able to ‘diagnose’ 
faults with the designs of studies that happened to be contrary to their beliefs and 
thereby able to ‘rationally’ reject the evidence.174 
 From the perspective of the broader idea of reason, and on its basis, I want to 
suggest that the American and Japanese participants are in an analogous situation—
they are not truly reasoning though it seems they are. Neither the Japanese nor the 
American teachers are genuinely asking “What are the actual competencies of the 
student”? Rather, no sooner does the student face a difficulty, the American teacher 
latches on to a culturally available ‘solution’ to the problem that “he might not have it in 
him” and no sooner does a Japanese teacher see a student face difficultly, she latches on 
to a ‘solution’ floating and readily available in her culture that “he just needs to put in 
more effort.” This phenomenon shows, I believe, that neither teacher is really reasoning, 
in that, neither is examining, investigating, even questioning, what is the real issue is 
                                                
174 In the face of seemingly recalcitrant evidence, one can rationally reject the conclusion by introducing 
auxiliary hypotheses i.e. in this case, the methods were faulty, hence results are not believable. I revisit 
these kinds of ‘rational’ maneuvers in science and in daily life in maintaining pre-established world views 
later in the chapter. This is reminiscent of Bacon who said that the intellect despises . what comes next in 
order to safe guard earlier opinions. 
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with the child. Rather, prior cultural beliefs, “lenses” (ability vs. effort), unexamined for 
the most part, determine the solution to the child’s difficulties rather than an 
examination of the real causes of the child’s difficulties. Just like the Stanford students, 
the American and Japanese participants too are in the grip of their beliefs which prevent 
them from inquiring into the matter before them. This illustrates Morteza’s insights into 
the relation of culture and reason noted earlier: “culture as a lens, culture as a barrier, 
and culture as grips in reasoning.”175 
 In both cases, a more rationale course of action would have been to ask, afresh, 
‘What are in fact the true abilities of the student?’ And ‘How can we determined them, 
what are possible measures?’ Just as in the Stanford students’ case, the rational course 
of action would have been to examine, afresh, ‘What does the evidence itself that is 
before me suggest?’ And one would embark on this investigation with open eyes, 
without preconceptions. It is this crucial piece of reasoning, that is missing from both 
parties above. This piece of reasoning is not just a matter of giving reasons; rather, it is a 
matter of engaging one’s reason and truly enquiring. 
 The gravity of the situation is clear from the point of view of the consequences 
for education. Because neither is reasoning, on account of deep enculturation, it 
forecloses in the minds of teachers and parents in both cultures explorations into 
numerous other alternative explanations—perhaps it truly is primarily an issue of 
ability or perhaps it truly is primarily a lack of effort, or perhaps it’s primarily 
motivation, or upbringing, or the effect of prior experience, or the design of materials, 
or teacher methods, or parental influence or a combination of them or other countless 
                                                
175 See page 131 above. 
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causes. Ready-made cultural lenses (‘it’s about ability,’ ‘it’s about effort’) limit the 
horizon of possible explanations, causes, diagnoses and goals. And this, not just on the 
part of students but also on the part of parents, teachers, policy makers and even on the 
part of philosophers of education within each culture. 
 Bringing into play a broader idea of reason enable us to see that, in these kinds of 
cases, i. the real problem of reason is not a lack of skills in argument identification and 
evaluation ii. the real issue is the problem of lenses that block participants from truly 
engaging into the matter at hand, iii. the desired engagement requires a different use of 
reason than merely giving arguments, iv. though participants are giving arguments 
they are not truly reasoning and, v. most importantly, because of a lack of reasoning, 
participants may have a distorted view of reality gleaned through these lenses. With 
respect to the cultivation of the intellect in education, since this particular ‘problem of 
lenses’ is not a problem of a lack of skills in argument identification and evaluation, the 
efficacy of critical thinking courses (which focus on argument identification and 
evaluation) in overcoming these kinds of problems would seem doubtful. 
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Chapter 3.2  
Case Study II: 
Reasoning about Preschool Ideals and Practices:  
Japan, China and the United States. 
 
 Consider, for starters, the behavior of a child in Komatsudani, a Japanese 
preschool on the outskirts of Kyoto documented in Tobin, Wu and Davidson’s Preschool 
in Three Cultures: Japan, China and the United States: 
On a day we videotaped at Komatsudani, Hiroki started things off with a flourish by 
pulling his penis out from under the legs of his shorts and waving it at the class during the 
morning welcome song. During the workbook session that followed, Hiroki called out 
answers to every question the teacher asked and to many she did not ask. When not 
volunteering answers, Hiroki gave a loud running commentary on his workbook progress 
(“now I am coloring the badger, now the pig . . .”) as he worked rapidly and deftly on his 
assignment. He alternated his play-by-play announcing with occasional songs, entertaining 
the class with loud, accurate renditions of their favorite cartoon themes, complete with 
accompanying dancing, gestures, and occasional flourishes. Despite the demands of his 
singing and announcing schedule, Hiroki managed to complete his workbook pages before 
most of the other children . . .  
Work completed, Hiroki threw his energies wholeheartedly into his comedy routine, 
holding various colored crayons up to the front of his shorts and announcing that he had a 
blue, then a green, and finally a black penis . . . As the children lined up to have Fukui-
sensei (Hiroki’s teacher) check their completed work, Hiroki fired a barrage of pokes, 
pushes, and little punches at the back of the boy in front of him, who took it all rather well. 
In general, as Hiroki punched and wrestled his way through the day with various of his 
male classmates, they reacted by seeming to enjoy his attentions, becoming irritated but not 
  140 
actually angry, or, most commonly, by shrugging them off with a “That’s Hiroki for you” 
sort of expression. The reaction of Satoshi, who cried when Hiroki hit him and stepped on 
his hand, was the exception to this rule.176 
As part of their ‘multivocal ethnography’ Tobin, Wu and Davidson recorded a typical 
day in each of the three preschools in Kyoto, Dong-feng (in rural southwest China) and 
Honolulu then had teachers, parents and administrators in each of these three cites, 
react to all three recordings. This method facilitated ‘insiders’ views of goings-on as 
well as of ‘outsiders.’ From the perspective of the present work, the different views 
presented by Tobin and his colleagues, on the very same events, brings into full view 
the generally invisible but enormously consequential lenses through which each culture 
sees itself and others—lenses which open new vistas and worlds but which can also 
limit, blur, and block perceptions and reasonings about the social world including 
educational matters. In this section of the chapter, I build upon the foundations laid in 
the previous section on the relationship between culture and reason but I also extend 
my treatment to the impact of culture on perception of problems, acceptable 
explanations, definitions of terms and observations. To do this, I present descriptions of 
                                                
176 Joseph Jay Tobin, David Y. H. Wu, and Dana H. Davidson, Preschool in three cultures: Japan, China, and 
the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 18.  
Most of the quotes in this chapter are from the above work. Fifteen years after his original field work, 
Joseph Tobin returned back to the field leading to the publication of Preschool in Three Cultures Revisited. 
See Joseph Jay Tobin, Yeh Hsueh, and Mayumi Karasawa, Preschool in Three Cultures Revisited: China, 
Japan, and the United States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
With respect to off color jokes Tobin et al. note:  
We should perhaps mention at this point that penis and butt jokes were immensely popular with 
four-year-old children in nearly every school we visited in all three countries. The only noticeable 
difference was that such humor was most openly exhibited in Japan, where the teachers generally 
said nothing and sometimes even smiled, whereas American teachers tended to say something like 
“We’d rather not hear that kind of talk during group time,” and in China such joking appeared to 
have been driven largely underground, out of adult view. Tobin, Wu and Davidson, Preschool in Three 
Cultures, 18. 
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Hiroki’s behavior in the classroom and his teacher’s (Fukui-sensei’s) responses and their 
interpretations from the perspective of the three cultures, Japanese, Chinese and 
American, as a running example—hence the extensive quotes regarding Hiroki’s 
behavior. Tobin, Wu and Davidson continue their description of Hiroki and his 
teacher’s intervention (or non-intervention): 
During the singing of the prelaunch song, Hiroki, who was one of the four daily lunch 
monitors, abandoned his post in front of the organ to wrestle with a boy seated nearby. 
While eating, Hiroki regaled his classmates with more songs and jokes. Finishing his lunch 
as quickly as he had his workbook, Hiroki joined other fast diners on the balcony, where he 
roughhoused with some other boys and then disrupted a game by throwing flash cards over 
the railing to the ground below . . . A few minutes later Fukui-sensei walked out to the 
balcony, looked over the railing, and said, “So that’s where the cards are going”. . . Soon 
several of the children, with the conspicuous exception of Hiroki, ran down the steps to 
retrieve the fallen cards. This proved to be a losing battle as Hiroki continued to rain cards 
down upon them. It was now that Hiroki (purposely) stepped on Satoshi’s hand, which 
made him cry . . .  
Lunch over and the room cleaned up, Fukui-sensei returned to the balcony where, faced 
with the sight of Hiroki and another boy involved in a fight (which consisted mostly of the 
other boy’s being pushed down and climbed on by Hiroki) she said neutrally, “Are you still 
fighting?” Then she added, a minute later, in the same neutral tone, “Why are you fighting 
anyway?” and told everyone still on the balcony, “Hurry up and clean up [the flash cards]. 
Lunchtime is over. Hurry, hurry.” Hiroki was by now disrupting the card clean-up by 
rolling on the cards and putting them in his mouth, but when he tried to enter the classroom 
Fukui-sensei put her hand firmly on his back and ushered him outside again. Fukui-sensei, 
who by now was doing the greatest share of the card picking-up, several times blocked 
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Hiroki from leaving the scene of his crime, and she playfully spanked him on the behind 
when he continued to roll on the cards.  
The rest of the day wound down for Hiroki in similar fashion . . . During the free 
playground period that ends the day, Hiroki played gently with a toddler and more roughly 
with some of the older boys. He was finally picked up shortly before 6:00 by his father, 
making him one of the last children to go home.177 
Perceptions and explanations of misbehavior 
 What did Japanese, Chinese and American teachers, parents and administrators 
‘see’ when they saw Hiroki? How did they explain Hiroki’s behavior and the teacher’s 
role? What was their reasoning? When the tape was shown to Fukui-sensei and her 
supervisors at Komatsudani, the ethnographers themselves, Tobin, Wu and Davidson, 
were curious to know how Fukui-sensei (Hiroki’s teacher) would react—whether she 
would be defensive regarding her seemingly not dealing with Hiroki’s misbehavior. To 
the contrary, say Tobin and his colleagues: “Both Fukui-sensei and her supervisors told 
us they were very satisfied with the film and felt that it adequately captured what they 
are about. Indeed, they said, the way Fukui-sensei dealt with Hiroki in the film, 
including ignoring his most provocatively aggressive and exhibitionistic actions, 
reflected not negligence but just the opposite, a strategy worked out over the course of 
countless meetings and much trial and error.”178  
 Nothing remarkable at all from the perspective of Japanese insiders at 
Komatsudani, on the contrary, a worked out “strategy” and nothing to explain! For 
                                                
177 Tobin, Wu, and Davidson, Preschool in Three Cultures, 18, 21. 
178 Ibid., 22. 
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insiders at Komatsudani no serious problem is perceived in Hiroki’s behavior. Is it the 
case then that cultural factors are determining the very perception of a problem? And if 
so, is culture impacting thinking, reasoning and rationality at the most basic level of the 
very detection of a problem?  
 What did Chinese parents, teachers and administrators see? Tobin and his 
colleagues report that Chinese preschool administrators and teachers who viewed their 
tape were “outraged” by Hiroki’s behavior. A third of their Chinese informants 
considered Hiroki’s fighting as the worse thing they had seen in their tapes. A Chinese 
teacher wrote in her response: “What a selfish boy! What a bully! He is obviously used 
to completely getting his own way at home, to having everything he wants, to being a 
little king. He is so spoiled he has no consideration for others. He thinks the world 
revolves around him.”179  
 The authors note that Chinese teachers, parents and administrators worry a great 
deal about children being spoiled:  
Many preschool administrators and teachers complained that children in China have 
become tai jiao—too delicate, too dependent, too fussy, too bourgeois. The character jiao 
contains the radical for “horse” and thus etymologically the phrase tai jiao carries with it a 
connotation close to the English headstrong or unreined. Tai jiao is caused by parents’ 
foolishly giving their children free rein, and it is corrected by teachers’ wisely tightening the 
reins.180 
                                                
179 Tobin, Wu, and Davidson, Preschool in Three Cultures, 88. 
180 Tobin, Wu, and Davidson, Preschool in Three Cultures, 90. 
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 Early, pre-revolutionary Chinese child-rearing texts “warned of the dangers of 
ni-ai, of ‘drowning a [child] in love.’”181 Furthermore, according to Tobin et al., 
concerns over spoiling are exasperated by what are perceived to be the effects of the one 
child policy, where four grandparents and two parents shower their love onto the one 
child (4-2-1 phenomena). One Chinese administrator had no trouble detecting this very 
phenomena in Hiroki: “He behaves like the worst kind of spoiled single child. I would 
bet he has no siblings. Do most Japanese families these days have only one child?”182 
And parents are the ones to blame for spoiling and the resultant behaviors. Here is a 
quote from an article by Chinese authors Tao and Chiu entitled “Psychological 
Ramifications of the One Child Family Policy”: 
Many parents look upon their only child as their great treasure and place all their hope on 
him or her. They try their best to provide the best nutrition so that the child will be healthy. 
They do their best to grant the child’s various demands (including unreasonable ones) in 
order to make him or her happy. They try to protect the child from difficulty or danger. 
They have all sorts of fears and are overly anxious about whatever concerns their child. 
Thus, they spoil and indulge the child for fear of losing their only treasure. The child senses 
this and takes advantage of it and will threaten parents in order to fulfill unreasonable 
demands.183 
The above quote is from observations and comments from a research article. Are the 
conclusions based on an inquiry or do they echo cultural notions? The concept of 
                                                
181 Ibid., 90. 
182 Ibid., 88. 
183 Ibid., 90. 
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‘spoiled’ serves as an explanatory framework for numerous ills as is so clear to Principal 
Hua: 
Some spoiled children are very stubborn, wild, and aggressive, like the Japanese boy in your 
tape. These children need to be treated with a firm hand and brought under control before it 
is too late. But more commonly, spoiled children are weak, soft, fussy, delicate. They don’t 
play with enthusiasm. They don’t eat with a hearty appetite, but instead leave food on their 
plates. The say, “It doesn’t taste like the way my mother cooks it.” They whine, “The beds at 
school are too hard. The teachers are too mean. They scold me.” They are angry when other 
children won’t yield to their demands.184 
 Bacon noted a major problem of the intellect where the intellect “distorts and 
discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.” Is it the case here that 
there has been an inquiry and an investigation into various kinds of misbehaviors such 
that it has now been discovered, through a thorough and rational inquiry, that very 
different kinds of traits and behavior (stubborn, aggressive, weak, fussy) are the result 
of spoiling? Have Chinese parents, teachers, administrators and researchers 
‘discovered’ spoiling as the cause of these traits and misbehaviors? Or is it the case that 
the concept of spoiled is so readily available as an overarching explanatory framework 
in the culture that it is readily projected on to all kinds of undesirable but very disparate 
behaviors: ‘selfish,’ ‘bully,’ ‘used to getting his way,’ ‘no consideration for others,’ 
‘thinks the world revolves around him,’ ‘too delicate,’ ‘too fussy,’ ‘too bourgeois,’ 
‘stubborn,’ ‘wild,’ ‘aggressive,’ ‘weak,’ ‘soft,’ ‘fussy,’ ‘delicate,’ ‘won’t play with 
enthusiasm,’ ‘doesn’t eat with a hearty appetite,’ ‘gets angry when other children won’t 
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yield to his demands’ and countless others? Is it the case here that the intellect is 
distorting and discoloring ‘the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it’? 
Wither reasoning into the real causes of misbehavior?185  
 And once a problem is diagnosed the cure is not too far either. Principal Hua can 
readily see the solution to this problem: “These children need to be treated with a firm 
hand and brought under control before it is too late.” As mentioned earlier, tai jiao, the 
tendency to be too delicate, dependent, fussy, bourgeois, in short spoiled, “is to be 
                                                
185 One wonders whether diagnoses of ADHD in the US share a similar mechanism. Note the variety of 
symptoms coming under it and note how they perfectly describe behaviors ‘disruptive’ in a US 
classroom. DSM-5 Criteria for ADHD: 
Inattention: 
 
Often fails to give close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in schoolwork, at work, or 
with other activities. 
Often has trouble holding attention on tasks or play activities. 
Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly. 
Often does not follow through on instructions and fails to finish schoolwork, chores, or duties in the 
workplace (e.g., loses focus, side-tracked). 
Often has trouble organizing tasks and activities. 
Often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to do tasks that require mental effort over a long period of time 
(such as schoolwork or homework). 
Often loses things necessary for tasks and activities (e.g. school materials, pencils, books, tools, 
wallets, keys, paperwork, eyeglasses, mobile telephones). 
Is often easily distracted 
Is often forgetful in daily activities. 
 
Hyperactivity and Impulsivity: 
 
Often fidgets with or taps hands or feet, or squirms in seat. 
Often leaves seat in situations when remaining seated is expected. 
Often runs about or climbs in situations where it is not appropriate (adolescents or adults may be 
limited to feeling restless). 
Often unable to play or take part in leisure activities quietly. 
Is often "on the go" acting as if "driven by a motor". 
Often talks excessively. 
Often blurts out an answer before a question has been completed. 
Often has trouble waiting his/her turn. 
Often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into conversations or games) 
 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
 
 http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/adhd/diagnosis.html 
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corrected by teachers’ wisely tightening the reins.” Furthermore, as noted earlier, “tai 
jiao carries with it a connotation close to the English headstrong or unrefined.” Notice 
here how unreined is written into the concept of being spoiled. If spoiled means 
unreined the cure becomes obvious. Spoiled children must be reined-in. 
Teacher roles 
 Tobin and his colleagues continue: “Viewing spoiling as the most serious 
problem presented by the single-child family policy, Chinese look to preschools as a 
solution. Preschools provide single children with the chance to interact with other 
children and with teachers trained to correct the errors of single-child parents.”186 
Spoiling is corrected through guam: “The word used most frequently in China to refer to 
teachers’ control and regimentation of children is guam—literally ‘to govern’ . . . When 
Ms. Xiang told the children to eat their lunch in silence and finish every bite, that was 
guam. When Ms. Wang got all twenty-six children to squat at once in the bathroom, 
that was guam.187 When Ms. Wang criticized one child for squirming and smiling while 
praising another for sitting straight with her hands behind her back and a serious 
expression on her face, that, too, was guam . . . Guam has a very positive connotation. It 
can mean ‘to care for’ or even ‘to love’ as well as ‘to govern’ . . . To govern children well 
is hard work. Chinese believe that preschool children are well behaved not because they 
                                                
186 Tobin, Wu, and Davidson, Preschool in Three Cultures, 90. 
187 Ibid., 78-79. Children in this particular school go to a communal bathroom at break time and all 
altogether. 
  148 
are born that way but because teachers work long and hard to bring them under firm 
control.”188 
 Spoiling and the need for its correction partly determine teachers’ roles. Here is 
principal Hua again: “Teachers must take charge in the classroom. Teachers must 
provide structure and order. That‘s their responsibility. That’s what they are there 
for.”189 Here is a Chinese administrator: “A preschool teacher should never waste time. 
Unstructured time leads to trouble. We do not have much of the kind of ‘free time’ in 
our school that we saw in your tapes of schools in Japan and the United States because 
we believe it is important for teachers to organize their students’ time, to govern (guam) 
the class so children do not have a chance to become wild or aimless.”190 Notice the 
descriptions “wild,” stubborn,” “aggressive,”—just like an unreined horse!“ Hence, it is 
no surprise how a Beijing teacher viewed Hiroki and her teacher: 
I think it’s terrible that the teacher just stood there while the children fought. If you let a 
child behave that way in preschool, they will think that it is acceptable to be that way, and 
he will develop a bad character that may last his whole life. When children misbehave, 
teachers must correct their misbehavior immediately and make it clear to the children that 
their behavior is not acceptable.”191 
                                                
188 Ibid., 93. 
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Tobin and his colleagues note that the “Child Development Center of China . . . has a 
mandate to raise the quality of Chinese parenting and preschool education by coaching 
teachers and parents in nutrition, education, and ‘how not to spoil their single 
children.’’’192 
 Emerging here is nothing less than a philosophy of education whose core 
foundation seems to be numerous cultural notions rather than systematic inquiry. If 
children are spoiled and are unreined they clearly need to be treated with a firm hand 
and reined-in before it is too late. Since well-behaved children are not born that way, 
teachers need to work long and hard to ‘govern’ them and thereby correct the spoiling 
indulged in by parents and grandparents at home. This ‘philosophy’ also determines 
how teachers are to correct spoiling and the ensuing classroom environment. Teachers 
must govern the class so children do not have a chance to become ‘wild’ or ‘aimless,’ 
hence no free time. The need to correct spoiling also determines the focus of teacher 
education as the mandate of the Child Development Center of China amply indicates. 
 Thomas Kuhn used the word paradigm.193 I think it is suggestive and highlights 
certain notions with respect to the goals of the present study. A paradigm, he argued, is 
a consensus among practitioners (during the phase of normal science) on such 
fundamentals things as the ultimate entities in the world, fundamental problems, 
acceptable and reasonable explanations, acceptable solutions and definitions, amongst 
other things. The paradigm, to practitioners, is not seen as a view on the world. To 
                                                
192 Ibid., 91 
193 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
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practitioners, this is how things really are. Reasoning then occurs within the confines of 
the boundaries of the paradigm. The boundaries are not seen and never questioned. On 
the contrary they seem completely obvious to its practitioners. From the perspective of 
the present dissertation, the force of the paradigm, in this case in the form of deep 
cultural commitments, forbids a true, rational inquiry into the matter. 
 Japanese teachers, parents and administrators have their own alternate 
worldviews and ready explanations. Here is Higashino-sensei, a teacher at 
Komatsudani: 
I suppose you could say in a sense that Hiroki is spoiled, but we believe that his problem is 
really the opposite. To me spoiling implies getting too much care and attention, and Hiroki’s 
problem is that he hasn’t really received enough of the right kind of attention and doesn’t 
know how to receive care and attention . . . He wants attention and to be cared for [amae], 
but he asks for it in the wrong way.194 
He hasn’t ‘received enough of the right kind of attention’ and ‘doesn’t know how to 
receive care and attention.’ In Japanese eyes, according Tobin and colleagues, Hiroki 
suffers from an ‘inability to be dependent’ a disorder of amae. Tobin and colleagues note 
that teachers at Komatsudani “often diffuse children’s anger and overcome their 
stubbornness by assuming that behavior problems such as these are at the heart 
problems of amae [an inability to be dependent] and responding with concern and 
sympathy rather than anger or criticism.”195 Furthermore, amae, dependency, is not 
considered innate but something that “must be learned and developed, and thus 
                                                
194 Tobin, Wu, and Davidson, Preschool in Three Cultures, 27. 
195 Ibid., 28. 
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something that must be taught.” Hence, someone diagnosed with “being awkward in 
the ways of amae, must be given help to overcome this problem.”196 Far from being 
spoiled, Hiroki is desperately in need of care and attention but finds it awkward to seek 
for them in the right way. He finds it hard to be dependent and needs be gently taught.  
 Both views cannot have a foundation in rationality as they are contradictory—
but they could have a foundation in culture; in the ready availability of explanatory 
concepts, spoiled vs. inability to be dependent. From the point of view of a narrow 
conception of reason, namely argument identification and assessment, members in both 
cultures are reasoning since they are giving plenty of (good) reasons; there are no 
shortage of reasons. However, from the perspective of a broader view of the idea of 
reason—one which includes the reasoner and reason—we see that in some ways 
members in neither culture are actually reasoning since they are not truly enquiring, 
investigating the true causes of Hiroki’s misbehavior. Rather, they are at the mercy of 
the culturally available explanations that come readily to mind. Hence, in many ways, 
they are victims of the power of culture and lenses over their minds. They do not have 
‘rational control’ over their reasonings and hence are not ‘rationally autonomous’ as 
Richard Paul might put it. 
Psychologies of learning 
 ‘Needs to be gently taught’ vs. ‘reined-in.’ A contrary pedagogy accompanies 
these lenses. And their consequences for educational practice are not insignificant. In 
total contrast to the Chinese, where the teacher needs to take firm control and ‘govern’ 
and rein-in children, the staff at Komatsudani believe “that children best learn to 
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control their behavior when the impetus to change comes spontaneously through 
interactions with their peers rather than from above. Thus, Hiroki’s best chance to learn 
self-control lies not in encounters with his teachers but in play with his classmates.” 
Teachers’ directives only go so far in Japanese eyes in contrast to Chinese perceptions. 
Children playing with classmates, interacting with others, learning to solve their own 
problems, is center stage. Here is an exchange between Fukui-sensei and Tobin, the lead 
author: 
Fukui: I told Midori and other children that if they felt it was a problem, then they should 
deal with Hiroki’s throwing the cards. If I tell Hiroki to stop, it doesn’t mean much to him, 
but if his classmates tell him, it affects him. 
Tobin: But he kept throwing the cards even after Midori told him to stop. 
Fukui: Because he is so proud. He won’t ever change his behavior if someone orders him to. 
He’ll always do the opposite in the short run. But in the long run, his classmates’ 
disapproval has a great effect on him.197 
Explanations are ready at hand and though it might not look like the remedy is effective 
now, ‘in the long run’ it will have its intended effects. Just like in the Chinese 
classrooms, though teachers taking firm control may seem harsh now, ‘in the long run’ 
it will pay off. ‘In the long run’ can save many a (cultural) theory from refutation. This 
is perhaps one of many mechanisms that sustain theories and cultural worldviews. 
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Goals of preschool 
 In tandem with pedagogical solutions ‘learning best from learning to play with 
others’ and ‘his classmates disapproval has a great effect on him’ come values and traits 
that define ideal encounters with teachers and students in a classroom. In a survey of 
Japanese teachers, cited in Tobin et al.., traits most highly valued in children, were 
found to be omoiyari (empathy), yasahii (gentleness), shakaisie (social consciousness), 
shinsetu (kindness), and kyochosei (cooperativeness).198  
 Tobin and colleagues asked Chinese, Japanese and American parents, teachers, 
administrators and child development specialists “What are the most important things 
to learn in preschool?” 80% of the Japanese ranked ‘Sympathy /Empathy / Concern for 
others’ as their top three compared to 20% of their Chinese counterparts.199 They asked, 
“What are the most important characteristics of a good preschool teacher?” 63% of the 
Japanese ranked ‘Tolerant’ as their top three compared to 2% of the Chinese. On the 
other hand, 35% of the Chinese ranked ‘Good at making children study hard (a firm 
taskmaster)’ as their top three compared to none, (0%) of the Japanese.200 They asked 
“Why should a society have preschools?” 70% of Japanese ranked ‘To give children a 
chance to play with other children’ as their top three compared to 25% of the Chinese. 
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And 61% of the Japanese ranked ‘To give children experience being a member of a 
group’ as their first choice compared to 12% of the Chinese.201 
 From only the questions and responses cited above, we can see vast differences 
in values. These differences, no doubt, translate into vastly different practices and 
perhaps even vastly different student outcomes. Yet, from the perspective of reasoning, 
members’ reasonings about educational matters within a particular culture, for the most 
part, is undertaken within the confines of these given values. The values themselves are 
not generally the subject of inquiry. Inquiries are undertaken to determine whether 
programs and policies are in-line with these given values—but the values themselves 
are sacrosanct. If at all questioned, they appear obvious to insiders: “Of course it’s 
important to give children experience being part of a group. They are part of a group!” 
a Japanese teacher might say. 
 That children need to learn to be a member of a group and learn to be 
appropriately dependent will sound odd to American ears. Through American eyes, 
children are naturally dependent in the early years but dependency is something that 
needs to be overcome towards independence and self-sufficiency. A disorder on the 
dependent-independent scale, in the American context, would mean a tendency to 
remain overly dependent and an inability to become independent. This is reflected in the 
canonical (Western?) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders [DSM-5 301.6 (F60.7)] 
and is unambiguously labeled “Dependent Personality Disorder Syndrome.” I did not 
find any disorder in this manual surrounding being too independent and an inability to 
be appropriately dependent. Cultural lenses go deep down. They seem to determine 
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illnesses themselves. What would a diagnostic manual of mental disorders look like if it 
had its origin in Japan? 
 Independence, individualism, individuality rather than groupism are center 
stage in the US. as Tobin and colleagues note: “It is in their commitment to treating 
children as individuals that the staff of St. Timothy’s differ most significantly from their 
counterparts in China and Japan . . . Our interviews suggest that Americans hold a 
profound belief in the essential un-likeness of same-age children in temperament, 
interests, rate of development, attention span, and intelligence. And with this belief 
comes an equally strong belief in the right of every child to a preschool curriculum 
appropriate to his or her unique abilities and needs.”202 
Tobin and his colleagues’ interviews with Japanese teachers gave them a very different 
picture: “Japanese preschool teachers are very reluctant to discuss individual 
differences in ability among the children in their care and believe that it is their 
responsibility to see that all children in their care are treated equally” whereas “teachers 
at St. Timothy’s [the US school] speak without hesitation of individual differences 
among the children and stress the importance of tailoring the curriculum to each child’s 
unique temperament, needs, interests, and abilities.”203 
Here is Cheryl talking about her role at St. Tomothy’s: 
As a teacher my job is to work with each child in my class wherever he is at. If a child is 
ready to read, then my job with that child is to be a reading teacher. Many of our children 
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aren’t quite ready to read. So my job with these kids is to work with them wherever they are 
on the skills they need. Some children like Kerry need a lot of work on their problem-
solving skills and self-control. I have to give Kerry a lot more individual attention and work 
more with him than I do with some other children right now. Kerry is a little younger than 
most of the others and he has a little more trouble with his self-control. But he is getting 
there.204 
“Unique” temperaments, needs, interests, abilities, multiple learning styles and many 
other “uniques” dictates to a large extent, the role of the teacher in US classrooms. That 
everyone is unique and deserves to be treated as individuals appears so self-evident 
that it is never questioned; it’s never reasoned about. What is reasoned about is whether 
school organization and teacher pedagogy foster this individuality and uniqueness of 
individuals. Extensive ‘reasonings’ are conducted within these staunchly held values—
if at all questioned they seem patently obvious just as the importance of children 
coming to see themselves much like others is obvious in Japanese eyes. Though in one 
sense cultural actors are reasoning, in another sense, when under the grip of values, 
cultural actors aren’t reasoning at all though they are giving plenty of reasons. This 
state of affairs is reminiscent of Locke’s ‘miscarriage’ of reason where individuals 
“seldom reason at all but do and think according to the example of others, whether 
parents, neighbors, ministers, or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an 
implicit faith in, for the saving of themselves the pains and trouble of thinking and 
examining for themselves.”205 
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Class size 
 With individuality and individual differences comes the value of small classes. 
And armed with these values comes a ‘detection’ of a problem with large classes. One 
American teacher could easily ‘diagnose’ the trouble in Japanese classrooms: “No 
wonder there is so much wildness and fighting. It’s a wonder there’s not more with that 
many kids in the class.” And another: “The worst thing [about Komatsudani] by far is 
the ratios. 30/1! That’s is way, way, too high.”206 
 Is it too high? When the ethnographers asked Japanese teachers and 
administrators whether they would like to have smaller classes they almost always 
replied yes. While watching a tape of an American preschool with a student / teacher 
ratio of about eight to one, a Japanese teacher in Kyoto commented: “It must be great to 
teach in America. Such small classes!” However, when they followed up asking the 
same teacher: “So you think it would be better to have a class size of ten or twelve 
instead of twenty-five or thirty?” Yano-sensei responded: “No, I wouldn’t say better. 
Well, maybe you could say better for the teacher, but not better for the children. Children 
need to have the experience of being in a large group in order to learn to relate to lots of 
kinds of children in lots of kinds of situations.”207 Furthermore, teaching is not like 
parenting, as another Japanese teacher explains: 
I envy the way the American teachers, with such small classes and such low student/ 
teacher ratios, have time to play so affectionately with each child. That’s how I like to play 
with my nieces and nephews. That’s a good way for aunts and uncles and parents to play 
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with their children. But I don’t think that’s necessarily the best way for a teacher to relate to 
children. Teaching is different from being a parent or aunt or family friend to a child . . . 
What I am trying to say is that a teacher should relate to the class as a whole rather than to 
each student, even if this is a little harder or even a little bit sad for the teacher sometimes.208 
‘A teacher should relate to the class as a whole.’ Needless to say, we have here radically 
opposed notions of ideal teachers. Nothing could be better for children than individual 
teacher attention in American eyes and nothing could be worse in Japanese eyes. Is it an 
enquiry, an investigation and a deep study that has determined these contrary but very 
steadfastly held views to the extent that they dictate entire learning and teaching 
philosophies or is it the case that members in both cultures are seeing the world 
through their colored lenses but not seeing their lenses? 
Tobin and his colleagues elaborate: “As we have noted, Japanese teachers believe in a 
large ratio of students to teachers to keep teachers from being too readily available to 
children, for they fear that an overly available and charismatic teacher, whatever her 
other merits, will tend to discourage children from forming friendships and reacting 
primarily to one another rather than, as at home, primarily to an adult.”209  
 From the perspective of Japanese teachers and administrators, all is well with 
having lots of children in one class. Indeed, it is desirable! On the contrary, what is 
really problematic is a low student / teacher ratio and individual teacher attention. 
Tobin et al. continue: “In the eyes of the Japanese preschool teachers and 
administrators, then, very small classes and low student / teacher ratios produce a 
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classroom atmosphere that emphasizes teacher-student over student-student 
interactions and fails to provide children with adequate opportunities to learn to 
function as members of a group.” A teacher in Tokyo comments, after watching a tape 
of an American preschool: “A class that size seems kind of sad and unpopulated.” 
Another Tokyo teacher wonders: “In a class that size wouldn’t a child’s world be too 
narrow?” Yago-sensei of Senzen Yochien in Kyoto questions small classes: 
I understand how this kind of small class size can help young children become very self-
reliant and independent. But I can’t help feeling that there is something kind of sad or 
lonely about a class that size. Don’t American teachers worry that children may become too 
independent? I wonder how you teach a child to become a member of a group in a class that 
small?210 
As mentioned earlier, in American eyes, there are no illnesses linked to becoming too 
independent only becoming too dependent. Hence, that children may become too 
independent is not even on the radar. Center stage for the Japanese teacher on the other 
hand is being a member of the group and being in a large classroom is a way of 
becoming one.  
Reasoning and the ‘Goldilocks’ effect 
 Tobin and his colleagues make an astute observation that speaks directly to the 
purposes of the present study. They noticed what they call a ‘Goldilocks’ effect when 
American respondents compared St. Timothy’s (a US school) with Komatsudani and 
Dong-feng:  
                                                
210 Ibid. 
  160 
Americans who viewed our three tapes generally found the Chinese preschool “too 
controlled,” the Japanese preschool “too uncontrolled,” and the American preschool “just 
right.” On the items [in a survey conducted after watching the tapes] “teachers set limits 
and controlled children’s behavior” and “teachers directed children’s activities and play,” 
our American respondents rated Dong-feng as directing and controlling “too much,” 
Komatsudani “too little,” and St. Timothy’s “just right.” On the items asking about the 
children’s mood and activity level, Chinese children were rated as “too controlled,” 
“passive,” and “subdued,” Japanese children were rated as “too wild and chaotic,” and the 
American children at St. Timothy’s as “just right.”211  
Why consider and reason about alternatives when you right? We have here yet another 
world view with its own windows, diagnoses, causes, and solutions. Reasoning about 
matters, especially very consequential matters, such as the direction of educational 
efforts seem to be based on unexamined lenses as noted earlier but worse, these very 
same lenses are used to reject all other alternatives. Instead of holding in check, say, 
American values and asking afresh ‘What about those other alternatives?’, ‘Is there any 
merit to them?’, participants are here allowing their values (lenses) to kick in as 
standards no sooner that they consider the other alternatives. In other words, just like 
the participants in the last section who go by their cultural notions (‘effort’ or ‘ability’) 
these participants are not really reasoning. And just like the Stanford students in the last 
chapter, reason is held captive by prior (cultural) beliefs and commitments. 
 From a narrow view of reason, that of participants giving reasons based on 
evidence where the Chinese give reasons about how and why children are spoiled and 
the need to rein them in, where Japanese give reasons about difficulties in learning to be 
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dependent and allowing children to learn to be dependent by playing with others and 
where Americans emphasize independence and individuality and where each child has 
a right to a curriculum appropriate to him are reasoning, they are all reasoning. But 
given the prior, invisible for the most part, lenses on the basis of which they give 
reasons—from the perspective of the broader idea of reason, they are not fully 
reasoning. The lenses at once prevent them from considering numerous other 
alternatives and blur their view of reality. As Richard Paul puts it in noting problems of 
reason: “Most people do not understand the degree to which they have uncritically 
internalized the dominant prejudices of their society or culture. Sociologists and 
anthropologists identify this as the state of being ‘culture bound’. . . the uncritical 
tendency to place one’s culture, nation, religion above all others.”212 
Virtues of fighting 
 Most Americans who watched the tape of “A Day at Komatsudani” with Hiroki 
misbehaving were very disturbed. An American teacher remarked:  
I think it was a mistake for Hiroki’s teacher to let him get that far out of control. Children 
always are testing the limits of what they can get away with. A kid like that is testing you all 
the time, looking for a consistent response. His teacher looks like she’s just ignoring him. It 
is hard to bring a child like that back under control once he has been allowed to get so out of 
control. The key is not to let things get so out of control in the first place.213  
A parent from Chicago remarked:  
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The way that boy is allowed to behave is bad for the whole class. One child should not be 
allowed to infringe on the other children’s rights. Children should be able to go to school 
without having to worry about constantly pounded on by other children. They have a right 
to a calm, secure, atmosphere in the classroom.214 
The American teachers are, of course, referring to Hiroki hitting and punching through 
most of the day. Before commenting on this, notice the language that is used. Neither 
the Japanese nor Chinese educators described the situation as anything to do with 
rights. Rights talk is quintessentially American. The American teacher above described 
Hiroki at-least twice as ‘out of control’ but none of the Chinese or Japanese participants 
used this phrase. Americans frequently diagnose children as ‘out of control’ and for a 
whole host of different reasons: hitting, not standing in line, speaking out of turn, 
yelling, and screaming. Cheryl, the American teacher quoted above characterized 
Kerry, twice in a paragraph, as having trouble with ‘self-control.’ The American 
‘Goldilocks’ phenomena is couched in the language of control (Dong-feng as directing and 
controlling “too much,” Komatsudani “too little,” and St. Timothy’s “just right”). Moreover, 
the generally operative theory is that such behavior needs to be controlled early or there 
will be far worse consequences later: ‘nip it in the bud’ metaphor.  
 And something that really needs to be taken care of immediately, in American 
schools, is hitting not only for the sake of the hitter but more and more so for the sake of 
other children. Safety of and harm to others have become, of recent, paramount concern 
to parents, teachers and administrators. Fights are seen as inherently harmful and hence 
their immediate crackdown. American teachers and parents spend an enormous 
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amount of time and energy thinking of, reasoning on and figuring out mechanisms to 
avoid conflicts, prevent fights, finding alternative ways to resolve conflicts (‘you need 
resolve by words’), how to stop fights, debating on appropriate punishments (time-
outs), restraints on children, and the like. This is nicely exemplified at St. Timothy’s:  
[W]e recorded many examples of children being encouraged to use words for what the staff 
members call “problem solving.” The approach Cheryl used to break up a fight in the block 
corner is a good example: “Mike, can you tell Stu with words what you want instead of 
grabbing? . . . Stu, when Mike took the block from you, how did you feel? Did you tell him 
that made you angry? Did it make you angry? 
Cheryl explained her strategy to us when we watched the tape together: “What I am trying 
to do there is to get them to use words instead of their hands to express their feelings. With 
kids this age, as soon as they get angry or frustrated their first reaction is to hit someone. I 
try to get them to realize what they are feeling and to express it verbally.”215 
Children hitting other children is inherently harmful and hence has no place in school 
in American schools. What could be more obvious than that it’s really bad for children 
to be hitting other children? What better alternative strategy to deal with conflicts than 
words? And what more effective mechanism than the full involvement and intervention 
of the teacher at the slightest hint of a fight? Here are some Japanese reactions to 
Cheryl’s interventions: 
Yagi: Wow, that’s amazing! Talking directly with such young children about their feelings. 
Taniguchi: The Teacher really gets right in there and deals with the problem. 
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Tanaka: Talking with children about disagreements like that . . . it seems a bit heavy, doesn’t 
it? It reminds me of marriage counseling.216  
What is absolutely ideal in an American classroom appears to be a ‘bit heavy’ and 
reminiscent of ‘marriage counseling” to Japanese teachers! Tobin et al. report that most 
Japanese teachers and administrators they talked with reported that fighting is natural 
and “has a place in the informal preschool curriculum” [emphasis added]: 
Our informants were careful to explain to us that fighting, especially among boys, is 
inevitable and even (within bounds) desirable, as it represents a display of age-appropriate 
behavior that is part of the human condition and thus part of the developmental curriculum 
of the childlike child.217 
 When Tobin and his colleagues asked Fukui-sensei why she had not made more of an 
attempt to break up Hiroki’s fights she responded: 
Of course there are times I do intervene, depending in part on whom Hiroki is fighting and 
under what circumstances, but in general I let them fight because it is natural for boys of 
that age to fight and its good for them to have the experience while they are young of what 
it feels like to be in a fight.218 
And here is Yoshizawa’s, the administrator’s, point of view:  
If there were no fights among four-year-old children, that would be a real problem. We 
don’t encourage children to fight, but children need to fight when they are young if they are 
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to develop into complete human beings . . . When children are preschool age they naturally 
fight if given the chance, and it is by fighting and experiencing what it feels like to hit 
someone and hurt them and to be hit and be hurt that they learn to control this urge to fight, 
that they learn the dangers of fighting and get it out of their system.219 
In complete contrast to the American teachers, according to Fukui-sensei and 
Yoshizawa, it’s good for children to fight and have the experience while they are young 
of what it feels like to be in a fight. Does it not make eminent sense then that kids 
should be allowed to fight in schools when they are young?  
 But what about the harm to others? Tobin et al. : “We asked Fukui, Higashino, 
and Yoshizawa, Komatsudani’s director, if it was not a problem for the other children 
that Hiroki causes so much chaos in the classroom and uses up a disproportion amount 
of staff time and energy”:  
Yoshizawa: No, I’d say it’s just the opposite. The children in that class are lucky to have 
Hiroki there. [Laughing] He makes things interesting. 
Higashimi: Its hard on Fukui-sensei, but I wouldn’t say it’s hard on the other children. By 
having to learn how to deal with a child like Hiroki, they learn to be more complete human 
beings.220  
By learning to deal with conflicts, including fighting, ‘children learn to be more 
complete human beings’! Moreover, it is precisely by fighting that they learn the 
dangers of fighting and ‘get it out of their system.’ Notice here an entirely different 
metaphor of the cure: something is pent up and needs to be released—keeping it pent-
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up (i.e. learning to controlling it) will only make it worse. Just the opposite to the 
American metaphor cited earlier—nip it in the bud before it gets too late. 
 Far from harmful, fighting (within bounds) is desirable, age-appropriate, part of 
the human condition, natural, good for kids to have the experience, helps kids develop 
into complete human beings, gives kids opportunities to know what it feels like to hit 
and be hurt and helps them get it out of their system. We have here nothing less than an 
elaborate theory of the virtues of fighting. Moreover, it is seamlessly connected to other 
theories, ‘better to learn by experience’ and ‘better to learn from others rather than 
being told by the teacher.’ These principles dictate other practices in preschool: lots of 
time to interact with children and minimal teacher intervention. 
 As we can see, numerous and plentiful reasons are given in support the harmful 
effects of fighting or the virtues of fighting. Is it the case that effects of fighting have 
been studied, investigated, evaluated and then determined to be harmful or beneficial? 
What seems more likely is that these notions, through a process of enculturation, are 
projected onto situations. The situations are being read in terms of them. This raises the 
fundamental question whether participants are really reasoning in these kind of cases. If 
we simply take arguments as our focus of reasoning the essential problem remains 
invisible. From the perspective of the broader idea of reason, we can see that the 
problem lies not in skills in giving arguments, rather the problem lies in the reasoner. 
Without taking the reasoner and the question of the true engagement of his reason into 
account we would not be able to detect the real problems in reasoning in these cases. 
Perhaps Hiroki is intellectually gifted 
 Dana Davidson, one of the co-authors of Preschool in Three Cultures hypothesized 
that perhaps Hiroki’s misbehavior might be related to him being ‘intellectually gifted 
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and easily bored.’ Hence, she suggested to Fukui-sensei and Higashino-sensei that 
“Hiroki might be quicker and smarter than the other children and that this ‘giftedness’ 
(which proved to be very difficult concept for us to express in Japanese) might provide 
at least a partial explanation for Hiroki’s behavior in the classroom.” To this suggestion, 
Tobin and colleagues point out, Fukui and Higashino “looked a bit confused and even 
taken aback by this suggestion.” Here is the exchange: 
Higashino: Hiroki’s intelligence is about average, about the same as most other children, I 
would say. 
Davidson: But he finishes his work so quickly. And he looks like he knows the words to so 
many songs. He just seems bright, gifted. 
Higashino: What do you mean by “gifted”? 
Davidson: Well, by “gifted” in the United States we mean someone who is exceptionally 
talented in some area, like intelligence. Like Hiroki who seems so smart, so quick. He has 
such a bright look in his eyes. We would say that a boy like this has a lot of energy and is so 
bright that he is quickly bored by school. To me, it seems that his incidents of misbehavior 
occur when he has finished his work before the other children. He provokes his teacher and 
other children in an attempt to make things more exciting, better matched to the pace and 
level of stimulation he needs.  
Higashino: It seems to me that Hiroki doesn’t necessarily finish his work because he is 
smarter than the other children. Speed isn’t the same as intelligence. And his entertaining 
the other children by singing all those songs is a reflection not so much of intelligence as it is 
of his great need for attention.221 
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These different perspectives, Tobin et al. comment, “suggest important cultural 
differences between Americans and Japanese, not only in definitions of and attitudes 
toward intelligence, but also in views of character, behavior, and inborn dispositions 
and abilities.” Perhaps ‘Higashimo’s insistence that Hiroki is only of average 
intelligence might lie in the great value Japanese teachers and contemporary Japanese 
society place on equality and on the notion that children’s success and failure and their 
potential to become successful versus failed adults has more to do with effort and 
character and thus with what can be learned and taught in school than with raw inborn 
ability.”222 
 This value, of course, fits in neatly with the goals of education: “Japanese society 
in general and teachers in particular view the role of education and perhaps especially 
of primary and preschool education as to even out rather than sort out or further 
accentuate these ability differences.” Hence, to Japanese eyes, the mention of gifted 
brings to mind those left behind: “Thus one Japanese preschool teacher responded to 
our description of programs for gifted children in American preschools by saying, ‘How 
sad that by age of three or four a child might already be labeled as having less chance 
for success than some of this classmates.’’’223 
 Being a member of the group trumps individual achievement. Teachers 
encourage “children to see themselves as like others in fundamental ways. This includes 
an effort by teachers to speed up and encourage slower learners and at times to slow 
down more talented members of the class. Teachers do not view as a disservice this 
                                                
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid., 25. 
  169 
holding back and slowing down of the more capable students because they believe that 
students benefit in the long run by developing an increased sensitivity to the needs of 
seemingly homogeneous group.”224 Once again, to American ears, this will sound 
discordant with values of individuality and individual achievement in the foreground. 
 But is Hiroki intelligent? According to Tobin and colleagues and citing the work 
of LeVine and White (1986) the Japanese rarely view “intelligence” as a neutral, value-
free trait. Instead, Japanese view intelligence “as closely linked to moral action and 
associate the terms oriko (smart) and atama ga ii (intelligent), when applied to young 
children, with traits such as kashikoi (obedient, well behaved), eria (praiseworthy), ki ga 
tsuku (sensitive to others) and wakareru (understanding).”  
In America, however: “Intelligence or smartness in a child is just as likely to be 
associated with asocial (naughty) as with desirable behaviors, as can be seen in such 
expressions as “smart-alec,” “too smart for his own good,” and “don’t get smart with 
me, young man.” But in Japan misbehavior is more likely to be associated with being 
not smart enough (lacking understanding) . . .These linguistic and cultural factors make it 
difficult for Hiroki’s teachers to think of him as especially intelligent. Their reasoning 
would go, “If he is so smart, why doesn’t he understand better? If he understood better, 
he would behave better.”225 
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Culture and reasoning 
 These cultural differences surrounding the question of Hiroki’s intelligence 
highlights yet another way in which culture impacts reasoning. Karl Popper noted how 
observations are theory laden. I want to suggest here that cultural lenses act as 
theories—and hence that observations are, in some sense, culture-laden. But theory 
ladeness and hence culture ladeness can be interpreted in two different ways—the 
second, more pernicious and more subtle than the first. On the first interpretation, 
theory/cultural lens highlight certain observations which would go unnoticed were it 
not for the theory/cultural lens and hence makes them available for reasoning. This is 
theory ladeness in terms of theory acting as a flashlight—it brings to light certain 
observations. In this sense, cultural notions bring to light certain observations in the 
absence of which the observations would not have been noticed. On the second 
interpretation, theory/cultural notions are read into the observations. This would be 
theory/culture ladeness where the flashlight, instead of having a clear lens has a 
colored lens and thereby it not only highlights certain observations but colors them as 
well in accordance with the hue of the lens in the flashlight. 
 In making a case whether Hiroki is intelligent or not, numerous observations are 
cited in support of the hypothesis by Dana Davidson and by Higashino. But notice the 
very different kinds of observations highlighted from the American and Japanese 
perspectives in order to make the case yea or nay: American: ‘he knows the words to 
many songs,’ ‘misbehavior occurs when he finishes his work,’ ‘he has a lot of energy’ 
etc. Japanese: ‘his intelligence is average,’ ‘he does not have a mother,’ ‘he has not 
received the right kind of attention.’ Given the theory/cultural lens of ‘acting out 
because he is intelligent and hence bored’ observations pertaining to intelligence and 
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boredom (‘he knows the words to many songs,’ ‘misbehavior occurs when he finishes 
his work’) become salient in the visual field. Here, theory/cultural lens highlights 
certain observations. These observations can then be used as evidence in one’s 
reasoning. 
 But theory can impact observations in a different way—they can color the 
observations made (rather than merely highlight them). Consider the following 
‘evidence’ cited by Dana Davidson and invoked to make the case that Hiroki is 
intelligent: ‘He provokes his teacher and other children in an attempt to make things 
more exciting, better matched to the pace and level of stimulation he needs’ and ‘He has 
a bright look in this eyes.’ Are these pure observations, descriptions of actual behavior? 
Do we really see Hiroki provoking in order to make things more exciting, better matched 
to what he needs? What we actually see is that he is poking and hitting. But we don’t 
see him ‘provoking’ and we don’t see him doing this ‘in order to make things more 
exciting better matched to the pace and level of stimulation he needs.’ The latter, it 
seems, are simply projections of the theory / cultural lens that is being argued for. Do 
we really see Hiroki having a ‘bright look in his eyes’? Clearly not. But given the theory 
/ cultural lens that he is acting out because he is bright, his eyes appear bright. To put it 
in different words, these supposed observations and evidence presented in support of 
the theory are projections of the very theory /cultural notion that is being supported; 
the theory is read into the supposed observations. The Japanese case does not fare any 
better. Consider the observation: “He has not received enough of the right kind of 
attention.” Is this an observation? It looks more like the theory itself namely that he has 
a dependency disorder. The flashlight of culture is coloring what is observed. Prior 
cultural notions are already coloring the very evidence that is brought in support of the 
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cultural notions. This fact severely limits the scope of genuine reasonings and objective 
inquiries into the matter in question as the evidence itself is tainted. 
 The power of fundamental theories, or lenses, is that though they color they 
themselves are not seen. American educators do not represent to themselves that 
‘fighting is harmful in the classroom, conflicts are bad.’ If at all brought to 
consciousness, say, from a different vantage point, the cultural notions appear to be 
obviously true. Similarly, ‘students should learn to be independent,’ ‘teachers should 
promote self-esteem,‘ ‘students should get individual teacher attention,’ and ‘teachers 
should promote individuality.’ If at all brought to consciousness they not seem as mere 
assumptions, even against a comparative background. They are seen to be completely 
and self-evidently true. Any justification of say, the value of independence, will rely on 
this value. Justifications will only invoke synonyms ‘it’s better to be one’s own man,’ 
‘it’s better than loosing oneself in the group,’ ‘better to be autonomous.’ But these are all 
simply re-descriptions of the value of independence. We seem to be caught in a vicious 
circle. And this, because these values are not simply values that we happen to have—
rather they have become our standards of judgment. It is through them that we judge 
other things. Hence, the Goldilocks effect (my culture is just right), the persistence of 
cultural notions and their effect in blurring reality. 
 From the perspective of rationality and reasoning, seeing these as self-evident or 
emphasizing them over others forecloses other possibilities of other goods and other 
evils and hence forecloses enquiry into these other possibilities. Perhaps some fighting 
may be good in that we become more graphically and deeply aware of pain from 
physical aggression when we are young, perhaps some dependency is good as we 
might form closer bonds with others, perhaps too much independence is not good as it 
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may weaken community feeling, and perhaps too much teacher attention may not be 
good as children may not learn to solve their own problems. Lenses, drastically limit 
possibilities and investigation of alternatives; they limit reasoning. This is reminiscent 
of Bacon’s men of dogma, the so-called ‘reasoners”: “the reasoners resemble spiders, 
who make cobwebs out of their own substance.” But these cobwebs are not perceptible 
from a conception of reason that emphasizes merely reasons, principles, justifications 
and arguments. These are made visible when we take into account elements in the 
broader idea of reason, namely, when we include in our conception such things as the 
reasoner, reason, reality, content, problems of reason, uses of reason and their 
relationships.  
  174 
Chapter 4 
 
The Cultivation of the Intellect in Education: 
Goals and a Research Program 
 
 In this concluding chapter, having demonstrated the problem of lenses in 
reasoning in previous chapters, I briefly review historical goals and educational 
programs for the cultivation of reason. Then, through select examples, I indicate a more 
promising approach and present an overarching goal for the cultivation of reason in 
education stemming from the broad idea of reason discussed in previous chapters. I end 
with a call for a specific research program for the cultivation of reason in education to 
realize the goal. 
 In the last Chapter, I demonstrated the problem of lenses in reasoning, 
specifically the problematic role of cultural lenses in the reasoning process. I showed 
how cultural lenses (such as effort vs. ability; lots of free play with other children vs. 
structured time; minimal teacher intervention vs. individual teacher attention; empathy 
vs. independence, etc.) may distort and color apprehension of reality. Furthermore, I 
showed how cultural lenses may cut-short the reasoning process. Instead of conducting 
a genuine inquiry into a particular subject matter (e.g. ‘What is the actual cause of 
Hiroki’s behavioral problems?’), cultural lenses quickly insert themselves as ‘solutions’ 
dictating the results. Under the grip of lenses, the individual in question (whether a 
teacher, a student, a parent, an administrator, a philosopher of education) is not really 
reasoning since the result of his enquiry is being pre-determined by his lenses. He is not 
using his reason though he is giving plenty of reasons. Finally, I showed how the 
problem of lenses can be understood and appreciated from a broader view of reason, 
one that takes into consideration the reasoner, reason, reality, problems of reason, uses 
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of reason, content of reasoning and their relationships with each other. A narrow view 
of reason on the other hand, namely one limited to evaluation of argument, does not 
bring the problem of lenses to light. If our recognition of the problem of lenses is correct 
and if our diagnoses of this problem is accurate (not reasoning, not using one’s reason) 
what might be the way forward?  
Education of the intellect 
 As noted in Chapter 1, philosophers, philosophers of education and curricular 
frameworks have, over the ages, looked to education as a solution. Plato noted how the 
‘instrument worth ten thousand eyes’ is rekindled through education when it has been 
blinded by other ways of life. 226 Locke noted that ‘great care should be taken of the 
understanding, to conduct it right, in the search of knowledge, and in the judgments it 
makes.’227 The Committee of Ten understood education as sure means for genuine 
‘mental training.’228 Dewey argued for an education that engenders ‘reflective 
thinking.’229 Hutchins insisted that if education is rightly understood it will be 
understood as the cultivation of the intellect.230 In more recent times, Scheffler noted 
how ‘rationality is a fundamental cognitive and moral virtue’ and that it should form an 
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objective of teaching.231 Lipman forthrightly noted that ‘the most important thing we 
can do for children is teach them to think well.’232 Richard Paul noted that education 
‘implies a self-motivated action one’s own thinking.’233 
 But while thinkers have looked to education, it is a real question whether their 
suggested educational programs are efficacious for the full cultivation of the intellect. 
Plato’s educational recommendations, though he emphasized that an education 
concerning reason is not one of ‘putting sight into the blind’ but one of ‘turning the 
soul,’ have come to be interpreted, over the years, as an initiation into the disciplines; 
mathematics, physics, history, literature, and the like. The history of liberal education as 
‘freeing the mind’ is often traced back to the ancient Greeks, but with the original 
intention of freeing reason from its entrapments completely buried with the gradual 
emphasis on (content) knowledge for its own sake. Locke, though acknowledging the 
‘instrument of reason’ and its sometimes lack of engagement, in the end, emphasized a 
proper upbringing to curtain the pull of the passions and a rigorous training in algebra 
so that students will become accustomed to follow ‘chains’ of reasoning. Mathematics 
became his model of ideal reasoning. 234 The Committee of Ten primarily emphasized 
disciplinary knowledge as a vehicle for mental training.235 Dewey emphasized a search 
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for grounds for belief recommended a scientific attitude of mind.236 Edward Maynard 
Hutchins, though emphasizing education as a means for fulfilling the function of man 
qua man as one of exercising reason (along Aristotelian lines), ultimately suggested a 
study of the classics; Euclid’s Principals, Newton’s Principia, Milton, Shakespeare, and 
the like.237 
 Contemporary educational programs in the area of the cultivation of the intellect, 
namely critical thinking, fairminded critical thinking, and initiation into the disciplines, 
despite surface differences are focused on argument identification and evaluation, 
evaluation of elements of thought and giving, and seeking reasons based on principles. 
But argument identification and evaluation are only an aspect of reasoning and hence 
insufficient for the full cultivation of the intellect. As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the 
best ‘critical thinkers,’ those well versed in argument identification and evaluation, 
when it comes to issues related to culture, may have great difficulty in effectively 
reasoning and investigating matters afresh. Locked into a particular way of seeing, a 
way of seeing which appears obvious, they are likely to take this view for granted and 
contrary views as errant. In one culture it is primarily about ‘effort,’ in another, ‘ability’ 
is emphasized much more. Hiroki’s behavior, in one culture, is diagnosed as resulting 
from being spoiled (‘being drowned in love’) and in another as resulting from not 
having enough of the right kind of love. Small class sizes appear obviously better in one 
culture (more individual teacher attention) and appear obviously harmful (lonely, 
unpopulated, minimal chance of interacting with others) in another. Reasoning seems to 
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take place within the confines of these ‘lenses’ rather than on the lenses themselves. Yet, 
plenty of reasons and arguments are given in support of worldviews in accordance with 
the lenses and plenty of reasons and arguments are given against other world views 
contrary to these lenses. Cultural actors, even the best of critical thinkers, are likely to 
reason only within their own cultural worldviews. Putting aside cultural lenses is no 
easy task. 
 Given the limitation of historical and contemporary philosophies of education 
with respect to the full cultivation of the intellect, I am inspired by Morteza’s suggestion 
that the fundamental curricular question in the area of reason and education is “How 
do we help students remove their (colored) lenses such that they can truly begin to 
reason?”238 Keeping the broader idea of reason in mind, I interpret this to mean an 
education that will enable students to become aware of thier lenses, put them aside, and 
reason afresh instead of relying on pre-given and for the most part, unexamined notions 
which hijack ones reasoning. How do we educate the intellect in this sense?  
An alternate direction for the cultivation of the intellect 
 In the present paper, no claims are being made for an educational solution. 
Rather, what is being suggested is a direction and a focused, empirically based research 
program, with the above focused question as setting the parameters of research and 
with a broader view of reason in the foreground. Let me illustrate the direction of an 
educational program through some examples. 
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 Consider an experiment devised in the field of visual cognition by Christopher 
Chabris and Daniel Simons. Students watch a short clip of two teams of three people 
each (one team wearing white shirts, the other black shirts) in a circle bounce-passing a 
basketball to each other and are asked to count the number of passes made by the white 
team. At some point during this clip, an individual dressed in a gorilla suit walks right 
in the midst of these of players and thumps his/her chest for a couple of seconds than 
leaves. Repeated studies of participants viewing this clip have shown that about half of 
the participants fail to see the gorilla at first viewing. When the clip is replayed, without 
having to focus on the number of passes, viewers are astounded as to how they missed 
the gorilla ‘right in front of them.’ For Chabris and Simons, this experiment 
demonstrates “we are missing a lot of what goes on around us, and that we have no 
idea that we are missing so much.”239 Daniel Kahneman, in his Thinking Fast, Thinking 
Slow, in commenting on this experiment puts it well: “[W] can be blind to the obvious 
and we are also blind to our blindness.”240 From the perspective of the present work, 
this experiment can be seen as exemplifying to students, in a simple and experiential 
way, how lenses can block reasoning. Because of the involuntary injection of the lens of 
‘what is to be ordinarily expected,’ inquiry and investigation of what is actually in front 
of us is cut-short leading to a distorted view of the matter. Furthermore, we are 
oblivious to the distorted view.  
                                                
239 The experiment is described and available on-line at the following address: 
http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/gorilla_experiment.html. See also Christopher Chabris and Daniel 
Simons, The Invisible Gorilla (New York: Crown, 2010). 
240 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Penguin, 2012), 24. 
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 Consider another experiment along these lines. One group of participants is 
given the following passage:  
Carol Harris was a problem child from birth. She was wild, stubborn, and violent. By the 
time Carol turned eight, she was still unmanageable. Her parents were very concerned 
about her mental health. There were no good institutions for her problem in her state. Her 
parents finally decided to take some action. They hired a private teacher for Carol. 
Another group of participants is given the same passage with “Helen Keller” 
substituted for “Carol Harris.” Studies have shown that when participants are asked a 
week later whether the sentence “She was deaf, dumb, and blind” was in the passage, 
fifty percent of students who read the passage as about Helen Keller mistakenly 
thought they had seen the phrase in the passage but only five percent who read the 
passage as about Carol Harris made that error. 241 This experiment also vividly shows 
the impact of lenses. Those who read the passage with the ‘Helen Keller’ lens 
inadvertently projected onto their memories their prior knowledge of Helen Keller 
inhibiting a true survey of their memories. 
 Consider a third example. A piano teacher notices that his student continues to 
look at this hand rather than only the music sheet while playing the piano despite 
knowing that he ought not to. The teacher helps the student by covering the student’s 
hands with a piece of cloth.242 In this example, the student looking at his fingers to 
determine which keys to depress can be interpreted to mean that he is using the lenses 
                                                
241 Experiment by R.A Sulin and D.J. Dooling cited in Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 209.  
242 I am indebted to Mansour Morteza for this example and its implication for the present work. 
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of his senses rather than using his head. And by covering his hands, the student no 
longer has access to the vehicle of the senses and is forced to use the power of his mind. 
In this case, the teacher blocks the use of one type of lens (the lens of the senses) and 
enables the student to use the resources of his mind. 
 These experiments and practical means may look simple. But they illustrate 
important points in light of the present work. Behind these deceptively simple examples 
is a broader idea of reason (reasoner, reason, content, reality, problems of reason) and 
broader notions of the use of reason. All three examples illustrate the force of lenses in 
one’s thinking. The first two (gorilla and Helen Keller) show how problems in the 
reasoner, in this case, the problem of viewing reality through colored lenses can distort 
apprehension of reality. All three examples show how lenses hijack reason cutting short 
inquiry and investigation. The last example (looking at one’s fingers while playing the 
piano) shows how assistance from an educator can help block a particular lens so that 
the student can begin to use his intellect. The first two (gorilla and Helen Keller 
examples) force the question ‘What do I actually see without my lenses?’ and the third 
‘How do I move my fingers (without going through the lenses of the senses)?’ In all of 
them, there is a display and an indication of the virtue of an engagement of an 
instrument which otherwise is not engaged but held captive by the lens.  
 What is being argued for here, through these practical examples, is not an 
education through these specific means but the principles behind them; to enable 
students to block their lenses so that their own reason gets engaged and the actual process of 
inquiry can begin. It is an education, through tangible and practical means, to enable the 
individual to reason by helping students release the grip of lenses on their minds.  
  182 
 An education along these lines is premised on several factors. First, it is clear 
from the many examples in the previous chapters and the simple examples presented 
here, that problems of reason are not limited to argument identification and assessment. 
The individual who has been told by the experimenter that she is very good at 
distinguishing genuine from false suicide notes is giving reasons as to why she thinks 
she is competent at distinguishing suicide notes. She is competent at giving reasons and 
her reasons, based on the reasons themselves, are entirely reasonable. Yet, we know that 
her entire reason giving exercise is tainted and infected by the authoritative comments 
made earlier by the experimenter. In a very real sense, her reasonings are not her own 
but in the service of the experimenter’s remarks regarding her competency. And yet, 
her arguments, in and of themselves, may be very reasonable. Indeed, the more 
competent she is at giving arguments, the more reasonable will be her arguments. Yet, 
all the while, she is not truly reasoning. The authoritative comments of the 
experimenter are exercising a grip on her as she gives reasons, almost as if the 
experimenter has cast a spell on her and she is under the spell when she gives reasons. 
The real problem is not in her skills at presenting arguments or the quality of her 
arguments but in the authoritative effect on her psyche of the experimenter’s earlier 
comments.  
 Second, these examples of failures in reasoning and of overcoming lenses in 
reasoning also manifest a different use of reason than one of merely evaluating 
arguments. When an individual, say, through distancing, attempts to remove his 
current ‘doom and gloom’ lenses, he is exercising his reason. He is attempting to put 
aside his current lenses and inquire into what is truly the case. But this use of reason is 
not one of giving arguments at all or giving reasons. It is one of i) recognizing a current 
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barrier ii) removing that barrier and iii) and then truly investigating. When an 
individual tries to undo the “what is to be expected lens” he is exercising his reason. 
Conversely, when he doesn’t, he fails to reason afresh. An education along these lines 
leaves open the question, what are all the uses of reason? What does reason do, besides 
giving and evaluating reasons? As argued in the preceding chapters, when Socrates 
raises a series of profound questions, he is ushering an entirely new framework of 
thinking. And this, through a use of his reason, a use which is not one of justification 
and testing propositions. His genius does not lie in giving and assessing reasons. His 
genius lies in giving birth to new areas of investigation in philosophy, areas which were 
not even imagined by the pre-Socratics. And, he does this, of course, through his use of 
reason. In Chapter 2, we noted the immense difference between evaluation and 
construction and where skills of evaluation are not the same as skills of construction. 
The quality controller makes use of very different skills than does the engineer and no 
amount of quality controlling will make one an engineer. The engineer evaluates but he 
does a lot more than evaluate. By starting with an understanding of the broader idea of 
reason this education leaves open the question whether reason is like a hammer with 
only one use or more like a Swiss army knife which can perform numerous functions. 
Imagine the vast difference between what a Swiss knife can do and what a hammer can 
do. Some Swiss knives have a hammer. So a Swiss knife can do everything a hammer 
can and so much, much more. An education along these lines leaves open the real 
possibility that students will come to see their own reason as a Swiss knife rather than 
simply as a hammer. Consider the phenomenal difference in achievement in human 
civilization in educating a person merely in evaluation, as opposed to educating a 
person in all the uses of reason?  
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 Third, these examples, and all others mentioned in the present work bring to 
light other essential elements in an adequate conception of reason. For example, a 
problem in the reasoner, stops one from using his reason which stops him from seeing 
reality as it is.  
Stemming from the broad idea of reason, and illustrated in the examples above, is an 
attendant philosophy of education with respect to the intellect that I find very 
promising. In his manuscript Morteza argues:  
Goals of education should include an adequate understanding, internalizing, application, 
and practice, of the idea of reason, consisting of reason in itself, the use of reason, the 
problems of reason, contents, reality, the reasoner and their relationships.243 
The goal here includes understanding and internalizing not just an aspect of reason but 
a much more comprehensive notion of reason. To realize this goal in education will 
require intensive research in several pertinent areas. Below I outline a focused research 
agenda in philosophy and philosophy of education for the cultivation of reason in 
education.  
A research program for the cultivation of the intellect 
 First, it will require a thorough philosophical study of reason in its own right. As 
noted in Chapter 1, tremendous disagreement obtains on the very conception of reason 
in the history of philosophy. In some passages, it is clear that Plato conceives of reason 
as an instrument but where it can become subservient to appetite. Hence, it needs to be 
pointed in another, more noble direction. Bacon, though acknowledging reason as a 
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faculty, speaks of the intellect more in terms of the human ‘understanding’ and 
conceives of it more as an entity that reflects than an entity that acts. [Perhaps there is a 
conflict within Bacon himself.] For Bacon, the solution to the intellect’s shortcomings 
lies in a method, the method of induction. Locke, on the other hand clearly conceives of 
reason as a faculty and even more so, as a natural and noble faculty. Shortcomings arise 
as a result of not using the faculty or in employing faulty standards. Rousseau suggests 
that reason as a faculty is the last one to develop and the most difficult and hence 
cannot itself be the object of early education. That would be ‘to begin with the end, to 
want to make the product the instrument.’ Dewey downplays the notion of a faculty 
altogether and focuses instead on thought and ‘the grounds of belief’ and the 
evidentiary basis of conclusions. Hutchins, in contradiction to Dewey, conceives of the 
intellect more as a repository and emphasizes disciplinary knowledge. Peters and Hirst 
conceive of the mind as essentially undeveloped until it is initiated into the intellectual 
products of a civilization. Contemporary philosophers of education, Ennis and Paul, 
much like Dewey, are silent on the nature of the intellect or reason. Their exclusive 
focus, as shown in Chapter 2, is on the desirability of evidence, good arguments, 
reasons and principles and reasonable conclusions on the basis of reasons and 
principles—in a word, on justified arguments. As is apparent, conceptions of the 
intellect dictate to a great extent educational remedies and goals for the intellect. Hence, 
it is vital that we engage in an earnest, philosophical investigation into the intellect 
itself. From here, a sound philosophy of education can begin to be constructed with a 
clear focus on what exactly it is that will be educated and why. 
 Second, as indicated in this study, it is somewhat puzzling to have as a goal of 
education the cultivation of reason without a deep understanding of problems besetting 
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reason. Hence, inquiry into pertinent problems of reason is also indispensable. This 
enquiry can start with historical philosophical insights into problems of reason (some of 
which I documented in Chapter 1) but can be extended to include studies from the 
empirical sciences including psychology, cognitive science, educational psychology, 
anthropology and other disciplines. Findings in these areas can be investigated from the 
perspective of impediments, shortcomings and barriers in reasoning. While there is 
already much in these disciplines that is relevant to reason, its relevance has not been 
appreciated and hence learnings have not been mined. Furthermore, when reasoning 
has been studied directly in these disciplines, it has been studied primarily in terms of 
‘inference’ (especially in cognitive science, beginning with Peter Wason’s famous card 
experiment to determine confirmation bias, inspired by Popper) and not in terms of 
reason in the broad sense Beginning with problems noted by philosophers and 
extending this enquiry to include the empirical studies would also have the benefit of 
bridging the gap between philosophers of education and say, psychologists of 
education studying the science of learning. Currently, there is no interaction. 
Philosophers of education, for the most part, theorize independently of empirical 
studies pertaining to learning. In my view, this is an untenable divide between what 
philosophers of education consider their own ‘normative’ tasks and the ‘descriptive’ 
tasks which are considered to be the purview of empirical scientists. Normative goals of 
education, for one, as indicated in the present study, ought to be formulated with an 
understanding of the ‘descriptive’ (and very real) problems of reason. A thorough study 
of problems of reason conducted through multiple disciplines is also vastly overdue 
and should inform any educational endeavor for the cultivation of reason. 
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 Lastly, also as indicated in previous chapters, the pedagogy of contemporary 
programs relies, for the most part, on explaining, telling and urging. It relies on 
readings, book exercises and goading as their methods without having inquired into 
their actual efficacy. But it is vastly insufficient to simply tell or urge students to be 
open-minded, to reason more effectively, to develop intellectual virtues, to overcome 
lenses. The question that needs to be asked, from a psychology of learning perspective, 
is what are some effective ways of helping students become open-minded, to enable 
them to remove barriers in reasoning and to enable them to reason. Far too much has 
been taken for granted in this area. In summary, the education of the intellect ought to 
be based on the specific goal of internalizing and understanding the idea of reason in its 
full sense and on a focused research program into the nature of the intellect, its 
problems and the best pedagogy for overcoming these problems.  
 One potential fruit of this enormous undertaking is nicely described by Thomas 
Nagel. Nagel, in his oft-quoted The View from Nowhere, locates the fundamental problem 
of “objectivity” in the fact that “we are small creatures in a big world of which we have 
only very partial understanding, and that how things seem to us depends both on the 
world and our constitution.” We can never escape the fact that we view the world from 
somewhere and “we can add to our knowledge of the world by accumulating 
information at a given level—by extensive observation from one standpoint.” “But” he 
continues: 
we can raise our understanding to a new level only if we examine that relation between the world 
and ourselves which is responsible for our prior understanding, and form a new conception that 
includes a more detached understanding of ourselves, of the world, and of the interaction between 
them. Thus objectivity allows us to transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an expanded 
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consciousness that takes in the world more fully. All this applies to values and attitudes as well as 
to beliefs and theories. 244 
We might add, all of this also applies to lenses. An education along the lines argued in 
the present chapter is a meta-understanding of reason—an education whose goal is also 
reasoning on reason. It is to introduce to students a philosophy of reason itself, with the 
ultimate goal of reasoning with full awareness rather than blindly falling victim to 
distorting lenses available at every turn. If, as Plato remarked, the instrument in every 
soul is worth more than ten thousand eyes, is it not befitting that an ultimate education 
should aim at an understanding of this most valuable entity in the universe? A research 
program on a philosophical study of the intellect, an empirical study of problems of the 
intellect and an empirical study of effective pedagogies for overcoming these problems 
promises to move us towards more rationalized curricula for the cultivation of the 
intellect in education. Imagine possible lives245 through this kind of an education. 
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Conclusion 
 Aristotle noted that we are rational creatures. But philosophers over the ages 
have also noted that the human intellect is fraught with problems. Plato observed how 
we are like puppets of the gods where cords and strings ‘tug us about’ in contrary 
directions. Bacon most acutely noted how the human understanding ‘is like a false 
mirror’ which distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature 
with it. More perniciously, how the intellect, once it adopts an opinion ‘draws all things 
else to support and agree with it.’ Locke observed a class of men who ‘seldom reason at 
all but do and think according to the example of others’ saving themselves the trouble 
of thinking for themselves. A contemporary philosopher of education notes that though 
it is our nature to think ‘much of our thinking, left to itself, is biased, distorted, partial, 
uninformed, or down-right prejudiced.’  
 Meanwhile, philosophers, and educators over the ages have urged the 
cultivation of reason and rationality in education. This raises the all-important question 
of ‘How?’ How is the cultivation of the intellect to be achieved in education? In the 
present dissertation, I examined three educational programs for the cultivation of the 
intellect: though critical thinking as proposed by Paul Ennis, through fair-minded 
critical thinking as proposed by Richard Paul, and through an initiation into the 
disciplines as proposed by Israel Scheffler. After a detailed examination, and on the 
basis of the broader idea of reason as proposed by Morteza, I noted how underlying all 
three programs is a much too narrow view of reason; one limited and tied to evaluation 
(whether of argument, or elements of thought or reasons and principles). But reason 
and rationality are broader than evaluation. Furthermore, problems of reason and 
rationality are not limited to problems of argument. Hence, I argued, an education in 
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the above programs is insufficient for the full cultivation of reason in education and 
certainly for overcoming problems of reason other than problems in argumentation. 
 One problem of reason I investigated in the present work such is the problem of 
cultural lenses in reasoning. I showed how numerous (colored) “lenses” having their 
origin in culture, may, at times, prevent the full exercise of reason—prevent true 
investigation and inquiry of the matter at hand cutting short the reasoning process. The 
problem of lenses is not limited to the reasoning of students, but impacts reasoning of 
teachers, administrators, and policy makers. Cultural lenses may also determine 
educational philosophies and national educational directions. 
 As a way forward, I intimated a direction for the cultivation of the intellect in 
education; a direction in curricular philosophy that brings awareness of lenses and 
helps students block their lenses such that they are then able to apply their reason to 
matters at hand. This direction is undergirded by a philosophy of education where the 
goal is to understand, internalize and apply the broader idea of reason. In order to 
realize this goal, I suggested a focused research program in three areas. 
  An endemic issue facing the cultivation of the intellect in education is the 
uncertainly with respect to what it is that needs educating—and this is directly tied to the 
plethora of philosophical conceptions of the intellect and reason, some of which are 
contradictory. Within the history of philosophy reason is said to be a faculty, at other 
times there is no mention of a faculty. At times, it is a noble faculty at other times it is 
tainted. In more recent times reason is conceived almost exclusively in terms of 
inference or the practice of giving and seeking reasons. As way through this morass, I 
suggested a focused philosophical inquiry into the intellect itself.  
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 Second, an education for the intellect ideally ought to be premised not only on 
goals for the intellect but known problems of the intellect as well. Though problems of 
the intellect have been noted by philosophers in history, contemporary philosophy of 
education, with very few exceptions, is silent on the matter preferring instead to focus 
on arguments and pitfalls in argumentation. This is a serious lacuna in contemporary 
research in philosophy of education and one that ought to be overcome if we hope to 
overcome problems in reasoning in general and not just problems in argument 
identification and evaluation. Hence, I suggested a multidisciplinary inquiry into 
problems of reason and rationality.  
 Finally, as noted in the dissertation, instruction geared towards the cultivation of 
the intellect has relied almost exclusively on texts, analyses of passages, and on telling 
and urging. But it is a real question whether these methods are at all efficacious. For too 
long traditional methods have simply been taken for granted. Hence, I recommended 
an empirical study into effective methods for the full cultivation of reason in education. 
Through this research program, undergirded by the broader idea of reason, I believe, 
we can move towards a much more rationalized philosophy of education with respect 
to the fuller cultivation of reason in education. 
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